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Essays on the Teachers’ Labor Market 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The four chapters are organized in chronological order as my research interests have 
developed.  
 
Chapter 1 begins with the motivation of my study in teachers’ labor market. I employ a 
monopolistic screening model to show that there exist multiple equilibria in the educational 
system; a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium. The model predicts that the 
pooling equilibrium is optimal only when the average quality of teacher applicants is high. 
Using data from the OECD, I examine the relation between teachers’ earnings and teacher 
quality of the U.S. and Korea. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on teachers and their career dynamics, and the data is at teacher level. 
Using the Current Population Survey for 2001-2010, I show that public school teachers are 
paid less compared to other comparable college graduates in non-teaching sectors. By 
studying the change in earnings after career changes, I find the evidence of positive selection 
when teachers move into the non-teaching sectors and of negative selection when non-
Dissertation Advisor: Richard Freeman  Eunice Sookyung Han 
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teachers move into the teaching sector, which results in the decrease in the average teacher 
quality. 
 
Chapter 3 looks at both teachers and school districts, and I use district-teacher matched 
dataset, based on the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) for 2007-2008. I employ a 
multilevel model and a propensity score matching to identify union effects in states with 
different legal environments for collective bargaining of teachers. I find that collective 
bargaining is neither necessary nor sufficient for unions to affect teachers’ well-being. I show 
that meet-and-confer is a popular alternative to collective bargaining and that it is an 
important mechanism for unions to influence teachers’ non-wage benefits. 
 
Chapter 4 concerns school districts, and I use SASS district level data. I reevaluate the role of 
teachers unions on pay structure and districts’ financial status. In contrasts to previous 
findings, I find that the variance of teachers’ earnings is higher in more unionized settings. 
Moreover, I show that the financial status of districts with teachers unions is stronger than that 
of districts without the unions. I confirm that unionism is associated with less usage of 
performance pay system. 
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Chapter 1: Multiple Equilibria in the Educational System: Case Studies on the U.S. and 
South Korea  
 
This study employs a monopolistic screening model to show that there exist multiple 
equilibria in the educational system; a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium. The 
model predicts that the optimal choice for school districts is the pooling equilibrium when the 
average quality of teacher applicants in the queue is high but the separating equilibrium when 
the average quality of applicants is low. In the pooling equilibrium, both low and high quality 
teachers are hired and all teachers receive high compensation. In the separating equilibrium, 
only the low quality teachers are hired at low level of compensation. Using data from the 
OECD, I compare the educational systems of the U.S. and South Korea and examine the 
relation between teachers’ earnings and teacher quality. I show that the average quality of 
teacher applicants in Korea is high, and Korean educational system has achieved a pooling 
equilibrium. On the other hand, the average quality of teacher applicants in the U.S. is low, 
and the US educational system is currently operating at a separating equilibrium. Thus, it will 
be necessary to raise teacher compensation significantly to improve teacher quality in the U.S. 
 
Key Words: monopolistic screening model, teacher quality, teacher salary, excess supply  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
 There is great variation in teacher salaries across countries; some countries pay their 
teachers considerably more than other countries do. Many believe that teacher salaries are 
positively associated with teacher quality, which leads to significant cross-country variation in 
educational outcomes. South Korea is considered as one of the examples that show a positive 
correlation between teacher salaries and teacher quality. According to Education at a Glance 
by OECD, teachers in South Korea earn high salaries by international standards, and students 
from South Korea perform at the very top on major international tests. Many educators and 
policy makers believe the high quality of Korean teachers as the key to this successful 
educational outcome.   
 However, empirical studies on the relation between teacher quality and teacher 
salaries show mixed findings. Some studies found the significantly positive and strong 
relationship between teacher salaries and teacher quality, measured by students’ academic 
performance (Murnane, 1991; Ballow and Podgursky, 1997; Flyer and Rosen, 1997; Figlio 
and Lucas, 2000; Temin, 2002; Goldin, 2006; and Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). 
Others found either insignificant or weak relationship between teacher quality and teacher 
salaries (Hanushek, 1986; Betts, 1995; and Grogger, 1996).  
 One reason for the inconsistent results may be because the relationship between the 
two is not linear. For instance, the increase in teacher salaries may not raise the average 
teacher quality if teacher salaries are set too low or too high. If this is the case, a regression 
analysis will not be able to capture the true relationship. The standard OLS models will also 
produce spurious estimates if the variance of teacher quality distribution or teacher salary 
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distribution is too small. If I regress teacher quality, proxied by students’ test score of the 
teacher, on teacher earnings, measured by annual base salary which has little variability across 
entities, the coefficient on teacher salary will be imprecisely estimated.  
In this study, I use a monopolistic screening model from mechanism design literature 
to show that an educational system may be in one of the two types of equilibria; a pooling 
equilibrium and a separating equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium, both low and high quality 
teachers are hired and all teachers receive high compensation. In a separating equilibrium, low 
quality teachers and high quality teachers receive different levels of compensations that are 
proportional to their quality type. The model predicts that the pooling equilibrium is optimal 
for school districts when the average quality of teacher applicants in the queue is high 
whereas the separating equilibrium is optimal when the average quality of teacher applicants 
is low. In the latter case, it is likely that only the low quality teachers are hired and they 
receive low salaries under certain conditions. As a simple application of the model, I compare 
the educational systems of the U.S. and Korea using the data from Education at a Glance by 
OECD. I show that the average quality of teacher applicants is low in the U.S. and the U.S has 
attained the separating equilibrium whereas and average teacher quality of applicants is high 
in Korea and Korea has achieved the pooling equilibrium. 
Further, I discuss how the Korean educational system may be currently operating 
above the optimal pooling equilibrium. The higher salary above the equilibrium results in the 
excess supply of teacher applicants with high quality. There is a very long queue for teaching 
positions, which seems to contribute to social loss. In the U.S., on the other hand, even if there 
also exists a queue for teaching positions, the average quality of current stock of teacher 
applicants is low. Therefore, it is difficult for US school districts to recruit high quality 
 4 
teachers, and a small raise in teacher salary may not bring a significant improvement to 
teacher quality. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In section two, I present the monopolistic 
screening model for multiple equilibria of educational system. Section three applies the model 
to the US and Korean educational systems. Section four discusses problems of excess supply 
of teachers. Section five lays out the policy implications for the US educational system, and 
the final section concludes with a brief summary. 
 
1.2 Model with Two Equilibria 
 
 The model I employ is monopolistic screening model from mechanism design 
literature. This screening model allows me to design the employment contracts where there is 
pre-contractual asymmetric information. In this model, an employer (a principal or school 
district) tries to distinguish among potential employees (teachers) who have different 
unobservable characteristics assumed to be related to quality or productivity. A monopolistic 
screening model fits better than a competitive screening model for my study because public 
educational system works as if a single firm, a public school district, offers employment 
contracts to all teachers that it hires. Since the school district is on the demand side of the 
labor market, the model could be called “monopsonistic” screening model.  
 Suppose that a school principal (or a district principal) is trying to recruit new teachers 
from a pool of teacher applicants who have identical observable qualifications, such as 
college diploma, teaching certificates, and teaching experience. Thus, these ex-ante 
observables provide no information for the principal to determine who will turn out to be 
 5 
better teachers. The applicants know their true types or at least know better than the principal. 
Suppose further that the new teachers automatically get tenure once they are hired.
1
 This is a 
critical assumption as it describes the common situation where the principal has to stay with 
the teachers that he hires after the teachers reveal their true quality, which might be quite 
poor. Moreover, pay for performance is not available, so the principal cannot cut down the 
wage even if the teachers deliver poor teaching performance.  
 There are two types of applicants in the pool; high quality (H) and low quality (L).   
represents the quality/productivity of applicants and can be measured in monetary unit, with 
H > L > 0. The principal does not know the true type of applicants, but he has an ex-ante 
belief that the fraction of applicants of type H is PH = prob (H) and the fraction of applicants 
of type L is PL = prob (L) = 1 – PH  with PH, PL [0,1]. WH (wL) is the expected hourly wage 
that the principal offers to type H (L). The expected hours of work that type H (L) 
applicant is willing to put in at a given wage are denoted as eH  (eL). e is standardized such that 
e=1 for a full-time (for instance, 40 hours a week) and e=0 for not working at all or reject the 
offer, so eH, eL [0, 1].  
 A school produces educational output using a teacher as an input. It can measure 
education quality by using a proxy such as students’ standardized test score or graduation rate. 
Denote  (e) educational quality measured by students’ test scores in monetary units when 
teachers work for e units of hours. The school produces the education with the quality of H 
(L) if it hires teachers of type H (L). High quality teachers always produce higher quality 
education for a given number of teaching hours, so H (e) > L (e) > 0. High quality teachers 
                                                          
1
 This assumption is realistic as few newly-hired teachers (less than 2%) are denied tenure due to poor 
performance once they are hired in the U.S. The detailed information about this is discussed in section 
three. 
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produce high quality education at an increasing rate with respect to e, so ’H (e) > ’L (e) > 0 
for all e. The principal offers teacher applicants a menu of contracts which consist of a pair of 
wage and work hour: (wH, eH) for type H applicants and (wL, eL) for type L applicants. The 
contract that I focus in this study is one time “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. I assume the following 
form of utility function for applicants, which is widely used in the literature: 
 
)1(),,( ttttttt ewewU   ,  t=H or L      (1) 
 
 If a type H applicant rejects the offer, eH = 0, so wH = 0, which implies UH = H. If the 
type H applicant accepts the full time job offer, eH = 1 and UH = wH. If a type L applicant 
rejects the offer, eL = 0 and UL = L. If the type L applicant accepts the full time job offer, eL 
= 1 and UL = wL. For an applicant to accept the contract, he/she must be guaranteed a utility of 
at least, 

U t  a reservation utility for each type. Therefore, the contract must at least offer 
HHU   for type H applicants and LLU   for type L applicants. This assumption implies 
that high quality applicants have better outside opportunities, so they have higher level of 
reservation utility; 0 LH UU . 
 The education quality depends on both the type of the teachers hired and the work 
hours they choose to undertake at a given wage. The gain the principal makes from offering 
the education is H eH – wH  if he hires type H applicants, and L eL – wL  if he hires type L 
applicants. Since the principal cannot distinguish the type with ex-ante observables, he has the 
following expected utility: 
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)()( LLLLHHHHp wePwePU          (2) 
 
 The principal’s problem is to offer a set of contracts that maximize his expected utility 
from offering education with a certain quality, given the applicant’s self-selection among the 
offered contracts. Therefore, the principal optimally chooses the pairs of contracts (wH, eH) 
and (wL, eL) by solving the following problem: 
 
)()(
,,,
LLLLHHHH
ewew
wePwePMax
LLHH
         (3) 
  s. t  (i)  HHHH ew   )1(  
   (ii)  LLLL ew   )1(   
   (iii)  )1()1( LHLHHH ewew    
   (iv)   )1()1( HLHLLL ewew    
 
 Constraints (i) and (ii) are the reservation utility (individual rationality) constraints for 
the type H  applicants and the type L applicants, respectively. Thus, each type of teachers 
should get paid at least their reservation utility level. Constraints (iii) and (iv) are the 
incentive compatibility constraints for the type H applicants and the type L applicants, 
respectively. In constraint (iii), the type H applicants get the utility of  if they 
tell the principal their true type, but they get the utility of  if they claim 
otherwise. Therefore, constraint (iii) ensures that the type H applicants get higher utility when 
they reveal their true type. Constraint (iv) implies that the type L applicants get higher utility 
when they reveal their true type. 

wH H (1eH )

wL H (1eL )
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Lemma 1 Constraint (ii) is redundant, so the set of feasible contracts derived from the 
problem (3) is exactly the same as the set of feasible contracts when the constraint (ii) is 
dropped from the problem.  
 
Proof  When both constraint (iv) and constraint (i) are satisfied, and under the 
assumption of H > L >0, we must have . 
Therefore, constraint (ii) is automatically satisfied.    
 
Lemma 2  and . 
 
Proof  When both constraint (iii) and constraint (iv) are satisfied, we have 
. Since H > L > 0 by the assumption, it must be that 
 and .  
 
 Lemma 2 implies that the type H applicants must have lower probability of accepting 
the offer or they must be willing to work fewer hours than the type L applicants to signal their 
preference for a higher wage. Also, in the optimal contract, the type L applicants cannot 
expect a lower wage than the wage of the type H  applicants. 
 
Lemma 3  Constraint (i) and constraint (iv) are binding (hold with equality).  
 
Proof   Lemma 1 states that constraint (ii) is redundant, so the problem (3) can be 
restated as: 

wL LeL wH LeH wH HeH H L

eL eH

wL wH

L (eH eL ) wH wL H (eH eL)

eL eH

wL wH
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)()(
,,,
LLLLHHHH
ewew
wePwePMax
LLHH
         (4) 
  s.t (i)  
   (iii)  
   (iv)  
 
 If I let 0),,( LH   be the multipliers of constraints (i), (iii), and (iv), respectively, 
the first two Kuhn-Tucker conditions along with the complementary slackness conditions for 
WH and WL , respectively, are: 
 
 (a)  
(b)  
 
 Condition (b) implies that 0L  (if 0L , 0 LHH PP , but this contradicts 
). Thus, constraint (iv) must bind at an optimal solution. If we add condition (a) 
and condition (b), and use , we get 1 . Hence, constraint (i) also binds at an 
optimal solution. 
 
Lemma 4  If the constraint (iv) is binding and , constraint (iii) is redundant. Thus, 
the set of feasible contracts derived from the problem is exactly the same as the set of feasible 
contracts when constraint (iii) is dropped from the problem.  
 

wH H (1eH ) H

wH H (1eH ) wL H (1eL)

wL L (1eL ) wH L(1eH )
0 LHHP 
0 LHLP 
1 LH PP
HL PP 1

eL eH
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Proof  Since constraint (iv) is binding, . Rearranging 
it gives . If , . So, it must be that 
, which is constraint (iii). 
 
 The conditions for the problem are now simplified to two constraints, so the 
Lagrangian simplifies to: 
 
  = [ ] +    
  +      (5) 
  
The first order conditions are: 
 
 (i)’   
 
 (ii)’    
 (iii)’   
 
 (iv)’    
 
From (i)’, we have LP . From (ii)’, 1 HLH PPP . Since constraints (i) 
and constraint (iv) are binding, we have  and . By 

wL L (1eL )  wH L(1eH )

wL wH L (eL eH )

eL eH

wL wH L (eL eH )

wH H (1eH ) wL H (1eL)

L

PH (HeH wH )PL(LeL wL )

[wH H (1eH ) H ]

[wL L (1eL ) wH L(1eH )]

L
wL
 PL   0

L
wH
 PH     0

L
eH
 PH H  H L  0

L
eH
 PLL L  0

wH HeH

wL HeH LeL LeH
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plugging in LP  and 1  along with these conditions derived from the two binding 
constraints, we have: 
  
 =        (6) 
    =  
        =  
       = )()()( LLLLHL
H
L
HHHH eP
P
P
eP  






 
 
 If we denote the element inside the bracket )()( HL
H
L
HH
P
P
Q   , then 
)( LLLLHH ePQePL   . Suppose that , which implies that the value of type L 
applicants worth more to the school than to themselves. This assumption explains the 
situation where the school cannot produce education without teachers and the school is still 
better off producing a low quality education with low quality teachers than producing no 
education at all. By the same argument, I assume . Then, to maximize L, it must be 
the case that . In other words, type L applicants are always willing to accept the full-
time job offer. Depending on the sign of A, we now face two different types of equilibria. 
 
Case I  If Q ≥ 0, ; a pooling Equilibrium  
  
 We have a pooling equilibrium with  and . It is optimal for 
the principal to hire both type H applicants and the type L applicants and to give them both 

L

PH (HeH wH )PL(LeL wL )

PH (HeH HeH )PL (LeL HeH LeL LeH )

PHeH (H H )PLeL (L L)PLeH (L H )

L  L

H   H

eL
* 1

eH
* 1

eL
*  eH
* 1

wL
*  wH
* H
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the high level of wage, H. The unique solution is )1,(),(),(
****
HHHLL ewew  . Rewriting Q ≥ 
0 gives 
LH
LH
HP




 . Under this condition, the educational system will operate at the 
pooling equilibrium. 
 
Case II If Q ≤ 0,
 
; a separating equilibrium 
  
 In this case, we have a separating equilibrium with 
  
and .
 
The only 
teachers the principal get to hire are the type L applicants and they get paid L. The solutions 
are )1,(),( ** LLL ew 
 
and )0,0(),( ** HH ew .  
 
 
 
 Figure 1.1: Optimal Contract 
 Note: When  and , the separating equilibrium is  and 
  while the pooling equilibrium is . 
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 Figure 1.1 depicts these two cases with simple numerical examples. Suppose that the 
type L and the type H applicants have qualities of L =10 and H =30, respectively. The 
separating equilibrium is )1,10(),( ** LL ew  for the type L applicants and )0,0(),(
** HH ew  for 
the type H applicants whereas the pooling equilibrium is )1,30(),(),(
****  HHLL ewew  for both 
quality types.  
 Then, under which circumstance will the principal choose the pooling equilibrium 
over the separating equilibrium? He will optimally select the pooling equilibrium if his utility 
is greater in Case I than in Case II. In other words, the principal will hire both types of 
teachers instead of hiring only the low quality teachers if; 
 
    (7) 
 
 Simplifying this inequality gives us 
LH
LH
HP




 , which is the equivalent condition 
for Q ≥ 0. When the fraction of high quality applicants in the applicants’ pool is above this 
threshold, 
LH
LH




, the principal is better off hiring teachers from both quality types and pay 
them both higher wage of . If the fraction of high quality applicants is below the threshold, 
it is optimal to just hire lower quality applicants and pay them lower wage of .  
 The pooling equilibrium is more beneficial to a society than the separating equilibrium 
in the long run because the society that hires high quality teachers can provide higher quality 
education to children. The society, in return, will be equipped with higher level of human 
capital, and the fraction of higher quality teachers will naturally increase, which generates a 

Upooling  PH (H H )PL (L H ) PL (L L ) Useperating

H

L
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“virtuous cycle” across generations. In the next section, I make the comparison between 
Korean educational system and the US educational system as a simple application of the 
model. 
 
Table 1.1: Students’ Academic Achievement in International Tests 
 
Year South Korea The U. S. 
TIMSS: 8
th
 grader mathematics test: ranking and average score 
1999 2
nd
 / 38 countries, 587 19
th
/ 38 countries, 503 
2003 2
nd
/ 44 countries, 589 15
th
/ 44 countries, 504 
2007 2
nd
/ 48 countries, 597 9
th
/ 48 countries, 508 
PISA: 15-year-old students mathematics literacy: ranking and average score 
2003 2
nd
 / 29 OECD countries, 542 24
th
/ 29 OECD countries, 483 
2006 1
st
/ 34 OECD countries, 547 17
th
/ 34 OECD countries, 547 
2009 1
st
/ 34 OECD countries, 546 16
th
/ 34 OECD countries, 487 
PISA: 15-year-old students reading literacy: ranking and average score 
2003 2
nd
/ 29 OECD countries, 534 19
th
/ 29 OECD countries, 495 
2009 1
st
/ 34 OECD countries, 539 14
th
/ 34 OECD countries, 500 
Source: TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) 1999, 2003, and 2007 and 
PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) 2003, 2006, and 2009. 
 
1.3 The Educational System of South Korea and the U. S. 
 
 Korean students have shown high academic achievements in reading, science, and 
mathematics on international tests whereas US students have performed far below the 
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expectation. Table 1.1 presents the average test scores and rankings of the two countries in the 
popular international tests for the last decade. There are many important factors to consider 
explaining the difference in the students’ performance between the two countries. 
 Table 1.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the educational 
system of each country from the Education at a Glance report by OECD and from “Basic 
Research on Academic Performance International Survey of Six Cities (2006)” by Child 
Research Net. The first panel of Table 1.2 reports educational inputs from teachers, schools, 
and government. In 2009, the public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP is very 
similar for both countries at approximately 7-8%. The private source of education in total 
household education expenditure is 32% in the U.S. and 42% in Korea. When it comes to the 
expenditure per student for primary public education, measured in 2008 $ppp, the U.S. spends 
$10,229, while Korea spends about a half of that, $5,437. Since the private education 
expenditure takes up a larger portion of educational expenditure in Korea, it is not fair to 
compare these numbers directly. However, according to Education at a Glance, the U.S. 
spends the most per pupil among all developed nations
2
. The student-teacher ratio is much 
higher in Korea. The number of students per class in elementary school is 14 in the U.S. and 
24 in Korea. In fact, Korea has the second highest student-teacher ratio among OECD 
countries after Mexico. The fraction of elementary school teachers with the master’s degree is 
50% in the U.S. but only 19% in Korea. Two sources of the education inputs that the U.S. 
educators believe to be critical, the student-teacher ratio and master’s degree, seem to receive 
less attention in Korea.  
  
                                                          
2 See OECD, Education at a Glance 2010, Table B1. A1. Only Luxembourg spends more than the 
U.S. at the primary education. 
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Table 1.2: Educational Inputs for Elementary school 
 
 South Korea The U.S. 
Panel 1: Educational Inputs by Teachers, Schools, and Government 
Public Education Expenditure  
(Percentage of GDP) 
7.1 % 7.6 % 
The private source of educations of total 
household education expenditure 
42 % 32 % 
Expenditure on Primary Public Education 
per Student (2008 $ppp) 
$5,437 $10,229 
Starting teacher salaries  
(2008 $ppp) 
$31,532 $35,999 
Teacher salaries after 15 years  
(2008 $ppp) 
$54,569 $44,172 
Teacher salaries at top of the scale  
(2008 $ppp) 
$87,452 $50,922 
Teaching hours in 2008 840 1,097 
Hourly teaching wage in 2008 $64.96  $40.3 
Wage percentile in 2008 0.77 0.52 
Students / teacher in 2008 24.1 14.3 
% of Teachers with master’s degree 19 50 
% of Teachers leaving teaching career 0.7 9.2 
% of female teachers in primary public 
education, 2005-2007 
71.6 88.4 
Panel 2: Educational Inputs by Students  
Participation in outside-of-school lessons 72.9% 8.2% 
Time spent in outside-of-school lessons per 
week (hour) 
7.16 1.45 
Subjects of outside-of-school lessons,  
allowing multiple choices (%) 
English (61.5), 
Sports (36.2), 
Music (35.3), 
Painting (15.8), 
Dance (3.2), 
Other (10.8) 
Sports (75.5),  
Music (27.5),  
Dance (13.7), 
Paining (11.5), 
Foreign language (8.5), 
Other (10.7) 
Source: OECD. Education at a Glance. (2010). Child Research Net, Basic Research on Academic 
Performance International Survey of Six Cities (2006) 
  
 17 
 In both countries, public schools hire teachers who meet certain qualifications. In the 
U.S, a typical applicant is required to have a bachelor’s degree and to have a teaching 
certificate. Many states in the U.S. ask for master’s degrees in addition to those requirements. 
In Korea, the same qualifications are required to become a teacher, but no master’s degree is 
needed. Almost all public school teachers from both countries get tenure once they are hired
3
. 
Every public school teacher is guaranteed with tenure in Korea without any additional 
obligation. US public school teachers must teach for a certain period of time, called 
probationary period, which lasts usually 1-3 years, depending on school districts and states. 
Having the summer off is one of the perks of being a teacher in both countries. Basic benefits 
including a retirement pension and maternity leave are also very similar.   
 Another important point to address is the existence of teachers unions in both 
countries. In 1999, Korean government legalized teachers unions and also permitted teachers 
unions to engage in collective bargaining. Since then, the number of union members has been 
growing. There are two major teachers unions in Korea; Korean Teachers Union (KTU) and 
Korean Federation of Teachers’ Association (KFTA). The KFTA is larger than the KTU in 
terms of the enrollment size, but the KTU is more actively exercising its bargaining power. 
Almost all public school teachers belong to one of the two teachers unions or both, with about 
a quarter of the teachers being members of the KTU. For there is a large variation with respect 
to the legal environment towards teachers unions and towards collective bargaining rights in 
the U.S., it is hard to compare the union effects in both countries. However, it should be noted 
                                                          
3
 In the U.S., very few teachers have been denied tenure within 1-3 years of their teaching period. 
According to New York Daily News, Newsweek, and The Los Angeles Times, less than 2% of new 
teachers were denied tenure. Newsweek reported that only 0.1% of new teachers was dismissed for 
poor performance between 2005 and 2008 in Chicago. In South Korea, every public school teacher 
gets tenure immediately after they are hired. 
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that teachers unions in Korea are politically very strong organizations just like teachers unions 
in the U.S.   
 The critical difference between the educational systems of the two countries is the 
competitiveness in joining teaching force. It is very difficult to become a public school 
teacher in Korea. The top 3-5% of senior high school class manages to enter the teacher 
preparation program in college to obtain the teaching certificate. Then, they need to pass the 
national teacher appointment test, which is administered by the states once a year. High 
college GPA is necessary to pass this test because the final score of test is weighted by the 
college GPA. The average acceptance rate for public school teachers among the graduates 
from the teacher preparation program between 2005 and 2008 is 7.2%. Thus, having to jump 
all these hurdles to become a public school teacher guarantees that the average academic 
quality of teachers in Korea is very high. A teacher is considered to be one of the most 
prestigious careers, partly due to Confucianism which emphasizes respect towards educators. 
The popularity of teaching career has increased even more as the job security becomes a great 
advantage in the wake of economic uncertainty that has been growing since the Asian Crisis 
in 1997. Public school teachers have been able to maintain high social status even among 
males. The fraction of female teachers in primary public education is higher in the U.S. than 
in the Korea (See Table 1.2). The competition for teaching careers keeps getting fiercer, 
which keeps the average quality of teachers high.  
 In the U. S., the story is quite the opposite. College GPA of teacher applicants is never 
asked during teacher hiring process, and obtaining teaching certificate is relatively easy. The 
tests are given multiple times per year, and the applicants can take the test as many times as 
they want, making the cumulative passing rate of the test virtually 100%. The job security of 
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public school teachers is also strong in US public schools, but teaching is not a popular career 
pick any more even among females as there exist many great opportunities available for them 
outside the teaching sector. 
 Reflecting this difference in teacher recruitment process, the salary that each country 
pays to public school teachers shows a big disparity. Table 1.2 shows the salary schedule for 
public school teachers in each country. After adjusted by 2008 $ppp, the initial teacher salary 
is higher in the U.S.; $35,999 in the U.S. and $31,532 in Korea. Teacher salary after 15 years 
of teaching experience, however, is higher in Korea: $54,569 in Korea and $44,172 in the 
U.S. Another important salary indicator, which is commonly used in the literature for teacher 
salaries, is the relative position of teacher salaries after 15 years of experience in income 
distribution of the entire population. Teacher salaries are located at about 50
th
 percentile in the 
income distribution in the U.S. while they are ranked 1
st
 on this metric
 
with top teacher 
salaries at the 80
th
 percentile in Korea. Teacher salaries at top of the scale are also much 
higher in Korea: $87,452 in Korea and $50,922 in the U.S.  
 Figure 1.2.A describes the trend of teacher salaries between 1999 and 2009 for Korea 
and the U.S. Even though the starting salaries are lower for Korean teachers than for US 
teachers, the salaries increase at a much faster rate over their lifetime for Korean teachers than 
for US teachers. Thus, the salaries after 15 years of experience are much higher for Korean 
teachers compared to US teachers. Figure 1.2.B depicts the trend of the ratio of teacher 
salaries to GDP per capita, another common indicator to study relative salary position. Korean 
teachers initially earn slightly more than the GDP per capita, but they make more than twice 
that amount after 15 years.  
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Figure 1.2.A: Teacher Salaries in Primary Education 
Source: Education at Glance. 2001-2011. OECD. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2.B: Ratio of Teacher Salaries in Primary Education 
 Source: Education at Glance. 2001-2011. OECD. 
 
 Figure 1.2.B also shows that the salaries of US teachers start much lower than the 
GDP per capita, although they show a steady increase over the last decade. With 15 years of 
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teaching experience, their salaries increase to the level of GDP per capita. Therefore, it is 
clear that Korean public school teachers get higher returns to experience than US teachers. 
 Both population growth rate and GDP growth rate can change the dynamics for the 
GDP per capita. Thus, the ratio of teacher salaries to GDP per capita can be a misleading 
measure for cross-country comparison of teacher salaries without considering fertility rate. 
The total fertility rate of Korea has been dropping fast, and the current total fertility rates is 
about 1.15, well below the population replacement rate of 2.1. Then, the ratio of teacher 
salaries to the GDP per capita can show a decreasing trend in Korea but a increasing trend in 
the U.S simply because of their fertility rate difference.  
 Another indicator for cross-country comparison of teacher salaries is the relative 
salary ratio between other occupations and teachers. Figure 1.3.A and Figure 1.3.B illustrate 
the trend of the salary ratio between the elementary school teachers and other occupations in 
the U.S. In general, the ratios of the average salary of other occupations to that of elementary 
school teachers have been increasing between 1999 and 2009. US teachers have been losing 
ground in their salary status relative to other occupations, except to the real estate brokers 
who have severely suffered from the recent housing bubble incidence.  
 In Korea, however, the trend is the opposite. According to Kim, Kim, and Han (2009), 
teachers’ earnings relative to other professionals (accountants, lawyers, computer 
programmers, engineers, and professors) have increased considerably between 2001 and 
2005. It indicates that Korean teachers’ economic status relative to other occupations in the 
non-teaching sector has been growing over time.  
 According to Education at a Glance in 2008, the average teaching hours per year are 
840 hours in Korea and 1,097 hours in the U.S. (See Table 1.2). In fact, US public school 
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 Figure 1.3.A: Ratio of Average Annual Salaries in the U.S.: Scientists to 
 Elementary School Teachers 
 Source: Education at a Glance. 2001-2011. OECD. 
 
 
 
 Figure 1.3.B: Ratio of Average Annual Salaries in the U.S.: Other Occupations 
 to Elementary School Teachers 
 Source: Education at a Glance. 2001-2011. OECD. 
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teachers face the maximum teaching hours among OECD countries. The average number of 
days of schools is greater in Korea than in the U.S.; 220 days in Korea
4
 and 180 days in the 
U.S.
5
 It implies that US teachers have more teaching hours per day than Korean teachers do. 
Full-time teachers in both countries have about 40 work hours per week. Thus, more teaching 
hours per day implies less teaching preparation time, which can reduce the quality of lectures 
and teaching presentations in the US classrooms. Moreover, compared to Korean teachers, US 
teachers have heavier teaching workload, so their salaries per teaching hour are lower than 
those of Korean teachers; the average hourly teaching wage of public school teachers is $40 in 
the U.S. and $65 in Korea. Only five countries among 34 OECD countries (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Israel, Mexico, and Poland) offer lower hourly teaching wages to public school 
teachers than the U.S. When we compare the ratio of average teacher salaries to the GDP per 
capita in 2008 $ppp, the U.S. is ranked in the bottom 5
th
 among OECD countries, and Korea 
is ranked 1
st
. Not surprisingly, the teacher retention rate is much higher in Korea than in the 
U.S. The fraction of teachers leaving the teaching career is less than 1% in Korea but close to 
10% in the U.S.
6
 The fraction of male teachers in primary education is much higher in Korea 
(approximately 30%) than in the U.S. (approximately 10%). This may be because teacher 
compensation in the U.S. is not enough to attract males, most of whom are heads of their 
households.  
 What we observe in the US educational system is that teachers are getting paid less 
and the average quality of the teachers is low. On the other hand, Korean teachers are earning 
                                                          
4 Saturday programs are common in Korea, but all classes compose of non-academic courses on 
Saturdays. 
5
 The OECD average of the number of days of schools is 187 days. 
6 According to Teacher Attrition and Mobility Survey by National Center for Education Statistics, 
8.5% of public school teachers left teaching profession during 2004-2005 and 8% during 2007-2008 
academic years. The teacher attrition report by the ministry of education, science, and technology of 
Korea shows that 0.7% of teachers left the teaching sector during 2008-2009 academic year. 
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higher wages and exhibiting higher quality. In section two, I show that the condition for the 
principal preferring the pooling equilibrium to the separating equilibrium is
LH
LH
HP




 . 
First, I shall compare the two thresholds K and A for Korea and America, respectively; 
K
L
K
H
K
L
K
HK




  for Korea and 
A
L
A
H
A
L
A
HA




  for the U.S.  
 In Korea, almost all teacher applicants are academically well prepared, so even the 
lowest quality applicant (type ) has high quality. Therefore, there is a small gap between 
the value of  and that of , so the numerator KL
K
H    becomes small. Many people in the 
applicants’ pool would have low quality in the U.S as the competitiveness for a teaching 
career is relatively weak. Some of the applicants may have low college GPAs and barely have 
passed the teaching certificate test after multiple trials. Thus, the value of the low quality 
applicants in the U.S. is a lot lower than that of Korea. In other words, I can make the 
following critical assumption: AL
K
L   . In the U.S., there might be some high quality 
applicants who have the passion for teaching. They are willing to accept lower compensation 
than what they can earn from the non-teaching careers. When they are hired, they can produce 
a high quality education, . It is reasonable to assume that the value of both  and  are 
the same in both countries, and that type  teachers in both countries have the same 
productivity. This implies that the high quality teachers in both countries can teach their 
students equally well. Thus, AH
K
H    and 
A
H
K
H   . Then, we have;  
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as KH
K
H    is negative by the assumption that the teacher’s quality is worth more to schools 
than to teachers. Thus, AK  , which implies that the threshold to have a pooling equilibrium 
is lower for Korea.  
 This leads to an ultimate conclusion. It is more likely that the threshold condition will 
be satisfied in Korea because Korean threshold (K) is low, and more principals would find it 
optimal to hire both types of applicants and pay them an equally high wage. Since the US 
threshold (A) is high, it is harder to meet the condition for the pooling equilibrium. Therefore, 
for US principals, it is better to offer low wages and only the low quality applicants would 
accept the offer. Simple numerical examples can describe this story easily.  
 Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 illustrate the optimal contract for each country. Suppose that 
20 AH
K
H  , 25
A
H
K
H  , 15
K
L  and 5
A
L . In Korea, a pooling equilibrium can be 
reached, and the principals hire both types of applicants and pay both types high wages, 
20w , as long as 
2
1
1525
1520



HP . This condition has been easily met in Korea, so all 
teachers earn high wages. On the other hand, US principals faces the condition of 
4
3
525
520



HP , which is harder to be satisfied. As a result, a separating equilibrium is 
obtained. Teachers get paid low wages, 5w , and only the low quality applicants accept the 
offer. 
When the majority of the applicants have low quality, HP  is low, so the separating 
equilibrium, in which only the low quality applicants are hired, dominates the pooling 
equilibrium. My model takes the fraction of low quality applicants as given because the 
principal takes the quality of the current applicants’ pool into a consideration for one time 
take-it-or-leave-it offers. Thus, the equilibrium portrays the one-time snap shot of a contract, 
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and it provides us with the optimal wage level for the given quality of applicants’ pool. 
However, if we had observed the equilibria over time and drawn the locus of the US 
equilibria, the location of the equilibrium would be moving downward, which indicates that 
teacher salaries relative to the salaries of other non-teaching occupations has decreased over 
time in the U.S. 
 
 
 Figure 1.4: Korea, Pooling Equilibrium 
 
 
 Figure 1.5: The US, Separating Equilibrium 
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 As we see in Figure 1.1, the optimal wage for low quality applicant is L . At the wage 
levels between  and  when e=1, the principal is overpaying the teachers of the low 
quality type. At this overpaid wage level, since the average quality of applicants is still low, 
there would be no significant educational gain with this extra wage expense unless the wage 
increases up to , at which the high quality applicants start to accept the offer.  
 My model assumes that there are two distinctive quality types (either or ), but 
the quality type will be a continuous distribution in reality. Thus, it can be shown that the 
increase in wage for low quality teachers above  may raise the average quality of the low 
type by a small amount. However, the majority of the applicants would be still low quality 
type because only few high quality applicants would be attracted to wage level of . As 
long as the variance of the distribution of   is large, my prediction remains the same; a small 
increase in wage will not be able to attract a large number of high quality applicants enough to 
significantly change the average quality of teachers, and the educational improvement from 
the small increase in wage will be negligible. Putting it differently, a small shock to a 
separating equilibrium is not enough to move it to a pooling equilibrium. If one public school 
district increases teacher salaries by $1,000 trying to get out of the separating equilibrium 
only to see no improvement in educational outcome, no other school districts will follow this 
policy. Soon, the market would go back to the original separating equilibrium.  
 My study show consistent results with Temin (2002). He also presented the multiple 
equilibria of teachers’ market in the U.S. using the Akerlof’s “Lemon” model. He also argues 
that the U.S. is currently stuck at the lower level of equilibrium and cannot get out of it unless 
we pay a lot more to our teachers. It seems that the separating equilibrium is inferior to a 
pooling equilibrium although both equilibria are optimally selected. If an educational system 
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L
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H

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can be stuck at the inferior equilibrium, there could also be a case where an educational 
system is trapped in the superior equilibrium. In the next section, I show that Korea is one 
example which describes falling into a superior equilibrium trap can cause social loss.  
 
1.4 Is Korean Educational System Golden?  
 
 If Korean educational system is currently operating at the pooling equilibrium, it 
means that the quality of teachers and the educational outcomes of students have reached a 
stable point where small increase/decrease in teacher salary cannot alter the teacher quality in 
Korea. However, whether Korea is actually on the equilibrium is questionable. Teachers’ 
earnings relative to other professionals (accountants, lawyers, computer programmers, 
engineers, and professors) have been considerably increasing in Korea (Kim, Kim, and Han, 
2009), but there is no evidence that teacher quality has also been growing. The pressure of the 
competition to become a teacher seems already at its peak, so further quality improvement 
from current level is quite hard to expect. Even one point in the teacher appointment test can 
determine success or failure, so the quality difference between teachers who pass the test and 
who fail the test would be almost negligible especially at the margin. Therefore, Korean 
educational system may be operating beyond the pooling equilibrium, where the raise in 
teacher salary does not induce any increase in teacher quality. The equilibrium force of the 
pooling equilibrium will work to bring any points beyond it back to the original equilibrium. 
In other words, Korea is stuck at this pooling equilibrium. 
 The optimal wage for the high quality teachers is KH , so Korea will be overpaying its 
teachers if it pays more than KH . The existence of a long queue to become a public school 
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teacher indicates that current teacher salary is set too high in Korea. Figure 1.6 illustrates the 
labor market situation where teachers’ ongoing wage is higher than the equilibrium wage, and 
there is excess supply of teachers at current wage level. Suppose that the equilibrium is at 
(200, $50), which is a pooling equilibrium. Suppose further that the current hourly wage is set 
at $60, which is higher than the equilibrium wage of $50. This leads to the excess supply of 
teachers, so some teachers find themselves unemployed when the hourly wage is set above 
$50.  
 The problem of excess supply in teachers’ labor market in Korea is quite severe. 
Among the graduates from teacher preparation program for secondary school teachers, the 
average employment rate is about 20% between 2000 and 2007. Out of 30,000 graduates each 
year, only about 6,000 people are hired as public school teachers after they pass the teacher 
appointment test.
7
 As the national teacher appointment test is administered once a year, many 
people spend multiple years trying to pass the test. Most people who fail the test work as 
irregular public school teachers or eventually move into the private educational sector to work 
at private schools and tutoring institutions. The extremely low employment rate of teachers 
exacerbates the excess supply problem in the teachers’ labor market, and the queue of teacher 
applicants is getting longer year by year.  
 High teacher salary helps sustaining the social status of teachers because it can attract 
many high quality people to the teaching sector. The typical “efficiency wage theory” 
explains this well. However, considering that the teacher applicants in the waiting period are 
people with high ability who continue to study to pass the teacher appointment test, the excess 
supply due to the above-equilibrium wage seem to cause social loss. Assuming that worker 
qualities in the teaching sector are positively associated with those in the non-teaching sector, 
                                                          
7 See Kim (2009). Table 14. p 50. 
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the high quality people of the excess supply in the teaching sector forgo great opportunity 
costs. Had they started off their careers at non-teaching sectors, they would have contributed 
to social gain rather than to social loss.  
 
 
 
 Figure 1.6: Teachers’ Labor Market in Korea 
 
 The story shown in the Korean educational system describes how paying teachers too 
much also creates social problem. As Korea is trapped in the pooling equilibrium, overpaying 
teachers above the equilibrium can results in the excess supply of high quality teachers which 
does not contribute to the increase in the average teacher quality. However, Korean 
educational system is already passed the pooling equilibrium, so going back to the 
equilibrium will not be as difficult as jumping to a new equilibrium in the U.S. Since the 
average teacher quality is already high in Korea, a small decrease in teacher salary may not 
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separating equilibrium. Therefore, an educational system operating at the separating 
equilibrium should aim for attaining the pooling equilibrium to exploit this advantageous 
trade-off.     
 
1.5 Policy Implications for the U.S. educational system 
 
 The immediate impact of having low teacher quality is poor educational outcomes. 
Moreover, low teacher quality diminishes the returns of investment in human capital 
accumulation in the long run. Thus, the direct policy implication of my study is very 
straightforward. To improve the teacher quality, getting out of a separating equilibrium and 
move towards a pooling equilibrium must be the goal of the US educational reform. The 
problem is that moving from a separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium is not an easy 
task because government has to come up with extra revenue to pay higher wages to teachers. 
It may also take a long time to arrive at the new equilibrium. I make several suggestions that 
can improve the average quality of teachers and speed up the transition.  
 
a)  Pin down the determinants that make good teachers.  
 Many researchers have been trying to figure out which teacher characteristics 
are critical to improve students’ academic performance. They have looked at many ex-
ante observable teacher credentials including teaching certification status, advanced 
education degree, college major, and competitiveness of colleges. However, little 
evidence has been found that these qualifications, except teaching experience, can 
significantly increase students’ academic achievement. Teaching experience is not a 
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useful hiring standard if most applicants are new to teaching. Nailing down some other 
teacher qualifications can help set better hiring standards for teachers.  
 
b)  Raise the standard for the minimum qualification for public school teachers.  
 Increasing the average value of will raise the average teacher quality. As the 
value of  gets larger, the threshold for the pooling equilibrium becomes smaller. 
Then, it is easier to satisfy the condition to reach a pooling equilibrium. One way to 
increase the average value of  is to raise the lower bar to become a teacher. For 
instance, screening the applicants by the minimum college GPA and by the course 
grade of their teaching subjects or increasing the passing scores for teaching certificate 
tests can increase . Raising the standards adds more competition among applicants, 
which can support higher teacher salaries.  
 
c)  Raise teacher salary significantly.  
 Teacher salaries should be at least comparable with what teachers can earn in 
the non-teaching sector. Unless the notion of “underpaid teachers” disappears, high 
quality people will refrain from entering the teaching sector. The small increase in 
teacher salaries can only incur additional education spending without improving 
average education quality. Manski (1987) also suggested that the average ability of the 
teaching force could be improved and the size of the teaching force could be 
maintained if the minimum ability standards were to be combined with sufficient 
salary increase. We may consider keeping the current wage schedule for existing 
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teachers and use the new wage schedule for new teachers who passed stricter 
screening processes.  
 
d)  Fire the worst teachers.  
 Giving tenure to all teachers does not seem to be a good strategy when the 
average quality of the teachers is already low. A documentary film, “Waiting for 
Superman”, reveals the common practice called “The dance of the lemons”. The 
principals trade their worst teachers, lemons, hoping that the new lemon they receive 
is better than the one they just got rid of. Firing the worst teachers, therefore, can 
eradicate this custom. In fact, firing the worst teacher seems a necessary task for any 
educational reform to work in the U.S. because it changes the composition of current 
stock of teachers. Assuming that spotting a few worst performing teachers is not a 
difficult task, we can expect an immediate positive impact on the average teacher 
quality of current teaching force by letting the worst-performing teachers go.  
  
 Many people have a very hopeful view towards the current education reform, which 
introduces the teacher evaluation and bonus system to public schools. The advocates of the 
pay for performance system believe that a low quality teacher could become a good quality 
teacher by providing simple financial incentives (Woessmann. 2011). According to a recent 
experimental study by National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) at Vanderbilt 
University (Springer et al. 2010), however, the bonus system of teacher pay did not show a 
significant effect on students’ academic performance. Other researchers also found similar 
results (Ballou and Podgursky, 2001; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2004).  
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 There is no accurate measurement for teachers’ productivity. Besides, teacher 
evaluation is a complex task as it is subjective, labor-intensive, and possibly fraud-inducing. 
Recently, 178 schoolteachers and superintendents were accused of cheating on standardized 
tests in Atlanta. This was not the only incident related to cheating teachers for the last several 
years. D.C., California, Florida, and Massachusetts were among the other states reporting 
similar events. Even when schools invite the third party evaluators, the evaluation content 
itself may not be unbiased. Another concern is that having an evaluation on a regular basis is 
very costly. A recent estimate shows that the teacher evaluation system will cost Washington 
D.C. 7 million dollars a year. The incentive pay system, therefore, might not be a cost-
effective method to improve educational outcome. Instead of putting lots of resources on 
implementing teacher evaluation, raising teacher salaries significantly enough to attract higher 
quality teachers and to retain them in the teaching sector might be a better strategy. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
 This study employs a monopolistic screening model to show that there exist multiple 
equilibria in the educational system; a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium. In 
the pooling equilibrium, both low and high quality teachers are hired and all teachers receive 
high compensation. In the separating equilibrium, low quality teachers and high quality 
teachers get different levels of compensations. The model predicts that the pooling 
equilibrium becomes the optimal choice for school districts when the average quality of 
applicants in the queue is high, whereas the separating equilibrium becomes the optimal 
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choice when the average quality of applicants is low. In the latter case, only the low quality 
teachers are hired and they receive low salaries.  
 As the application of the model, I compare the educational systems of the U.S. and 
South Korea using data from OECD. I also examine the relation between teacher salaries 
measured by hourly teaching wage, and teacher quality measured by students’ international 
test results. This study shows that the average quality of teacher applicants in the U.S. is low 
and the U.S. educational system is currently operating at a separating equilibrium. On the 
other hand, the average quality of teacher applicants of Korea is high, and its educational 
system has reached a pooling equilibrium. In the current US educational system, a small 
increase in teacher salary will not bring a significant improvement in teacher quality. Rather, 
a substantial raise in teacher salary is needed to achieve a considerable gain in educational 
outcomes by moving to a superior equilibrium. 
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Chapter 2: Teacher Wage Penalty and Decrease in Teacher Quality: Evidence from 
Career Changes in CPS 2001-2010 
 
This paper examines the relation between teachers’ earnings and teacher quality. Using the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) and CPS Supplements for Occupation Mobility and Job 
Tenure between 2001 and 2010, I find that US public school teachers are paid less compared 
to other comparable college graduates in non-teaching sectors. By studying the change in 
teachers’ earnings after career changes, I find the evidence of positive selection when teachers 
move into the non-teaching sectors and of negative selection when non-teachers move into the 
teaching sector, which results in the decrease in the average quality of public school teachers. 
Teachers unions are positively associated with teachers’ earnings only in states that have 
collective bargaining laws, and they may serve as a mechanism to encourage the high quality 
teachers to remain in the teaching sector. In states without collective bargaining laws or where 
collective bargaining is prohibited, teachers face less favorable working conditions. In those 
states, the impacts of the positive selection and the negative selection are stronger, so the 
average quality of public school teachers may fall faster than in states with collective 
bargaining laws. 
 
Key Words: teacher wage penalty, teacher quality, teachers unions, collective bargaining, 
positive selection, negative selection 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
 Disappointed with their students’ performance in international tests, educators and 
school officials in the U.S. have been trying to improve the quality of public education. In 
particular, the quality of teaching forces has been pointed out as the key to a successful 
educational reform. Many blame teachers unions for being a hindrance to the educational 
reform. They point out that the teacher salaries keep increasing while the academic 
achievement of students still remains poor. They argue that public school teachers in the U.S. 
are being “overpaid” considering the decrease in teacher quality. Biggs and Richwine (2001) 
claimed in their article in The Wall Street Journal that there was no teacher wage penalty if 
they compared teachers and non-teachers with similar Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) scores. Moreover, they argued that teachers were receiving 52% more in average 
compensation (including benefits) than they could earn in the non-teaching sectors. On the 
other hands, according to the research by National Education Association (NEA), teachers 
have been  “underpaid” compared to other college graduates in non-teaching industries and 
the wage gap between non-teaching careers and teaching careers among college graduates 
was about 60% for males and 16% for females in 2000.  
 The standard approach by labor economists says that a queue for a specific occupation 
is an indication that the occupation is overpaying its workers. However, even with the queue 
of applicants in the teaching sector, it is also important to consider the quality of the 
applicants to determine whether teachers are truly overpaid or not. If the queue mostly 
consists of low quality people, it could be the case where teachers have been underpaid, so the 
high quality people no longer enter the teaching sector while only the low quality people 
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remain in the applicants’ pool. Thus, it is critical to understand the dynamic relationship 
between teacher salaries and the quality of teachers that is associated with educational 
outcomes.  
 This paper utilizes the data from Current Population Survey merged Outgoing 
Rotation Group (CPS ORG) and CPS Supplements between 2001 and 2010. I find that the US 
public school teachers are paid less relative to other college graduates, controlling for relevant 
wage determinants. Young teachers who are in their 20s get teacher premium of 6%, but the 
premium quickly disappears and turns into teacher penalty over their lifetime. Teachers of age 
30 or older earn 4% less than comparable college graduates in the non-teaching sector. The 
wage penalty for teachers is greater and more significant for male teachers than for female 
teachers.  
 My identification strategy is to study the change in earnings of teachers who move 
into non-teaching sectors and of non-teachers who move into teaching sectors. Comparing the 
changes in earnings after career changes provides additional evidence that public school 
teachers are losing grounds in their earnings. I find that public school teachers in their 30s and 
40s increase their earnings when they move into non-teaching occupations. This is larger than 
the increase in earnings of non-teachers who change to other non-teaching occupations.  
 I use a simple two-sector version of Roy Model to show that there is positive selection 
when public school teachers move into the non-teaching sectors whereas there is negative 
selection when non-teachers move into the teaching sector. On average, teachers who leave 
the teaching profession have had higher pre-earnings than the teachers who remain in the 
teaching sector, but they still choose to leave the teaching sector for better earning 
opportunities in the non-teaching sectors. Non-teachers who change into the teaching sector 
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have had significantly lower pre-earnings than other non-teachers who stay in their careers. 
The difference in the pre-earnings between the career-stayers and career-changers suggest that 
this is beyond the simple case of compensating differentials.
8
 Therefore, considering that the 
pre-earnings are the proxy for the ability/aptitude of workers, my study suggest that high 
quality teachers tend to leave teaching careers whereas low quality non-teachers tend to enter 
the teaching sector under the current pay scheme for teachers, 
Studies on the effect of teachers unions face endogeneity problem of unionization. 
Teachers unions may behave differently under different legal environments towards collective 
bargaining of teachers. Thus, if a study does not take this into account, the estimates for union 
effects may suffer from omitted variable bias. To ease this problem, I classify 50 states into 
three categories based on their legal status regarding collective bargaining of teachers unions; 
states with compulsory collective bargaining laws, states that do not have collective 
bargaining laws but allow the collective bargaining to occur, and states that prohibit collective 
bargaining of public school teachers. The CPS ORG data reveals that teachers unions increase 
the teachers’ earnings only in the states that have collective bargaining laws. In all three 
groups, public school teachers who leave the teaching career have had higher pre-earnings 
while non-teachers who enter the public school teaching sector have had lower pre-earnings. 
This pattern leads to the decrease in the average quality of public school teachers. The adverse 
trend is more substantial in the states that prohibit collective bargaining of teachers, where 
teachers face a larger wage penalty compared to their comparable non-teachers. 
 
                                                          
8
 According to compensating differentials, teachers switching into non-teaching sector are willing to 
take less benefits in exchange of higher wage whereas non-teachers moving into teaching sector are 
willing to take less wage and more benefits, but their total compensation should remain the same as 
long as they share the same wage determinants. 
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2.2 Literature on the Relation between Teacher Salaries and Teacher Quality 
 
 Many studies examine the relation between teacher salaries and educational outcomes 
using cross-country variations of teacher compensations. Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez 
(2011) estimated that a 15% increase in teacher salaries raises student’s test score in Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) by 6-8% using the OECD cross-
country data. Studies on teacher effectiveness found a significantly positive relationship 
between teacher quality and teacher salaries (Murnane, 1991; Ballow and Podgursky,1997; 
Flyer and Rosen, 1997; Figlio and Lucas, 2000; Temin, 2002; Goldin , 2006)
9
. Hanushek 
(1986), Betts (1995), and Grogger (1996), however, showed that teacher salaries have either 
insignificant or negligent effect on students’ lives. 
 One of the hypotheses that explain the inconsistent findings is that the variation in 
teacher salaries may be too little to induce any significant change in the quality of teachers in 
some data. For instance, studies using state level data are more likely to find a significant 
effect of teacher salaries on teacher quality than those using school district level data, which 
has a smaller variation in teacher salaries especially if the school districts are from the same 
state. Cross-state variation of teacher salaries is smaller than cross-country variation. There is 
almost 40-percentile difference between the minimum and the maximum of the relative 
position of teacher salaries in the income distribution of the whole population among OECD 
countries. However, the relative position of teacher salaries in the income distribution of each 
state in the U.S. is between 47
th
 and 52
nd
 percentile. According to my calculation of the 
                                                          
9
 Note that we need an assumption that high quality teachers bring better educational outcome of the 
students. Most researchers agree that there is a large teacher fixed effect, which implies that there is a 
better quality teacher who consistently produces higher quality education. However, no consensus has 
been reached regarding which ex-ante qualifications, other than teaching experience, make them 
higher quality teachers. 
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average hourly earnings using CPS ORG, thirteen states pay their teachers more than the 
state’s median wage, but no more than the 52nd percentile of state’s income distribution10.  
Several researchers found that the average teacher quality have decreased over time in 
the U.S. Murnane et al. (1991) and Bacolod (2003) found a drop in the fraction of college 
graduates with high AFQT scores among teachers. Using the US Census data, Lakdawalla 
(2001) found that the relative schooling of teachers declined by about three years from the 
1900 birth cohort to the 1950 birth cohort. Corcoran et al. (2004) found that the average 
quality of female teachers, measured by the quartile ranking based on their placement in the 
distribution of mathematics and verbal exams administered in their senior year of high school, 
fell since 1960. Hoxby and Leigh (2004) also found that the teachers’ academic aptitude in 
the U.S. has decreased. They pointed out that increasing outside options that pay higher 
salaries to high quality females, who used to enter teaching professions, have drawn them to 
non-teaching career paths. 
Another stream of researches on teacher salaries focuses on the effect of teachers 
unions on teacher compensations. Lipsky (1982), Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986), and 
Freeman (1986) provided the reviews of early literature on union effects. According to the 
theory, the effect of unions on the level and structure of teacher salaries should be determined 
by unions’ goals and their collective bargaining power. The empirical studies on the effect of 
teachers unions on teacher salaries have produced various estimates (Baugh and Stone, 1982; 
Freeman and Valletta, 1988; Gyourko and Tracy, 1991; Zwerling and Thomason, 1995; 
Belman, Heywood, and Lund, 1997; Hoxby, 1996; Lemke, 2004; Lovenheim, 2009; Hirsch, 
Macpherson, and Winters, 2011). It is commonly conceived that the union wage effects in the 
                                                          
10
 These states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and West Virginia. All of these states, 
except West Virginia, have the collective bargaining laws of teachers unions. 
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public sector is smaller than those in the private sector ranging between 5% and 20% of wage 
premium. 
 Teachers unions also try to offer good working conditions and better fringe benefits to 
their members in addition to base salaries. They may improve other educational inputs such as 
student-teacher ratio and school districts’ education expenditures. Due to the data limitation of 
the CPS, I focus on teachers’ earnings measured by hourly wage. However, I discuss the 
relations between the non-wage benefits/working conditions and teacher wage in terms of 
compensating differentials. 
 
2.3 The Roy Model for Career Changes  
 
 If teachers are paid less than comparable non-teachers, they should be able to have 
larger increase in their earnings, on average, when they change to non-teaching occupations 
than non-teachers who change to other non-teaching occupations. The fundamental problem 
to this approach is that the career change is an endogenous outcome of various optimizing 
decisions, in which people self-select the occupational sector that provides them with the 
highest expected earnings. I use Roy model to deal with the self-selection issue of career 
changers. In this section, I fully describe my version of the Roy model that is inspired by 
Borjas (1987) who used the simple two-sector Roy Model to discuss the self-selection 
problem of immigrants.  
Consider two occupations; teachers (A) and non-teachers (B). Let 

WA  indicate the log 
(hourly earnings) for teachers, and it is given by 

WA YA A . 

 t  represents the unobservable 
ability of a teacher and it is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
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of 2 . Thus, 

 t ~ N(0, t
2)  for t=A, B. If all teachers change their career to non-teachers, their 
log (hourly earnings) is denoted as 

WB , and 

WB YB B  if we ignore the general 
equilibrium effect. Suppose that there is a cost in changing careers, C, and it is proportional to 

WA . Following Borjas, I denote this cost 

 C /WA , which is a “time-equivalent” measure of 
career-changing cost. The correlation between the unobservable ability of teachers and non-
teachers are given by: 
 
 

AB 
AB
AB
  where ),( BAAB Cov          (1) 
 
Teachers will move into the non-teaching sector if , or equivalently, 

(YB YA ) (B A )  0 . Define the indicator variable I=1 if teachers change their career 
to non-teaching professions, and define 

u B A . The probability that a teacher chooses to 
move into the non-teaching sector is given by:  
 
 
    

 Pr[
u
u

YA YB 
u
]  Pr[
u
u
 z] 1(z)       (2) 
 
where 

z 
YA YB 
u
 and 

(z)  is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Then, the 
larger the value of z  is the lower the probability of teachers moving into the non-teaching 

WB WA   0

P Pr(I 1) Pr[(YB YA )u  0] Pr[u  (YA YB )]
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sector is. So, 

P
YA
 0, 

P
YB
 0, and . If teachers earn higher wages, the probability 
that they move into the non-teaching sector falls. If non-teachers earn higher wages, on the 
other hand, the probability that teachers move into the non-teaching sector increases. To make 
the story more interesting, I focus on the case where . 
The expected earnings in the teaching sector for the teachers who choose to move into 
the non-teaching sector are given by:  
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The expected earnings in the non-teaching sector for the teachers who choose to move 
into the non-teaching sector are given by:  




















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z
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EYIWE AB
A
B
u
BA
B
u
BBB







     (4) 
  
where 

Au 
Cov(A ,u)
Au

Cov(A ,B ) A
2
Au
 and 

AB 
Cov(A ,B )
AB
. 
 
Equation (3) implies that whether the teachers who change into the non-teaching 
sector earn more or less than the average teachers in the teaching sector depends on 

P

 0

YA YB
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
AB  / 
A
B
. Equation (4) implies that whether the teachers who change into the non-
teaching sector earn more or less than the average non-teachers in the non-teaching sector 
depends on 

AB  / 
B
A
. Define 

QA  E(A I 1)  and 

QB  E(B I 1)  to be the expected 
value of the unobserved ability of teachers and non-teachers, respectively, given that the 
teachers choose to move into the non-teaching sector.  
I discuss two cases in which the self-selection changes the expected wages in the Roy 
Model: positive selection and negative selection. The positive selection implies that the 
teachers who move into the non-teaching sector are positively selected in the ability 
distribution of teachers, and they are also above the mean in the ability distribution of non-
teachers. The positive selection will occur if  and , which is equivalent to 
 and 

AB min
A
B
,
B
A





. When these two conditions are satisfied, the high quality 
teachers are more likely to move into the non-teaching sector to take advantage of higher 
returns to ability. More specifically, the two conditions are: 
 
i) : This condition indicates that the non-teaching sectors have more dispersed 
income distribution than the teaching sector does. Thus, the returns to ability are 
higher in the non-teaching sectors than in the teaching sector. In Table 2.1, the 
standard deviations of weekly earnings and hourly earnings are larger in non-
teaching sectors ($681.32 and $15.36, respectively) than those in the teaching 
sector ($427.94 and $10.39, respectively). Therefore, this condition is satisfied. 

QA  0

QB  0

B
A
1

B
A
1
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ii) 

AB min
A
B
,
B
A





: This indicates that the correlation between the ability that is 
relevant both in the teaching sector and in the non-teaching sector is sufficiently 
high. High ability (thus high quality) teachers will move into the non-teaching 
sector only if their ability is highly correlated with the ability that are valued in the 
non-teaching sectors. Chingos and West (2012) found that high-value-added 
teachers earned more than low-value-added teachers after they left for other jobs in 
the non-teaching sectors. This suggests that the opportunity wages in the non-
teaching sectors are positively correlated with teacher effectiveness. Given their 
findings, the second condition is also satisfied.  
 
 Negative selection occurs if non-teachers are negatively selected in the ability 
distribution of non-teachers, and they are also below the mean of the ability distribution of 
teachers when they move into the teaching sector. The conditions necessary for this negative 
selection to happen are the opposite of the conditions of the positive selection; the non-
teaching sectors have more dispersed wage distribution than the teaching sector, and the 
correlation between the ability that is relevant both in the teaching and in the non-teaching 
sector is also sufficiently high. When these conditions are met, the low ability people will 
want to move to the teaching sector to take advantage of the narrower wage distribution of 
teaching occupations. 
 
2.4 Data and the Legal Settings towards Collective Bargaining 
 
 51 
 The primary data source I use is the Current Population Survey merged Outgoing 
Rotation Group (CPS ORG) files for 2001 through 2010. CPS ORG is not a panel data as the 
households are not tracked once they move. However, every household that enters the CPS is 
interviewed each month for 4 months, then ignored for 8 months, and then interviewed again 
for 4 more months. So, we get to observe the same individuals in the same household twice in 
a year if they do not move. I drop the observations if the value for either weekly earnings or 
work hours is missing to make a use of hourly earnings that are calculated by the weekly 
earnings on the primary job divided by usual hours worked per week on that job. I restrict the 
sample to full time workers, who have the usual work hours per week of 30 or above. The 
earnings data is truncated at the bottom 1 percentile, and I focus on the people at least with 
college degrees. I define the public school teachers as primary school teachers, secondary 
school teachers, special education teachers, and other instructors who are public sector 
employees.  
 I also utilize the data from the CPS Supplements for Occupation Mobility and Job 
Tenure (SOMJT). Between 2001 and 2010, the CPS SOMJT is reported in January, except for 
the year of 2001 and 2005, in which February file provides the data. The CPS SOMJT is not 
available for the year of 2003. I create the pooled cross-sectional dataset using CPS SOMJT 
2001 through 2010 files. This dataset provides additional information that CPS MORG file 
does not have. In particular, it provides valuable information about labor force activities of 
people with multiple jobs. These include the number of jobs that people have, characteristics 
of their second jobs, and their occupation mobility.  
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 On average, both weekly and hourly earnings are lower for public school teachers than 
for non-teachers. The fraction of female workers and earnings ratio of female to male is 
higher for public school teachers. The fraction of people with master’s degree, union 
membership, and the US citizenship is also higher for public school teachers. The fraction of 
people with professional school or doctorate degree, however, is the smallest for public school 
teachers. A larger fraction of public school teachers has multiple jobs than non-teachers do.  
States have different legal environments towards collective bargaining. These legal 
environments are quite exogenous factors because they have not changed much over time for 
the past 3-4 decades. The legal environments influence states’ unionization, so the effect of 
teachers unions may differ across different legal settings. To deal with this issue, I classify all 
51 states into three different categories depending on their legal status towards collective 
bargaining of public school teachers.
11
 The first group is composed of 35 states that have 
compulsory collective bargaining laws.
12
 The second group consists of 9 states that do not 
have collective bargaining laws, but these states permit collective bargaining to occur if local 
unions can pressure local school boards into accepting it in their school districts.
13
 The third 
group prohibits the collective bargaining of public school teachers. There are 7 states in this 
                                                          
11
 The source for the information on collective bargaining laws and agency fees are from “Teacher 
Monopoly, Bargaining, and Compulsory Unionism, and Deduction Revocation Table”, National Right 
to Work Foundation(2010). For reference, I also use Table 2-2, p. 54-55, Moe (2011). 
12
 These states are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New 
Hampshire, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. 
13  These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Utah, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. 
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group.
14
 I call the first group “High-CB”, the second group “Low-CB”, and the third group 
“No-CB”. 
 Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics of public school teachers for each group of 
states. High-CB group has the biggest union membership rate (75.4%) and the biggest 
collective bargaining coverage (93.7%) among all three groups. High-CB group pays the 
highest nominal salaries to teachers, has the highest fraction of teachers with master’s degree, 
and has the smallest fraction of female teachers. Low-CB group has a union density of 50%, 
but less than 30% of public school teachers are covered by collective bargaining agreements. 
No-CB group prohibits the collective bargaining, but some teachers still join teachers unions, 
and the average union membership rate of public school teachers is 27.5%.  
There are two limitations in the use of CPS ORG that deserve special attention. The 
first is the possible measurement error in the earnings data. Table 2.3 reports the earnings for 
the summer months (July and August) and non-summer months. Male non-teachers report 
lower average weekly earnings ($1,319<$1,337) and lower average hourly earnings 
($29.49<29.74) during summer months, and these differences are statistically significant at 1% 
significance level. On average, however, male teachers in public schools make higher weekly 
earnings ($1,056>$1,035) and higher hourly earnings ($25.06> $24.14) during summer 
months. Some schools provide an option for the teachers to decide whether they want to be 
paid over 10 months or for the entire year. If they are paid over a 12-month period, then their 
annual salary is divided by the number of pay periods in 12 months. In this case, they choose 
to receive lower payments in order to get paid all year long. Thus, the fact that the average 
earnings of male teachers are higher over the summer than during the school year seems quite 
odd. My conjecture is that some teachers have multiple jobs during the summer and they 
                                                          
14
 These states are Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Public School Teachers by Group 
 
College Graduates Only 
 
VARIABLES High-CB group 
Low-CB 
group 
No-CB 
group 
List of states 
Alaska Nebraska 
California Nevada 
Connecticut New Hampshire 
DC New Jersey 
Delaware New Mexico 
Florida New York 
Hawaii North Dakota 
Idaho Ohio 
Illinois Oklahoma 
Indiana Oregon 
Iowa Pennsylvania 
Kansas Rhode Island 
Maine South Dakota 
Maryland Tennessee 
Massachusetts Vermont 
Michigan Washington 
Minnesota Wisconsin 
Montana  
 
 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Missouri 
Utah 
West 
Virginia 
Wyoming 
 
Arizona 
Georgia 
Mississippi 
North 
Carolina 
South 
Carolina 
Texas 
Virginia 
 
Union membership .754 (.431) .50 (.499) .275 (.446) 
Collective bargaining 
coverage (%) 
93.7 29.6 0 
Weekly earnings ($) 1,003 (446) 851 (349) 886 (371) 
Hourly earnings ($) 23.6 (10.9) 19.9 (8.4) 20.53 (8.72) 
% of US citizen 94.88 98.2 95.32 
% of Non-white 10.05 19.19 16.01 
 % of Hispanic 4.15 1.85 8.71 
% of female teachers 
in public education 
71.27 74.73 79.04 
% of teachers with 
Master’s degree  
49.36 46.23 36.06 
% of teachers with  
Professional school 
or Doctorate degree 
2.32 2.03 2.38 
N 22,419 3,937 4,959 
Source: CPS MORG. The list of states in each group and the collective bargaining coverage data is 
from Moe (2011), Table 2-2. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
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might have added the earnings from their second jobs to their regular teacher salaries. I 
regressed earnings on the dummy variable for summer months to check if this would 
seriously jeopardize the reliability of the data. The dummy variable did not show a 
significant association with earnings, so it seems acceptable to use a full-year sample. 
However, this measurement error would systematically bias the estimates if people have 
added (but never subtracted) their earnings from their other jobs to their primary earnings. 
 
Table 2.3: Comparison between Summer and Non-summer Months in CPS 
 
College Graduates Only 
 
  
  
Public School Teachers Private School Teachers Non-Teachers 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Weekly earnings ($) 
Summer 
1056.44 902.76 994.57 893.27 1319.37 1011.81 
(486.14) (422.45) (515.89) (455.62) (702.45) (570.95) 
Non-summer 
1035.45 941.68 985.84 838.91 1336.91 1008.94 
(469.21) (406.94) (501.01) (416.67) (713.05) (536.21) 
Hourly earnings ($) 
Summer 
25.06 21.58 23.61 21.34 29.49 23.92 
(11.57) (9.95) (12.02) (10.92) (15.03) (12.64) 
Non-summer 
24.14 22.08 22.78 19.88 29.74 23.76 
(11.53) (22.09) (12.00) (10.08) (15.16) (12.48) 
Source: CPS MORG, 2001-2010. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 
A research commissioned by the Texas State Teachers Association in 2010 shows that 
40 percent of teachers work a second job during the school year and 56 percent during the 
summer. 62 percent of teachers working outside the classroom say that the main reason they 
have multiple jobs is to make ends meet. On average, teachers spend 15.2 hours per week on 
their second jobs during the school year in Texas. According to the CPS Supplements 
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between 2001 and 2010, almost 10% of public school teachers have more than one job while 
less than 3% of non-teachers have more than one job. Among college graduates, 15.6% of 
male public school teachers have more than one job while 5.3% of male non-teachers have 
more than one job (See Table 2.1). 1.6% of the male public school teachers and 0.5% of male 
non-teachers have three or more jobs.
15
 Even though there is a large gap in the magnitude 
between the survey by Texas State Teachers Association and the CPS Supplements regarding 
the fraction of people with multiple jobs (40 % vs. 10%)
16
, it is clear that, on average, a larger 
fraction of teachers work for more than one job compared to non-teachers. Therefore, to the 
extent that some respondents may have combined all of their earnings together, the earnings 
data in the CPS has some unreliability.  
The other limitation is the measurement problem of collective bargaining coverage 
calculated from the CPS. Only if a person is not a union member does CPS ask whether or not 
the person is covered by collective bargaining. Thus, when people calculate the collective 
bargaining coverage using the CPS, they usually presume that all union members are covered 
by collective bargaining. The fraction of workers covered by collective bargaining is assumed 
to be the sum of all union members and non-members who answered that they are covered by 
collective bargaining. This is a serious misspecification in assessing the true collective 
bargaining coverage of public school teachers for two reasons. First, not all union members 
are covered by collective bargaining. In states that prohibit collective bargaining of teachers, 
                                                          
15
 The top 10 second jobs for public school teachers are 1) private school teachers 2) post-secondary 
school teachers 3) coaches 4) retail salesperson 5) musicians 6) farmers and ranchers 7) religious 
activities directors 8) waiters/waitress 9) janitors and building cleaners 10) supervisor/managers of 
retail salespersons. 
16
 One of the reasons for this discrepancy is that some survey questions ask teachers to count 
afterschool program as a second job. 
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members of teachers unions are not covered by collective bargaining. Second, some teachers 
who are not union members may not know if they are covered by collective bargaining or not. 
There is an alternative source for the union coverage data; the Survey of Schools and 
Staffing Survey (SASS) conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 
The survey is completed by school district administrators, who know better about the 
collective bargaining status of the teachers in their district, so the union coverage data from 
the SASS can be calculated at the school district level. Therefore, SASS provides more 
accurate data on collective bargaining coverage of teachers than the CPS. For this reason, 
Hirsch et al. (2011) used both CPS and SASS to study the effect of collective bargaining on 
teacher salaries.  
Table 2.4 summarizes the descriptive statistics on the unionization using both SASS 
and CPS. For each data source, the first column reports the union density by state and the 
second column reports the collective bargaining status by state. There is a substantial 
discrepancy between the SASS and the CPS in the unionism measures, in particular the 
collective bargaining coverage. To see how big the measurement errors are in the CPS, I 
regress the collective bargaining coverage calculated from CPS on the collective bargaining 
coverage from SASS
17
. Table 2.5 reports the empirical results.  
In Panel A of Table 2.5, the collective bargaining coverage calculated from the CPS 
shows a strong association with the one reported from the SASS in High-CB group. In Low-
CB group, however, the collective bargaining coverage from the CPS shows some 
unreliability, as the coefficients for the SASS are insignificant. For the states that prohibit 
                                                          
17 I used the values reported in table 2.2 in Moe (2011). He uses the average values from SASS 
between 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 academic years, as the unionization and collective bargaining of 
teachers in each state is quite stable over time. 
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Table 2.4: Unionization and Collective Bargaining of Public School Teachers  
By State 
 SASS
1 
CPS
2 
States 
Percent of 
teachers 
unionized  
Percent covered  
by collective 
bargaining 
Percent of 
teachers 
unionized  
Percent covered 
by collective 
bargaining
3
 
Alabama 84 2 58 61 
Alaska 90 99 77 77 
Arizona 51 0 41 46 
Arkansas 36 17 28 33 
California 96 98 79 79 
Colorado 69 76 56 59 
Connecticut 100 95 84 84 
DC 93 100 63 65 
Delaware 93 100 71 73 
Florida 61 100 44 50 
Georgia 55 0 26 31 
Hawaii 98 100 80 80 
Idaho 66 95 43 51 
Illinois 95 96 82 82 
Indiana 81 99 62 65 
Iowa 75 98 63 67 
Kansas 60 88 42 50 
Kentucky 60 21 37 45 
Louisiana 61 19 29 34 
Maine 79 98 63 68 
Maryland 86 100 69 71 
Massachusetts 97 98 80 81 
Michigan 99 94 81 82 
Minnesota 99 93 83 83 
Mississippi 35 0 18 27 
Missouri 76 8 45 51 
Montana 85 90 67 68 
Nebraska 85 93 65 68 
Nevada 72 100 59 63 
New 
Hampshire 
81 99 70 72 
New Jersey 99 95 85 86 
New Mexico 41 56 36 45 
New York 99 95 87 87 
N. Carolina 49 0 16 21 
N. Dakota 77 85 53 61 
Ohio 95 97 79 80 
Oklahoma 59 63 40 45 
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Table 2.4: Unionization and Collective Bargaining of Public School Teachers (Cont.) 
 SASS
1 
CPS
2 
States 
Percent of 
teachers 
unionized  
Percent covered  
by collective 
bargaining 
Percent of 
teachers 
unionized  
Percent covered 
by collective 
bargaining
3
 
Oregon 97 99 82 83 
Pennsylvania 96 98 84 84 
Rhode Island 99 93 87 87 
S. Carolina 28 0 15 22 
S. Dakota 56 88 38 44 
Tennessee 65 84 36 42 
Texas 65 0 29 35 
Utah 70 84 50 51 
Vermont 84 98 67 70 
Virginia 53 0 28 32 
Washington 98 97 81 81 
West Virginia 75 0 62 64 
Wisconsin 99 98 80 81 
Wyoming 56 40 41 46 
U.S. Average 79 64 58 61 
1
The data for SASS is from Moe (2011. Table 2-2), in which he reported the average values from 
SASS between 2003-2004 and 2007-2008.  
2
The data for CPS MORG is from between 2001 and 2010.  
3
This is calculated as the sum of union members and non-union members who answered that they 
are covered by collective bargaining. 
 
collective bargaining, No-CB group, I cannot investigate this relationship because the values 
for the collective bargaining coverage from SASS are zero for all states. However, the 
average collective bargaining coverage calculated from CPS is almost 30%, which is far 
from zero. In Panel B, on the other hand, the coefficients of union density from the SASS 
are significant in all groups, which suggest that union density data from the CPS is 
sufficiently close to the one from the SASS. Therefore, in my analysis, I focus on the union 
membership data rather than collective bargaining data, in the CPS to assess the strength of 
unionism. 
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Table 2.5: The Measure of Unionization using CPS and SASS 
 
By Group 
 
Public School Teachers 
 
 
 
High-CB group Low-CB group No-CB group 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Collective bargaining coverage calculated from CPS 
CB coverage from SASS .741***(.207) .015(.110) NA 
Adjusted R
2 
.246 .002 NA 
N 35 9 7 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Union density from CPS 
Union Density from SASS .961***(.052) .706***(.128) .446***(.096) 
Adjusted R
2
 .925 .642 .366 
N 35 9 7 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Survey of Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) from Moe (2011, Table 2.2). The collective 
bargaining coverage is the average values of 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 academic year. The average 
collective bargaining coverage in No-CB group is zero.   
 
2.5 Empirical Strategies 
 
 Hurley (2004) showed that the wage gap between non-teaching careers and teaching 
careers among college graduates has been increasing since 1940, and it was about 60% for 
males and 16% for females in 2000. He argued that the real wage differentials among college 
graduates would be even larger because more teachers have master’s degrees than their 
comparison group. The wage gap reported in this study is the unconditional wage differentials 
between public school teachers and non-teachers among college graduates. Murnane et al. 
(1991) also stated that a large wage gap exist between teacher salaries and the salaries for the 
college graduates with the same major, but they did not consider other wage determinants. 
Using CPS data from 1977-1999, Temin (2002) found that the females with the years of 
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schooling of seventeen or above working in the non-teaching occupations made 40% more 
than the ones working in the teaching career in 1999, also uncontrolling for other wage 
determinants.  
 The first part of my empirical analyses builds on these studies by directly comparing 
earnings among the college graduates, but I control for other wage determinants and 
individual attributes such as potential work experience, union status, industries, occupations, 
worker class, metropolitan region, marital status, race, and ethnicity. State fixed effects and 
year fixed effects are also added in my regression models. Rather than using the entire 
population, I focus on the population with the college degrees since most public school 
teachers are college graduates. This approach can provide the direct evidence if teachers are 
paid less relative to other comparable college graduates with similar worker characteristics.  
 The second part of my empirical studies focuses on the changes in earnings after 
people change their careers. The Roy model predicts that if (i) the non-teaching sectors have 
more dispersed income distribution than the teaching sector does and (ii) the unobservable 
abilities are highly correlated between the teaching sector and the non-teaching sectors, 
positive selection occurs when teachers move into the non-teaching sectors but negative 
selection occurs when non-teachers move into the teaching sector. In other words, when these 
two conditions are satisfied, the high quality teachers are more likely to move into the non-
teaching sectors for higher returns to ability, and the low quality non-teachers are more likely 
to move into the teaching sector to take advantage of narrower income distribution. 
First, I investigate if public school teachers are paid less than their comparable non-
teachers. The most straightforward way is to directly estimate a wage premium or a wage 
handicap for public school teachers. The general wage equation I estimate is:  
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Log (Hourly Earnings) = uXTeacher  1210        (5) 
 
where Teacher is a dummy variable for public school teachers, X1 is the vector of wage 
determinants, and u is the error terms that are unobservable. X includes education, gender, 
race, ethnicity, marital status, citizenship status, and potential work experience, which is 
proxied by age–years of schooling–6, interaction between gender and potential experience, 
union membership status, metropolitan regions, worker class, broad industry dummies, and a 
dummy for private school teacher. Time fixed effects are included to control for period-
specific shocks that hit all states, such as financial crisis in 2008. I also add state fixed effects 
to control for unobservable state characteristics that do not change over time. The standard 
error is clustered within states. measures the effect of being a public school teacher on Log 
(hourly earnings). When its sign is positive (negative), public school teachers have a wage 
premium (penalty). I also run the regressions for different age groups separately to see if how 
teachers’ work experience affects their earnings.  
Then, I examine the effect of wage determinants on earnings for three occupational 
groups: public school teachers, private school teachers, and non-teachers. The wage equations 
I estimate for each group is: 
 
Log (Hourly Earnings of each occupational group) = uX  210     (6) 
 
where X2 is the vector of other wage determinants in each group. For teachers, variables of 
occupation, industry and worker class are excluded to avoid perfect multicollinearity. For 
1
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non-teacher group, I add broad occupation dummies, broad industry dummies, and worker 
class dummies to reduce the omitted variable bias. 
 If public school teachers are truly underpaid than comparable non-teachers, then they 
must have better alternative opportunities in the non-teaching sectors. They should have larger 
increases in their earnings after they move into the non-teaching sectors than non-teachers 
who change the careers to other non-teaching occupations. To verify this, I assess the change 
in earnings of public school teachers who change to non-teaching professions and of non-
teachers who change to teaching professions. During one-year period, some people change 
their careers (career-changers) while others remain in their occupations (career-stayers). The 
changes in earnings of career-stayers can be interpreted as returns to experience of current 
occupations. The changes in earnings of career-changers can be interpreted as the wage 
premium/penalty of holding previous occupations. Most wage determinants including 
individual characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship status, education status, 
marital status, metropolitan area, and the states which they live in, do not change (or change 
little) during one year. The only thing that changes is their careers which is the driving force 
for the changes in earnings. Thus, I directly compare the differences in earnings by using 
individual fixed effects model:  
 
Log (Hourly Earningsi2) = 22 iii uCareer         (7) 
Log (Hourly Earningsi1) = 11 iii uCareer        (8) 
∆ = (7) – (8) = )())(( 1212 iiii uuCareerCareer       (9) 
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where  is the individual characteristics that do not change over time, and Careerit represents 
the occupation at period t=1 or 2. The effect of a career change on changes in earnings is
  , which has no meaningful interpretation. ∆, the changes in earnings, however, tells us 
which career path offers higher or smaller increase in earnings after one year. When ∆ is small, 
it can be interpreted as a percentage change in hourly earnings. If the sign of ∆ is positive 
(negative) for a career changer, it suggests that the person could have earned more (less) if 
he/she were working for the new occupation. Thus, it implies that there is wage penalty 
(premium) in holding previous occupation. 
 One important estimation issue is the work experience that people had built up at 
previous occupations. In many cases, people will lose the value of the work experience when 
they start a new career. The CPS does not provide the data about how long the person has 
been working at a current job, so it is hard to know exactly how much experience people have 
accumulated. To deal with this issue, I look at the changes in earning for different age groups 
since it is reasonable to assume that the older the person is the greater the work experience is. 
Another approach is to use the standard work experience formula (age – years of schooling – 
6) as a proxy. The earnings will increase even if people just stay in their current occupations 
as they receive returns to experience over the year, and it can set the base line. I look into the 
changes in earnings for ten different career paths for various age groups and work experience 
groups: 
 
1)  Change from a public school teacher to another public school teacher 
2)  Change from a public school teacher to a non-teaching occupation 
3)  Change from a private school teacher to a public school teacher 

 i
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4)  Change from a private school teacher to a non-teaching occupation 
5)  Change from a non-teaching occupation to another non-teaching occupation 
6)  Change from a non-teaching occupation to a public school teacher 
7)  Change from a non-teaching occupation to a private school teacher 
8)  Stay teaching in a public school 
9)  Stay teaching in a private school 
10)  Stay in a non-teaching occupation 
 
Next, I attempt to deal with the endogeneity problem of unionization by analyzing the 
union effects separately for different groups of states that have same legal environment 
toward collective bargaining of teachers unions. I examine if teachers unions in each group 
have different effects on teachers’ earnings by utilizing two datasets. I use the CPS ORG to 
measure the effect of union membership. I combine CPS ORG data and the collective 
bargaining data from the SASS to estimate both the effect of collective bargaining and the 
effect of union membership on teachers’ earnings. The model I estimate for each group using 
CPS ORG is: 
 
Log (Hourly Earnings) = uXUnionTeacherUnionTeacher  43210 )*(   (10) 
 
where Union is a dummy variable for a union member. I add the interaction term between 
public school teachers and teachers union ( UnionTeacher * ) to see if the effect of unions on 
earnings differs between teachers and non-teachers. 2  measures the union wage premium for 
non-teachers while 32    measures the union wage premium for public school teachers. For 
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the combined dataset of the SASS and CPS ORG, I add the information on the collective 
bargaining coverage of each state from the SASS, which is reported in Table 4, into the model 
(10).  
Intuitively, the effect of teachers unions on teachers’ earnings would be more 
significant and greater in states that have collective bargaining laws, while the effect is either 
insignificant or smaller in states that prohibit the collective bargaining of public school 
teachers. To check whether the union effects are proportional to the strength of the legal 
environment for teachers’ bargaining rights, I estimate the following model for each group 
separately: 
 
Log (Teachers’ hourly earnings) = uXionsTeachersUn  210     (11) 
 
where ionsTeachersUn  indicates if a teacher is the member of teachers unions. 
Lastly, I compare the changes in earnings of ten career paths during one-year period 
for each group separately to examine if career dynamics differ in different legal environment 
towards collective bargaining. For this analysis, I estimate the same model (9) by age groups.   
 
2.6 Results 
 
Table 2.6 summarizes the result from regression model (5). Overall, public school 
teachers earn 3.3% less than other comparable college graduates who work in the non-
teaching sector. The wage penalty is 7.8% for male public school teachers and 1.6% for 
female public school teachers. The gender difference in the wage penalty explains why the 
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teaching sector is still dominated by females. There exists a wage premium of 8% for public 
school teachers in their 20s, but it quickly disappears. The wage premium turns into the wage 
handicap for public school teachers in their 30s or above. Even though young public school 
teachers are paid better than their comparable non-teachers, it is only for a brief period of their 
career path. Thus, public school teachers are paid less compared to other college graduates 
considering their lifetime income.  
 
Table 2.6: Wage Premium/Penalty of Public School Teachers 
 
By Age group and gender 
 
College graduates only 
 
Dependent Variable: Log (hourly earnings) 
 
Age Group All Male Female 
All ages -.033 (.009)*** -.078 (.014) *** -.016 (.008)** 
< 30 years old .081 (.015)*** .095 (.025)*** .063 (.013)*** 
30 - 39 years old -.043 (.015)*** -.088 (.027)*** -.031 (.015)** 
40 - 49 years old -.031 (.010)*** -.066 (.020)*** -.017 (.011)* 
50 - 59 years old -.026 (.010)** -.060 (.019)*** -.009 (.010) 
> 59 years old -.085 (.024)*** -.137 (.041)*** -.064 (.021)*** 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control variables: a dummy for higher education(master’s degree or above), potential experience 
and its square, categorical dummies for race, ethnicity, metropolitan area, population size, marital 
status, worker class, and broad industry, a dummy for family head, union status, citizenship status 
and private school teachers. All regressions employ state FE and time FE. All regressions use 
persons’ composited final weight. 
 
Why does the teacher premium in their 20s quickly disappear? To answer this question, 
I first investigate the effects of wage determinants on earnings by occupational group. Table 
2.7 reports the coefficients and standard errors estimated from model (6). The returns to 
master’s degrees are higher for teachers (13.5%) than for non-teachers (11%). The returns to 
higher level of education (professional school degree and doctorate degree) are  
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Table 2.7: Wage Determinants by Occupation 
 
College graduates only 
 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: Log (hourly earnings) 
 
VARIABLES Public School Teacher Private School Teacher Other Occupations 
Master’s degree 
.135 *** 
(.007) 
.136 *** 
(.014) 
.109 *** 
(.004) 
Professional school or 
Doctorate degree 
.201 *** 
(.0203) 
.104 ** 
(.046) 
.216 *** 
(.0108) 
Male 
.0001 
(.018) 
.003 
(.050) 
.059 *** 
(.005) 
Potential experience 
.021 *** 
(.002) 
.012 *** 
(.004) 
.025 *** 
(.0007) 
Potential experience
2 -.0003 *** 
(.000) 
-.0002 * 
(.000) 
-.0005 *** 
(.00001) 
Male*experience 
.006 *** 
(.0016) 
.009 * 
(.005) 
.007*** 
(.0006) 
Male*experience
2 -.00007 ** 
(.00003) 
-.000 
(.0001) 
-.0001 *** 
(.00001) 
Metropolitan area 
.096 *** 
(.013) 
.156 *** 
(.03) 
.133 *** 
(.012) 
Union membership 
.057 *** 
(.014) 
.166 *** 
(.020) 
.053*** 
( .006) 
Black 
-.026 
(.018) 
-.014 
(.028) 
-.115 *** 
(.006) 
Indian 
.0522 
(.068) 
.124 
(.095) 
-.071 *** 
(.017) 
Asian 
.007 
(.027) 
.101*  
(.051) 
-.007 
(.008) 
Other 
-.021 
(.054) 
.057 * 
(.034) 
-.007 
(.013) 
Hispanic 
.014 
(.008) 
.093 *** 
(.017) 
-.076 *** 
(.007) 
State FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES 
    
Adjusted R
2 
0.216 0.194 0.253 
N 31,142 6,114 347,170 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other control variables: For teachers, categorical dummies for population size and marital status, a 
dummy for family head and citizenship status are used. For non-teachers, categorical dummies for 
worker class, broad industry, and broad occupation are also included. All regressions employ state 
FE and time FE. All regressions use persons’ composited final weights. 
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slightly lower for public school teachers, but much lower for private school teachers. The 
returns to experience are also lower for teachers than for non-teachers. The coefficients for 
both male and the interaction between male and experience are significant at 1% level in non-
teaching sectors, which suggest that the returns to experience is higher for male non-teachers 
than for female non-teachers. Therefore, for those who have master’s degree in their 20s, 
teaching career may look attractive because the beginning teachers’ wage is higher than the 
beginning non-teaching wage, but this wage premium wanes over time and more quickly so 
for male teachers partly due to low returns to experience in the teaching sector. This also 
provides evidence why the attrition rate is so high especially among new teachers
18
.  
The nominal income should be higher in metropolitan area to compensate for higher 
living costs and to keep the real income stable. However, public school teachers receive 
smaller premium (9.6%) than non-teachers (13.3%) who live in the same metropolitan regions. 
Thus, teachers in the urban districts face even worse wage penalty than teachers in rural 
districts, and this will contribute to the problem of low teacher retention rate in urban area.  
The effects of unions on earnings are slightly higher in the teaching sector (5.7%) than 
in the non-teaching sectors (5.3%) when focused only on college graduates. Considering the 
substantial difference of the average union membership between the teaching sector (64%) 
and the non-teaching sectors (9.5%), the difference of the union effects on earnings between 
the two sectors is quite small. In the later analysis, I show that the average union effect 
presented in Table 2.7 is misleading because the union effects on teachers’ earnings 
significantly differ depending on the legal environments towards collective bargaining.  
                                                          
18
 See Carroll and Foster (2010). According to the survey administered by NCTAF (National 
Commission on Teaching and America’s Future), the teacher attrition rate has been steadily increasing 
since mid-90s, and it is about 46% in 2010 for a new teacher whose teaching experience is less than 
five years.  
 71 
According to compensating differentials, public school teachers take less salary than 
non-teachers in exchange for better fringe benefits. This implies that they should earn more 
hourly earnings and fewer benefits when they move to the non-teaching sectors such that the 
total compensations for teachers and non-teachers with the same wage determinants are 
commensurate. If compensating differentials can explain the entire difference in hourly 
earnings between teachers and non-teachers, then teachers should make higher hourly 
earnings if they change to non-teaching occupations just enough to make up for the wage 
penalty that have been receiving in the teaching sector so that their total compensations in 
both sectors remain the same. However, if public school teachers have been paid less 
compared to non-teachers, then their total compensation will be lower than that of non-
teachers. In this case, when they move to the non-teaching sectors (ignoring self-selection 
issue for now), their hourly earnings will be greater in magnitude than the wage penalty that 
they have received in the teaching sector. Thus, public school teachers will be able to receive 
higher total compensation after they change to the non-teaching sector. To verify this, I 
examine the changes in earnings for teachers and non-teachers after they change careers. 
Table 2.8 presents the changes in earnings during the one-year period for ten career paths by 
age group estimated from the model (9).  
I first discuss career dynamics and changes in earnings for teachers. In the top panel 
for all-ages group, public school teachers have steeper increase in their earnings, on average, 
when they change into non-teaching sectors (3.81%) than non-teachers do when they change 
their careers to other non-teaching careers (3.14%). The 3.81% increase in hourly earnings of 
public school teachers is larger than their wage penalty of 3.3% in Table 2.6, and the pattern 
is observed for both male teachers (8.57% > 7.08%) and female teachers  (3.29% > 1.6%).
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Table 2.8: The Change in Earnings after Career Change by Age Group 
 
College Graduates Only 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆ = Log (After hourly earnings) – Log (Before hourly earnings) 
 
  
All Male Female 
N ∆ N ∆ N ∆ 
All ages 
All Career changers 30185 .0364 17239 .0332 12946 .0406 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 962 .0582 345 .1055 617 .0318 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 433 .0381 121 .0857 312 .0329 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 72 -.032 28 -.063 44 -.012 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 143 .0464 49 .2932 94 -.082 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 27765 .0314 16497 .0304 11268 .0318 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 457 .0660 103 .1133 354 .0523 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 176 .0189 43 .0193 133 .0189 
All stayers 39039 .0415 20488 .0449 18551 .0378 
Stay teaching at public school  4325 .0488 1084 .0680 3241 .0424 
Stay teaching at private school 819 .0498 209 .0127 610 .0626 
Stay in non-teaching 33895 .0404 19195 .0440 14700 .0358 
< 30 years old  
All Career changers 4140 .0826 2022 .0717 2118 .0927 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 114 .2421 43 .2123 71 .2602 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 56 .0971 14 .0840 42 .1109 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 4 .0310 0   4 .0310 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 21 -.045 4 .2455 17 -.113 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 3817 .0770 1931 .0688 1886 .0868 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 68 .1052 17 .1780 51 .0809 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 38 .1001 7 -.132 31 .1524 
All stayers 4436 .0649 1960 .0734 2474 .0581 
Stay teaching at public school  501 .0373 115 .0301 386 .0390 
Stay teaching at private school 117 .0668 34 .0509 83 .0734 
Stay in non-teaching 3818 .0692 1811 .0770 2005 .0615 
30 - 39 years old  
All Career changers 8245 .0433 4725 .0464 3520 .0392 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 237 .0272 87 .1032 150 -.017 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 127 .1001 37 .1963 90 .0706 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 20 .0811 11 .0583 9 .1089 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 37 .1226 15 .2751 22 .0188 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 7643 .0426 4525 .0435 3118 .0414 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 101 .0373 23 .0422 78 .0358 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 39 -.054 13 -.044 26 -.059 
All stayers 10402 .0530 5643 .0617 4759 .0425 
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Table 2.8: The Change in Earnings after Career Change by Age Group (Cont.) 
 
Stay teaching at public school  1035 .0583 297 .0829 738 .0544 
Stay teaching at private school 211 .0836 61 .0372 150 .1025 
Stay in non-teaching 9156 .0665 5285 .0697 3871 .0479 
40 - 49 years old  
All Career changers 9129 .0288 5310 .0300 3819 .0271 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 281 .0226 90 -.003 191 .0346 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 112 .0455 32 .1306 80 .0310 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 21 .0514 10 .0870 11 .0192 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 34 -.01 13 .1191 21 -.089 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 8460 .0282 5113 .0293 3347 .0265 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 128 .1123 27 .2141 101 .0851 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 50 -.063 9 -.025 41 -.071 
All stayers 11772 .0353 6196 .0358 5576 .0346 
Stay teaching at public school  1220 .0441 305 .0683 915 .0370 
Stay teaching at private school 221 .0345 43 -.084 178 .0631 
Stay in non-teaching 10331 .0342 5848 .0350 4483 .0330 
50 - 59 years old 
All Career changers 7017 .0188 4138 .0103 2879 .0311 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 285 .0510 105 .0702 180 -.019 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 114 .0335 33 .1709 81 .0129 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 19 -.035 5 -.276 14 .0516 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 37 .1682 12 .7364 25 -.105 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 6342 .0167 3934 .0039 2409 .0378 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 126 .0590 28 .0775 98 .0524 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 32 .1003 8 .1268 24 .0915 
All stayers 9966 .0305 5230 .0286 4736 .0326 
Stay teaching at public school  1356 .0509 312 .0580 1044 .0488 
Stay teaching at private school 224 .0519 60 .0514 164 .0520 
Stay in non-teaching 8386 .0267 4858 .0265 3528 .0269 
> 60 years old 
All Career changers 1654 .0035 1044 .0069 610 -.002 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 45 .0249 20 .0304 25 .0206 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 24 -.13 5 .3819 19 -.264 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 8 -.555 2 -.943 6 -.425 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 14 -.204 5 -.224 9 -.192 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 1503 .0117 994 .0073 509 .0203 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 34 -.071 8 -.034 26 -.083 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 17 .0935 6 .2555 11 .0051 
All stayers 2463 .0260 1457 .0389 1006 .0074 
Stay teaching at public school  213 -.014 55 .0149 158 -.025 
Stay teaching at private school 46 -.084 11 -.076 35 -.087 
Stay in non-teaching 2204 .0322 1391 .0407 813 .0176 
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This suggests that public school teachers can make hourly earnings that are more than enough 
to make up for the wage penalty of the teaching career when they move to the non-teaching 
sectors. It suggests that public school teachers are underpaid to the extent that they could have 
made higher total compensation if they had started at non-teaching occupations. 
Compensating differentials, therefore, cannot fully explain the wage gap in hourly earnings 
between the teaching and the non-teaching sectors.  
The second panel of Table 2.8 shows changes in earnings for people in their 20s. 
During one-year period, non-teachers who stay in their careers have significantly higher 
increase in their earning (6.92%) than public school teachers who remain in the teaching 
sector (3.73%). Thus, the returns to experience of public school teachers are almost a half of 
the returns to experience of non-teachers for this age group. Public school teachers who move 
into the non-teaching sectors in their 20s have a huge increase in their earnings (9.71%) as 
opposed to staying in the same teaching positions (3.73%). Recall that public school teachers 
in their 20s have a wage premium of 8% (See Table 2.6). Public school teachers in their 20s 
who leave the teaching career even with the wage premium are more likely to be high quality 
teacher. For them, the teacher premium might not be enough to encourage them to stay in the 
teaching sector because they have even better earning opportunities outside the teaching 
sector. The low returns to experience for young teachers might also encourage them to leave 
their classrooms.  
The third, fourth, and fifth panel of Table 2.8 show the changes in earnings for people 
in their 30s, 40s, and 50s and above, respectively. When public school teachers in their 30s 
move into the non-teaching sectors, they also have considerably higher increase in earnings. 
Public school teachers in their 40s have slightly higher pay increase when they move into the 
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non-teaching sectors. Public school teachers in their 50s and above are better off staying in 
their careers even though they face a wage penalty. Public school teachers in their 40s and 50s 
have higher returns to experience than non-teachers of the same age groups. 
I now discuss career dynamics and changes in earnings for non-teachers. In all-ages 
group, non-teachers who move into the teaching sector increase their earnings (6.6%) more 
than non-teachers who change to other non-teaching occupations (3.14%). Non-teachers in 
their 20s can take advantage of teacher wage premium by moving into the teaching sector. 
Non-teachers in their 40s and 50s also have larger increase in their earnings when they move 
into the teaching sector. Considering that teachers in their 40s and 50s face a wage penalty 
(see Table 2.6), non-teachers in these age groups who still decide to become teachers having a 
large increase in their earnings are more likely to be low quality people or less successful in 
their previous careers.  
I also analyze the changes in earnings after career changes from model (9) by potential 
experience group, and Table 2.9 summarizes the results. For people with less than 20 years of 
experience, public school teachers have steeper increase in their earnings when they move 
into the non-teaching sectors than non-teachers do when they change to other non-teaching 
occupations. This is the same result as the age group analysis reported in Table 2.8, which 
implies that public school teachers are underpaid in a sense that they could have obtained 
higher earnings had they started off as non-teaching careers. Moreover, the returns to 
experience with less than 10 years of experience are 3% for public school teachers and 7% for 
non-teachers. The returns to experience for public school teachers with higher experience 
(between 11 and 20 years) are larger than for non-teachers, so the salary schedule for public 
school teachers seems to put more weight on seniority. Non-teachers between 10 and 30 years 
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Table 2.9: The Change in Earnings after Career Change by Experience Group 
 
College graduates only 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆ = Log (After hourly earnings) – Log (Before hourly earnings) 
  
 
All Male Female 
N ∆ N ∆ N ∆ 
Potential experience ≤ 5 :  semi-equivalent to age group of  < 30 years old 
All Career changers 3138 .0944 1498 .0837 1640 .1041 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 87 .2728 31 .2036 56 .3104 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 50 .0931 10 .0183 40 .1137 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 3 .2401 0   3 .2401 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 16 -.026 3 .1311 13 -.046 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 2872 .0899 1430 .0854 1442 .0983 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 59 .1396 13 .2351 46 .1027 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 34 -.006 7 -.122 27 .0239 
All stayers 3682 .0750 1639 .0903 2043 .0661 
Stay teaching at public school 399 .0429 93 .0170 306 .0528 
Stay teaching at private school 95 .0640 25 .1201 70 .0431 
Stay in non-teaching 3188 .0782 1521 .0949 1667 .0677 
Potential experience ≤ 10:  semi-equivalent to age group of  < 39 years old 
All Career changers 7071 .0654 3628 .0596 3443 .0711 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 218 .1521 82 .1564 136 .1496 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 114 .0928 30 .0785 84 .0962 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 11 .1155 5 .0682 6 .1550 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 37 .0832 11 .2399 26 .0167 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 6489 .0620 3447 .0582 3042 .0664 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 109 .0413 27 .0665 82 .0326 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 52 .0846 14 -.008 38 .1187 
All stayers 8512 .0665 4133 .0810 4379 .0529 
Stay teaching at public school 900 .0313 239 .0416 661 .0276 
Stay teaching at private school 192 .1089 59 .1430 133 .0937 
Stay in non-teaching 7420 .0697 3835 .0825 3585 .0560 
11 ≤ Potential experience ≤ 20: semi-equivalent to age group of 40 - 49 years old 
All Career changers 8721  .0347 5204 .0382 3517 .0340 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 229  .0086 82 .0514 147 -.015 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 109  .1826 33 .3662 76 .1085 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 19  .1459 11 .1318 8 .1732 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 37  -.015 17 .1135 20 -.133 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 8138  .0334 5006 .0344 3132 .0320 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 105  .0980 28 .2545 77 .0466 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 42  -.125 11 -.154 31 -.115 
All stayers 10986 .0434 6011 .0455 4975 .0408 
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Table 2.9: The Change in Earnings after Career Change by Experience Group (Cont.) 
 
Stay teaching at public school 1103  .0741 300 .1054 803 .0635 
Stay teaching at private school 220  .0283 54 -.149 166 .0914 
Stay in non-teaching 9663  .0398 5657 .0442 4006 .0336 
21 ≤ Potential experience ≤ 30: semi-equivalent to age group of 50 - 59 years old 
All Career changers 8989 .0323 5137 .0315 3852 .0334 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 338 .0452 118 .1007 220 .0157 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 137 -.022 37 .0193 100 -.048 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 23 .0251 7 .0037 16 .0352 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 39 -.074 10 .0401 29 -.114 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 8213 .0321 4911 .0309 3302 .0367 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 140 .1065 30 .0651 110 .1136 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 48 .0213 7 .1695 41 -.004 
All stayers 11993 .0309 6229 .0313 5764 .0324 
Stay teaching at public school 1437 .0411 335 .0811 1102 .0328 
Stay teaching at private school 251 .0382 58 .0021 193 .0475 
Stay in non-teaching 10305 .0293 5836 .0288 4469 .0320 
31 ≤ Potential experience: semi-equivalent to age group of  > 60 years old 
All Career changers 5422 .0068 3314 -.001 2108  .0187 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 185 .0204 68 .0874 117 -.019 
Public school teacher to non-teacher 77 -.053 22 -.034 55 -.06 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 17 -.38 5 -.714 12 -.241 
Private school teacher to non-teacher 33 .1823 13 .6142 20 -.098 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 4935 .0078 3169 -.004 1766 .0289 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 100 -.017 18 .0051 82 -.022 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 31  .0865 11 .1320 20 .0615 
All stayers 7583 .0292 4142 .0322 3441 .0256 
Stay teaching at public school 889 .0416 212 .0224 677 .0476 
Stay teaching at private school 154 .0141 37 .0754 117 -.005 
Stay in non-teaching 6540 .0279 3893 .0324 2647 .0214 
 
of experience gain larger increase in their earnings when they move into the public school 
teaching sector. Considering that the returns to experience are low for new teachers, these 
non-teachers who move into the teaching sector with good experience in their previous 
careers are likely to be low quality people. 
To address the self-selection problem of career changes, I use the Roy model. The 
model predicts that high ability teachers are more likely to move into the non-teaching sectors 
 78 
(positive selection) and that low ability non-teachers are more likely to move into the teaching 
sector (negative selection). Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 showed that younger public school 
teachers with less experience earn more when they move into the non-teaching sectors, and 
older non-teachers with more experience are better off moving into the teaching sector. 
However, it is not yet clear whether these younger teachers who move into the non-teaching 
sectors are the high quality people and whether older non-teachers who move into the 
teaching sector are the low quality people. Comparing the pre-earnings (hourly earnings that 
people reported during the first interview) of career-changers and career-stayers provides the 
supporting evidence.  
Table 2.10 provides the summary statistics of pre-earnings, measured in hourly wage, 
for public school teachers and non-teachers. The first panel summarizes the pre-earnings for 
all-ages group, and the second panel presents the pre-earnings for younger age group (age<40) 
of teachers and older (40<age<60) age group of non-teachers. The first panel shows that, 
overall, public school teachers who stay in their current teaching position had lower pre-
earnings, and teachers who move into the non-teaching sectors had higher pre-earnings. This 
pattern becomes more apparent in the second panel. For young males, public school teachers 
who move out of the teaching sector have higher pre-earnings ($23.94) than public school 
teachers who stay in their teaching positions ($21.11), and this difference is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Therefore, public school teachers who move into the non-
teaching sectors are, on average, high aptitude teachers with higher-earnings ability  
than the public school teachers who stay in current teaching positions, and this provides 
evidence for positive selection.  
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Table 2.10: Pre-Earnings for Teachers and Non-teachers 
 
College Graduates Only 
 
  
Male Female 
N 
Hourly 
Earnings($) 
N 
Hourly 
Earnings($) 
Panel 1: All-Ages Group 
Public school teachers 
Stay teaching at public school 1,048 24.02 3,241 21.82 
Change to other public school teacher  345 24.09 617 23.27 
Change to non-teaching career 121 25.11 312 22.10 
Non-teachers 
Stay in non-teaching career 19,195 30.51 14,700 25.01 
Change to other non-teaching career 16,497 29.98 11,268 23.75 
Change to private school teacher 43 24.94 133 21.14 
Change to public school teacher 103 24.01 354 22.51 
Panel 2: Younger Teachers and Older Non-teachers 
Public school teachers (age <40) 
Stay teaching at public school 456 21.11 1,207 19.73 
Change to other public school teacher  138 21.47 239 21.01 
Change to non-teaching career 55 23.94 143 20.83 
Non-teachers (40< age <60) 
Stay in non-teaching career 10,135 32.34 7,618 26.18 
Change to other non-teaching career 8,525 32.29 5,387 25.42 
Change to private school teacher 16 25.87 60 23.09 
Change to public school teacher 52 25.80 185 24.87 
Source: CPS MORG, 2001-2010 
 
Figure 2.1 displays the distributions for pre-earnings and after-earnings of public 
school teachers by gender with box plots. The left and right side of the box is the 25
th
 
percentile and 75
th
 percentile, respectively, and the vertical line near the middle of the box 
indicates the 50
th
 percentile. There are many dots to the right of the whisker, which implies 
that this is a heavy-tailed distribution. Compared to the distribution of pre-earnings of public 
school teachers who stay in their careers (the first box plot of each gender), the distribution of 
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Figure 2.1: Changes in Earnings of Public School Teachers 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Changes in Earnings of Non-teachers 
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pre-earnings of public school teachers who move into the non-teaching sectors (the third box 
plot of each gender) is slightly to the right. The after-earning distribution for public school 
teachers who leave the teaching professions (the fourth box plot of each gender) is also more 
to the right than the after-earning distribution for career stayers (the second box plot of each 
gender). The median of after-earning distribution is much higher for public school teachers 
who move the into non-teaching sectors than that of public school teachers who stay in their 
careers. Thus, public school teachers who leave the teaching sector are more likely to be 
higher aptitude teachers with higher-earnings ability than public school teachers who remain 
in the teaching sector. 
For non-teachers, the story is the opposite. Table 2.10 shows that on average non-
teachers who stay in their careers had higher pre-earnings, and that non-teachers who move 
into the teaching sector had lower pre-earnings. In all-ages group, the pre-earnings of male 
non-teachers who move into the teaching sector is the lowest ($24.01) among all career paths. 
Older male non-teachers who move into the teaching sector have much lower pre-earnings 
($25.80) than older non-teachers who stay in their careers ($32.34), and the difference of the 
pre-earnings is significant at the 1% level.  
In Figure 2.2, pre-earnings distribution of non-teachers who move into the teaching 
sector (the third box plot of each gender) is significantly to the left of the pre-earnings 
distribution of non-teachers who stay in their careers (the first box plot of each gender). This 
pattern is more conspicuous for male non-teachers. The after-earnings distribution of non-
teachers who move into the teaching sector (the fourth box plot of each gender) is also to the 
left of the after-earnings distribution of non-teachers who stay in their careers (the second box 
plot of each gender). Thus, the negative selection finds the supporting evidence; non-teachers 
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who move into the teaching sector had lower pre-earnings than other non-teachers who 
remain in their career, so they are more likely to be lower aptitude people with lower-earnings 
ability.  
If what we observe is a simple case of compensating differentials, every public school 
teacher should have the same chance to make better hourly earnings in exchange for less 
fringe benefits if they move into the non-teaching sector, and there is no reason to find the 
significant differences in the pre-earnings between the teachers who remain in the teaching 
sector and who move into the non-teaching sector. By the same argument, we should not 
observe the difference in the pre-earnings between non-teachers who stay in their careers and 
who move into the teaching sector. However, we do find a significant difference in the pre-
earnings distribution between career-stayers and career-changers among public school 
teachers and non-teachers, which strongly suggests that career-changers and career-stayers 
belong to the different parts of the ability distribution of the relevant population in each 
occupational group.  
The top 10 career picks for public school teachers who move into the non-teaching 
sectors are education administrators, managers, secretaries, librarians, counselors, preschool 
or kindergarten teachers, teacher assistants, coaches, postsecondary teachers, and registered 
nurses. Many non-teachers who have had these occupations also move into the teaching sector. 
However, among these new public school teachers who moved from non-teaching sectors, 
there are people who used to be in low-skilled jobs such as cashiers, janitors, building 
cleaners, dining room helper, cargo and freight agents, and movers. For these people, 
especially who move into the teaching career in the later stage of their career path, teachers’ 
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earnings may look attractive even though teachers actually face a wage penalty in older and 
high-experience group. 
Low teacher salaries attract young people with low quality into teacher preparation 
programs. Even though some high quality teachers with passion for teaching initially enter the 
teaching career, it is very likely that they leave the teaching profession before they can build 
up 10 years of experience. Public school teachers with low quality remain in the teaching 
sector, and non-teachers with low ability are moving into the teaching sector. Therefore, the 
average quality of public school teachers will decrease.  
Next, I investigate union effects on teachers’ earnings under different legal 
environments towards collective bargaining of teachers. Table 2.11 presents the results from 
model (10). In the High-CB group, on average, public school teachers earn less than non-
teachers by 7.8%. The effect of unions on earnings of non-teaching occupations is 4.4%, and 
the effect of teachers unions on teachers’ earnings is 12% (4.4%+7.5%). Since teachers who 
are members of teachers unions can earn 12% more than non-members, there is a strong 
incentive for public school teachers to join the unions. In the Low-CB group, public school 
teachers face insignificant wage penalty of 1.8%. The effect of unions on earnings of non-
teaching occupations is about 3.8%, but teachers unions have a slightly positive effect of0 .06% 
(3.79% – 3.73%) on teachers’ earnings. In the No-CB group, public school teachers make 2.3% 
less earnings than non-teachers, but this is not significant. The union effects on earnings of 
non-teaching occupations is about 4.5%, but teachers unions have almost negligible effect of -
0.2 % (4.5% – 4.7%) on teachers’ earnings. Without collective bargaining power, union 
membership status has no significant effect on teachers’ hourly earnings.  
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Table 2.11: The Effect of Teachers Unions on Earnings by Group, CPS  
College Graduates Only 
 
Dependent variable: Log (hourly earnings) 
 
VARIABLES High-CB group  Low-CB group No-CB group  
Public school teacher 
-.078*** -.018 -.0235 
(.0145) (.0258) (.0201) 
Union membership 
.0441*** .0379*** .0445*** 
(.0057) (.0056) (.0121) 
Public school teacher x 
Union 
.075*** -.0373 -.0469** 
(.021) (.0292) (.0234) 
Master’s degree 
.0881*** .078*** .0796*** 
(.0034) (.008) (.007) 
Male 
.0551*** .0635*** .0819*** 
(.0042) (.0132) (.0115) 
Potential experience (Exp) 
.0238*** .0242*** .0234*** 
(.0009) (.0024) (.0016) 
Exp
2
 
-.0004*** -.0005* -.0004*** 
(1.96e-05) (5.98e-05) (4.12e-05) 
Exp x Male 
.0078*** .0085*** .0066*** 
(.0008) (.0027) (.0014) 
Exp
2
 x Male 
-.0001*** -.0001** -.0001** 
(2.11e-05) (6.77e-05) (3.95e-05) 
Metropolitan 
.142*** .0701*** .117*** 
(.0125) (.0203) (.0252) 
Black 
-.1081*** -.0817*** -.1206*** 
(.007) (.0101) (.0065) 
Indian 
-.0542*** -.1199 -.068* 
(.0198) (.0772) (.0405) 
Asian 
-.0060 -.0162 .0245* 
(.0108) (.0188) (.0144) 
Other 
-.0023 -.1410*** .0169 
(.0151) (.0468) (.0181) 
Hispanic 
-.0615*** -.0650*** -.0818*** 
(.0051) (.0206) (.0101) 
Constant 
2.6302*** 2.5284*** 2.5185*** 
(.0129) (.0198) (.0305) 
Other control variables YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Clustered SE YES YES YES 
Adjusted R
2 
.308 .312 .304 
N 291,775 39,860 52,791 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other control variables: a dummy for family head, citizenship status, and private school teacher, 
categorical dummies for population size, marital status, worker class, broad industry and broad 
occupation. All regressions employ state FE and time FE and use persons’ composited final weight. 
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As an attempt to reduce the omitted variable bias due to states’ legal status towards 
collective bargaining in measuring union effects on teachers’ earnings, I add states’ collective 
bargaining coverage from the SASS (See Table 4). Table 2.12 shows the results estimated 
from model (10) with the addition of the variable for collective bargaining coverage.
19
 In the 
High-CB group, states with 100% collective bargaining coverage pay their teachers 20% more 
than states with 0% collective bargaining coverage. The effect of collective bargaining on 
teachers’ earnings is also significant but much smaller for the Low-CB group than for the 
High-CB group. In sum, collective bargaining coverage has a significantly positive effect, on 
teachers’ earnings.  
I also analyze the effect of teachers unions for each group within the teaching sector 
using CPS ORG. Table 2.13 summarizes the results from model (11). In the High-CB group, 
union membership has a significantly positive effect on teacher’s earnings. The members of 
teachers unions earn the wage premium of 9.34% over non-members. In the Low-CB group 
and the No-CB group, union membership has no significant effect on teachers’ earnings. The 
returns to master’s degree and the returns to teaching experience are the lowest in the No-CB 
group. The returns to professional or doctorate degree of the No-CB group, however, are the 
largest. Less than 3% of public school teachers have these degrees, so the high returns to 
higher level of education works as if the average teachers without higher level of education 
are being penalized in the No-CB group. Male teachers in the No-CB group have a 
considerably large wage premium of 7.47% over female teachers. Approximately 80% of 
teachers are females in the No-CB group (See Table 2.2), which is the highest female fraction 
                                                          
19 Since the collective bargaining measures use the average value of collective bargaining coverage of 
each state between 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 academic years, I cannot employ state fixed effect, 
which requires the variation within each state. 
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Table 2.12: The Effect of Teachers Unions on Earnings by Group, CPS & SASS 
College Graduates Only 
 
Dependent variable: Log (hourly earnings) 
 
VARIABLES High-CB group Low-CB group No-CB group 
Public school teacher 
-.0854*** -.0237 -.0268* 
(.0124) (.0181) (.0154) 
Collective bargaining  
.0022*** .0007*** n/a 
(.0001) (9.2e-05) n/a 
Union membership 
.0598*** .0406*** .0405*** 
(.0043) (.0116) (.0132) 
Public school teacher x 
Union 
.0775*** -.0311 -.0439** 
(.0119) (.0221) (.0182) 
Master’s degree 
.090*** .0789*** .0814*** 
(.0028) (.0064) (.006) 
Male 
.0545*** .0620*** .0791*** 
(.0067) (.0171) (.0134) 
Potential experience (Exp) 
.0240*** .0243*** .0234*** 
(.0006) (.0014) (.0010) 
Exp
2
 
-.0004*** -.0005* -.0004*** 
(1.96e-05) (3.72e-05) (2.25e-05) 
Exp x Male 
.0081*** .0086*** .0069*** 
.0008 (.0019) (.0015) 
Exp
2
 x Male 
-.0001*** -.0001** -.0001** 
(1.10e-05) (4.67e-05) (3.72e-05) 
Metropolitan 
.206*** .0651*** .121*** 
(.0041) (.0121) (.0092) 
Black 
-.1076*** -.0792*** -.1200*** 
(.0052) (.0122) (.0076) 
Indian 
-.0477*** -.1282** -.0694** 
(.0151) (.0617) (.0273) 
Asian 
.0136** -.0135 .0220 
(.0058) (.0149) (.0141) 
Other 
.006 -.137*** .0113 
(.009) (0.0499) (.0221) 
Hispanic 
-.0511*** -.0614*** -.0996*** 
(.006) (.0173) (.0124) 
Constant 
2.327*** 2.5011*** 2.5784*** 
(.0178) (.0223) (.0202) 
Other control variables YES YES YES 
State FE NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Adjusted R
2 
0.264 .301 .304 
N 291,775 39,860 52,791 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Other control variables: a dummy for family head, citizenship status, and private school teacher, 
categorical dummies for population size, marital status, worker class, broad industry and broad 
occupation. All regressions use persons’ composited final weight. 
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Table 2.13: The Effect of Teachers Unions on Teachers’ Earnings by Group, CPS  
 
College Graduates Only 
 
Dependent variable: Log (hourly earnings of public school teachers) 
 
VARIABLES High-CB group Low-CB group No-CB group 
Teachers unions 
membership 
.0934***   -.0082 .0037 
(.0171) (.02674) (.0138) 
Master’s degree 
.139 *** .124*** .1196*** 
(.0092) (.0155) (.0175) 
Professional school or  
Doctorate degree 
.1826*** .2336*** .2552*** 
(.0217) (.0442) (.0263) 
Male 
-.0245 .0859 .0747** 
(.0217) (.0615) (.0338) 
Potential experience (Exp) 
.0231*** .0252*** .0163 *** 
(.0017) (.0046) (.002) 
Exp
2
 
-.0004*** -.00044*** -.0002 *** 
(4.0e-05 ) (.0008) (.0000) 
Exp x Male 
.007*** .0029 .0001 
(.002) (5.8e-05 ) (.004) 
Exp
2
 x Male 
-.0001** -.00002 -3.74e-06 
(5.1e-05) (.0001) (.0001) 
Metropolitan 
.1062*** .0795** .0807*** 
(.0135) (.0306) (.0253) 
Black 
-.0556* .0281 .0007 
(.0331) (.0354) (.0108) 
Indian 
.0432 -.1676 .0954 
(.0581) (.1385)   (.1650) 
Asian 
.0007 -.0016 .0043 
(.0527) (.0995) (.0425) 
Other 
-.0032 -.6203 .1836* 
(.0278) (.5572) (.1042) 
Hispanic 
.0162** .0006 .0479*** 
(.0067) (.0758) (.0112) 
Constant 
2.604*** 2.366*** 2.489*** 
(.0319) (.0355) (.0273) 
State FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Adjusted R
2 
0.217 0.195 0.182 
N 22,329 3,854 4,959 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Other control variables: a dummy for family head and citizenship status, categorical dummies for 
population size and marital status. All regressions employ state FE and time FE. All regressions use 
persons’ composited final weight. 
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among all three groups. Therefore, the average female public school teachers seem to face the 
worst salary schedule in the No-CB group than in other groups. 
Next, I explore the earning dynamics of career-stayers and career-changers in the 
teaching sector by group of states. Table 2.14 presents the summary from model (9) by group. 
The High-CB group shows a very different pattern from the other two groups. The first panel 
of Table 2.14 shows the results for all-ages group. For the High-CB group, moving to other 
teaching positions is the best option for public school teachers as it can bring the largest 
increase in earnings (6.11%). Leaving for the non-teaching sectors provides higher wage 
increase (3.87%) than staying in current teaching positions at public schools (3.6%), but the 
difference is small. Non-teachers in the High-CB group are better off staying in their careers 
(4.05%). In the Low-CB and No-CB group, however, public school teachers are much better 
off staying in their current teaching position, and on average moving into the non-teaching 
sectors is the least attractive option for public school teachers. Non-teachers in these two 
groups find it very appealing to move into the public school teaching sector as they increase 
their earnings considerably by doing so.  
The analysis of specific age group is presented in the subsequent panels of Table 2.14. 
In the High-CB group, public school teachers in their 20s through 40s who move into the non-
teaching sectors have a large increase in their earnings. Non-teachers in their 40s who move 
into the public school teaching sector can receive higher earnings than they can by staying in 
their current occupations. Non-teachers who are in their 50s and above are better off staying 
in their current non-teaching career paths. In the Low-CB and the No-CB group, in most age 
groups, it is more advantageous for public school teachers to stay in the teaching sector, with 
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Table 2.14: The Changes in Earnings after Career Change by Group 
 
College Graduates Only 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆=Log (After hourly earnings) – Log (Before hourly earnings) 
 
  
High-CB 
group 
Low-CB 
group 
No-CB  
group 
N ∆ N ∆ N ∆ 
All ages 
All Career changers 22910 .0401 3059 .0358 4234 .0216 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 696 .0611 126 .0582 148 .0215 
Public school teacher to non- teacher 311 .0387 53 .0454 73 .0146 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 51 .0066 7 .0976 12 -.2319 
Private school teacher to non- teacher 109 .0869 17 -.0629 20 -.1514 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 21153 .0396 2784 .0347 3838 .0207 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 302 .0394 48 .0738 104 .1161 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 141 .0237 9 -.0122 23 -.0151 
All stayers 29756 .0403 4261 .0440 5057 .0465 
Stay teaching at public school  3105 .0360 547 .0758 677 .0847 
Stay teaching at private school 628 .0552 79 .0551 110 -.0034 
Stay in non-teaching 26023 .0405 3635 .0389 4270 .0417 
< 30 years old 
All Career changers 3163 .0877 425 .0903 539 .0519 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 81 .3101 14 .2040 18 -.0093 
Public school teacher to non- teacher 44 .0898 6 .1373 7 -.0114 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 2 .3442 0  1 .0332 
Private school teacher to non- teacher 15 -.0022 1 -.141 5 -.2096 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 2931 .0804 395 .0918 480 .0548 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 42 .1816 5 -.3290 20 .0399 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 30 .0832 2 .0041 6 .2161 
All stayers 3378 .0832 446 .0671 616 .0495 
Stay teaching at public school  353  .0248 59 .1472 92 .0355 
Stay teaching at private school 92  .0248 9 -.0074 14 .0870 
Stay in non-teaching 2933 .0728 378 .0579 510 .0510 
30 - 39 years old 
All Career changers 6185 .0520 875 .0457 1193 -.0015 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 165 .0298 29 .0631 45 .0099 
Public school teacher to non- teacher 88 .1453 14 -.0851 25 .0492 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 16 .1150 1 -.1397 3 -.0265 
Private school teacher to non- teacher 23 .2665 10 -.0669 6 -.3748 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 5758 .0508 799 .0502 1090 -.0018 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 68 .0135 15 .0567 19 .0990 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 30 -.0598 4 .053 3 -.0999 
All stayers 7809 .0512 1183 .0477 1443 .0701 
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Table 2.14: The Changes in Earnings after Career Change by Group (Cont.) 
 
Stay teaching at public school  722 .0456 148 .0653 173 .1374 
Stay teaching at private school 164 .0940 19 -.0130 28 .0433 
Stay in non-teaching 6923 .0507 1016 .0462 1242 .0613 
40 - 49 years old 
All Career changers 6973 .0307 859 .0313 1311 .0309 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 204 -.0024 34 .0370 47 .0859 
Public school teacher to non- teacher 72 .0717 20 .0063 21 -.0135 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 15 .0676 3 .1632 2 -.2572 
Private school teacher to non- teacher 30 -.0645 2 .0425 2 .7612 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 6496 .0316 784 .0305 1193 .0268 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 81 .0908 11 .1224 33 .1194 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 41 -.0477 1 .0274 8 -.1523 
All stayers 8986 -.0477 1262 .0372 1507 .0454 
Stay teaching at public school  858 .0252 164 .1116 192 .0847 
Stay teaching at private school 166 .0181 24 .1450 33 .0315 
Stay in non-teaching 7962 .0345 1074 .0234 1282 .0399 
50 - 59 years old 
All Career changers 5335 .0202 736 .0034 949 .0162 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 215 .0497 42 .0599 31 .0351 
Public school teacher to non- teacher 89 -.0741 11 .1739 16 .0459 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 12 -.0904 3 .1112 4 .0238 
Private school teacher to non- teacher 29 .2851 3 -.2403 6 -.2090 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 4820 .0201 659 -.0061 860 .0089 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 91 -.0190 13 .1687 22 .2958 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 27 .1027 1 .2242 4 .0530 
All stayers 7651 .0306 1113 .0383 1211 .0193 
Stay teaching at public school  1014 .0558 156 .0448 186 .0413 
Stay teaching at private school 174 .0772 24 .0211 24 -.1232 
Stay in non-teaching 6463 .0256 933 .0377 1001 .0186 
> 60 years old 
All Career changers 1254 -.0014 164 .0104 242 .0393 
Public school teacher to other public school teacher 31 .0743 7 .0192 7 -.1881 
Public school teacher to non- teacher 18 -.1803 2 .2525 4 -.0931 
Private school teacher to public school teacher 6 -.3534 0  2 -1.159 
Private school teacher to non- teacher 12 -.2457 1 .0952 1 0 
Non-teacher to other non-teacher 1148 .0051 147 .0041 215 .0718 
Non-teacher to public school teacher 20 -.1253 4 .2448 10 -.0888 
Non-teacher to private school teacher 13 .1404 1 -.5849 2 -.1698 
All stayers 1932 .0190 257 .0446 280 .0421 
Stay teaching at public school  158 -.0508 20 -.0794 34 .1869 
Stay teaching at private school 32 -.1137 3 .2270 11 -.0823 
Stay in non-teaching 1742 .0278 234 .0529 235 .0270 
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the exception of teachers of their 50s. Regardless of age groups, in these groups, non-teachers 
find it more attractive to move into the teaching sector.  
Table 2.15 provides the summary statistics for pre-earnings for teachers and for non-
teachers by group. The first panel is for public school teachers, and the second panel is for 
non-teachers. In all three groups, the pre-earnings of male public school teachers who stay in 
current teaching positions are lower than the pre-earnings of male public school teachers who 
move into the non-teaching sectors. Thus, the positive selection occurs when public school 
teachers move into the non-teaching sectors; public school teachers who had higher earnings 
ability move into the non-teaching sectors, which have more dispersed income distribution. 
On the other hand, non-teachers who move into the teaching sector have the lowest pre-
earnings in all three groups. Since public school teachers face a wage penalty on average, the 
fact that the non-teachers with the lowest pre-earnings still move into the teaching sector 
suggests that the negative selection occurs in this case; non-teachers with lower earnings 
ability are more likely to move into the teaching sector, which has narrower income 
distribution. Through the processes of positive and negative selection, the average qualities of 
public school teachers in all three groups fall. 
The difference of the pre-earnings of teachers between career-stayers and career-
changers are more apparent in the Low-CB and the No-CB group than in the High-CB group. 
In the No-CB group, the pre-earnings of male teachers who move into the non-teaching 
sectors ($24.49) is larger than those of male teachers who stay in their careers ($20.08) by 
more than $4, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Recall that public 
school teachers obtained larger increase in their earnings when they stayed in current teaching 
positions in the No-CB group (See Table 2.14). Therefore, teachers leaving the teaching 
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profession in the No-CB group are more likely to be higher aptitude teachers who are 
unsatisfied with their earnings, which are still higher on average than the earnings of career-
stayers in the teaching sector. Meanwhile, in the High-CB group, the pre-earnings of male 
teachers who move into the non-teaching sectors ($25.34) is not significantly different from 
the pre-earnings of male teachers who stay in their careers ($24.17). 
 
Table 2.15: Pre-Earnings for Teachers and Non-Teachers by Group 
 
College Graduates Only 
 
Dependent Variable: Hourly earnings ($) 
 
Career Path 
High-CB  Low-CB  No-CB  
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Panel 1: Public School Teachers 
Stay teaching at public school 24.27 23.09 22.03 18.35 20.08 19.31 
Change to other public school teacher  24.67 24.27 20.15 20.62 24.11 20.97 
Change to non-teaching career 25.34 23.93 23.38 18.48 24.49 21.90 
Panel 2: Non-Teachers       
Stay in non-teaching career 30.71 25.42 29.10 23.01 30.42 24.14 
Change to other non-teaching career 30.22 24.22 27.78 22.06 30.33 23.43 
Change to public school teacher 25.46 24.01 19.75 19.69 19.79 19.10 
Source: CPS MORG, 2001-2010 
 
Figure 2.3.A and 2.3.B illustrate the positive selection of the career change from 
public school teachers to non-teachers for the High-CB group (Group 1) and for the No-CB 
group (Group 3), respectively. In both groups, the median of pre-earnings of teachers moving 
into the non-teaching sectors (the third box plot) is higher than that of teachers staying in the 
teaching sector (the first box plot), but the difference of the median is more  
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Figure 2.3.A: Changes in Earnings for Public School Teachers in the High-CB Group 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.B: Changes in Earnings for Public School Teachers in the No-CB Group 
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conspicuous in the No-CB group than in High-CB group. The box of the pre-earning 
distribution for career-changing teachers (the third box plot) is also more to the right of the 
box of the pre-earning distribution for career-staying teachers (the first box plot) in the No-
CB group than in the High-CB group. This suggests that the average quality of the public 
school teachers who leave the teaching profession in the No-CB group might be higher than 
the one in the High-CB group. The difference of pre-earnings of non-teachers between career 
changers and career stayers are also larger in the Low-CB and the No-CB group than the one 
in the High-CB group. In the No-CB group, male non-teachers who move into the teaching 
sector have pre-earnings ($19.79) which is lower than the pre-earnings of male non-teachers 
who stay in their careers ($30.42) by more than $10. For the High-CB group, there is a 
smaller difference ($5) in the pre-earnings between male non-teachers who stay in current 
careers ($30.71) and who move to the teaching sector ($25.46). The difference between the 
pre-earnings of career changers and of career stayers in both the High-CB and the No-CB 
group are statistically significant at the 1% of significance level. Since the variance in 
earnings is larger for the High-CB group (See Table 2.10), the larger difference of pre-
earnings between career-changers and career-stayers in the Low-CB and the No-CB group 
suggests that there may be a greater distributional change in worker quality after the career 
changes in the Low-CB and the No-CB group. 
Figure 2.4.A and 2.4.B portray these distributional differences for non-teachers for the 
High-CB group (Group 1) and the No-CB group (Group 3), respectively. For both groups, the 
non-teachers who move into the teaching sector (the third box plot) have lower median than 
the non-teachers who stay in their occupations (the first box plot), but the difference is much 
larger in the No-CB group than in the High-CB group. In the No-CB  
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Figure 2.4.A: Changes in Earnings for Non-Teachers in the High-CB Group 
 
 
Figure 2.4.B: Changes in Earnings for Non-Teachers in the No-CB Group 
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group, therefore, the average quality of public school teachers might be even lower than the 
one in the High-CB group because more teachers with higher quality tend to leave the 
teaching profession and more non-teachers with lower quality tend to join the teaching force.  
 In sum, in all three groups, positive selection and negative selection occur through the 
career changing process in a way that the average teacher quality decreases. The magnitude of 
the positive and the negative selection is the strongest in the No-CB group.  Only in the High-
CB group, which has collective bargaining laws for teachers, teachers unions effectively 
increase teachers’ earnings. There also exist more favorable teacher salary schedule such as 
higher returns to experience and higher returns to master’s degree (See Table 2.12 and Table 
2.13) in the High-CB group than in the other two groups. Hence, the High-CB group provides 
more incentives for high quality teacher to remain in the teaching sector even though many 
high quality teachers still move into the non-teaching sectors for better earning opportunities. 
As a result, the average teacher quality will be higher in the High-CB group than in the Low-
CB and the No-CB group.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
  
 This paper examines the relation between teachers’ earnings and teacher quality. 
Using the CPS and CPS Supplements for Occupation Mobility and Job Tenure between 2001 
and 2010, I show that US public school teachers are paid less compared to other comparable 
college graduates working in the non-teaching sectors. Applying the Roy model, I find that 
public school teachers with high aptitude tend to leave the teaching professions in the early 
stage of their careers as they find it more advantageous to move into the non-teaching sectors, 
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which is the case of positive selection. Also, I find that non-teachers with low aptitude are 
more likely to move into the teaching sector, which shows the pattern of negative selection. 
Through the positive and negative selection processes, the average quality of public school 
teachers falls.  
 I discuss the different legal environments towards collective bargaining, and show that 
teachers still unionize in states that do not allow collective bargaining of teachers. It seems 
vital to understand the roles of teachers unions with and without bargaining power because 
the effects of teachers unions in different legal environments towards collective bargaining 
substantially differ. Teachers unions can undo some of the teachers’ wage penalty by 
successfully raising teachers’ earnings, returns to education, and returns to experience, but 
their effects are significant only in states with collective bargaining laws. In states that do not 
have collective bargaining laws and prohibit collective bargaining of teachers unions, unions 
have insignificant effects on teachers’ earnings, and teachers face less favorable compensation 
scheme than non-teachers. In those states, the impacts of the positive selection and the 
negative selection on the ability distribution are stronger, so the average quality of public 
school teachers may decrease faster than in states with collective bargaining laws. 
 My study only focused on the hourly wage of workers due to the data limitation. 
Unions may affect working conditions and benefits of employees, and the legal environment 
toward collective bargaining of each state will surely play important roles for them to 
establish certain aspect of employer-employee relationship. Therefore, more research is 
needed to fully understand what unions can do beyond influencing salaries under different 
legal settings towards collective bargaining. 
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Teachers Unions on Teachers’ Well-being under Different 
Legal Environments: Evidence from Districts and Teachers Matched Data 
 
This paper examines how teachers unions affect teachers’ economic conditions using an 
employer-employee matched dataset based on the School and Staffing Survey and School 
Districts Finance Survey for 2007-2008. I employ a multilevel (hierarchical) model and 
propensity score matching to identify union effects in states with different legal environments 
for collective bargaining of public school teachers. Three major findings emerge from my 
empirical analysis. First, collective bargaining is neither necessary nor sufficient for teachers 
unions to affect teachers’ work lives. About half of the teachers join unions even in the states 
that outlaw collective bargaining. Also, in the absence of any written agreements, teachers 
gain from unions via meet-and-confer agreements or higher union density. Second, the effects 
of teachers unions are multi-dimensional. Teachers unions improve teachers’ working 
condition and/or non-wage benefits as well as teachers’ salaries. Third, teachers unions affect 
working conditions and non-wage benefits in a way that trades off with teacher salaries, as 
expected from a compensating differential analysis. 
 
Key words: employer-employee matched data, collective bargaining, meet-and-confer, 
agency fees, multilevel (hierarchical) linear model, propensity score matching, working 
conditions, non-wage benefits. 
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3.1 Introduction 
  
 Over half of union workers in the U.S. work in the public sector. Public school 
teachers make up the single largest group of unionized public sector workers. In 2010, 
governments employed approximately 3.2 million public school teachers, of whom about 70% 
reported that they were union members. The majority of union members belong to the 
National Education Association, about 25% of members to the American Federation of 
Teachers, and the rest to small local groups.  
 In the 2000s, there was a considerable public controversy over the effect that teachers 
unions had on the compensation of teachers and the operation of an educational system. Many 
blamed unions for raising pays far above what teachers might have earned in other jobs and 
for creating an inflexible and inefficient educational system. Some politicians and policy 
makers blamed public sector unions, including teachers unions, for state or municipal 
financial problems or as a barrier to resolving those problems. Defenders of unions rebutted 
these charges. Recently, the decisions by legislatures in Wisconsin and Ohio to restrict 
collective bargaining and the movement to overturn those decisions attained national 
attention.  
 How large an effect, if any, do teachers unions have on the compensation and work 
conditions of teachers? By what mechanisms do teachers unions affect the economic status of 
school districts? To answer these questions, I have combined two surveys from Department of 
Education, the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) and School Districts Finance Survey 
(SDFS) for 2007-2008, to create a district-teacher matched dataset. This data provides a 
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unique picture of the relation between teachers unions, teacher pays/working conditions, and 
the financial status of school districts. 
 The legal environment of a state towards teachers unions certainly influences the 
strength of unionization of public school teachers. This study estimates union-nonunion 
differentials, the union effect, across states with widely varying legal environments for 
unions, ranging from those that prohibit collective bargaining (e.g. Texas or Virginia) to those 
that encourage collective bargaining (e.g. New York or Massachusetts). Unlike previous 
studies on the union effects, which tend to focus on a single measure of unionization, I 
conduct a comprehensive analysis on union effects using various measures of unionization at 
different levels. The variations I use to identify the union effects are the contractual status 
between school districts and the unions, union density of school districts, and union 
membership of public school teachers. 
 The datasets I use are observational rather than experimental, which makes it difficult 
to reach conclusions about causation. I mitigate this problem by using two approaches. First, I 
contrast my outcomes of interests across legal environments, which were largely determined 
by the states’ legislation that was set several decades ago. Since the legislation has not 
changed much over time, the legal environment is fairly exogenous variation source for 
teacher unionization. Second, I compare the union/non-union differentials within the similar 
legal environment using multilevel (hierarchical) linear models and propensity score matching 
to minimize the omitted variable bias and/or selection bias involving unionization. 
My analysis reveals that some widely held views about teacher unionization, public 
sector unionization more broadly, are more myth than reality. Many people believe that few 
workers will join unions if a state bans collective bargaining and that collective bargaining is 
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the sole source of power for unions. However, my data show that in the states that ban 
collective bargaining of teachers, about half of the teachers still join teachers unions. 
Moreover, even in those states, unions are correlated with teacher salaries or work conditions. 
A substantial number of school districts have legally unenforceable agreements with the 
unions, called “meet-and-confer agreements,” which also affect the teacher compensations. I 
find that the meet-and-confer is the main form of agreement in states that do not allow 
collective bargaining of public school teachers, but it is also found in states where collective 
bargaining is permissible.   
I also find that the union effects vary among the outcomes of interests depending on 
states’ legal environments towards teachers unions. In some legal environments, the data 
shows larger union-nonunion differentials in working condition, measured by the number of 
contract days, than in base salaries of teachers. In other legal environments, districts’ union 
density rather than contractual status appears to affect outcomes. In addition, I find that there 
exist trade-offs between base salaries and working condition and between base salaries and 
non-wage benefits. Teachers in the legal settings encouraging collective bargaining face more 
favorable trade-offs than teachers in the legal settings that are against collective bargaining.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section two provides the review of previous 
literature on unions and my research contribution. Section three describes the different legal 
settings in which teachers unions operate across states and school districts. Section four 
presents the data sources and explains how I have created the master dataset for the study. 
Section five lays out the empirical strategies and econometric models that guide my analysis. 
Section six presents the empirical results. In section seven, I conclude with a brief summary 
of findings.  
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3.2 Literature on the Effects of Teachers Unions  
 
 Most studies have found that teachers unions played important roles in raising teacher 
salaries. Reviews of the literature in the 1980s by Lipsky (1982), Freeman (1986), and 
Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) showed that teachers unions were associated with higher 
salaries, but that the union wage differential was smaller among the workers in the public 
sector than in the private sector in general. Baugh and Stone (1982) and Freeman and Valletta 
(1988) found a union/non-union gap on teacher salaries to be 12-22 percent using Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) estimated unions’ wage effects of 
about 10 percent in the absence of the controls for individual teacher characteristics. Belman, 
Heywood, and Lund (1997) reported similar estimates using CPS outgoing rotation file for 
1991. 
  Other studies have looked at the prevalence of teachers unions across the states with 
different legal environment (for instance, whether a state allows collective bargaining or not) 
or across school districts with diverse contractual status (for instance, whether a school 
district has a collective bargaining agreement with teachers union). Hoxby (1996) estimated 
the union effects on teacher salaries to be about 5 percent using panel data on school districts. 
Zwerling and Thomason (1995) estimated that a 10-percentage-point increase in states’ union 
density raised the highest teacher salaries by 2.6 percent and the lowest teacher salaries by 0.2 
percent. Using a district level dataset, Lemke (2004) estimated the union premium to be 7.6 
percent for public school teachers in rural areas of Pennsylvania. Using the CPS from 2000 to 
2009 and the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) for 1999-2000 district level data, Hirsch et 
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al. (2011) estimated the effect of union coverage to be as little as 1 percent to as high as 20 
percent. 
 Studies of private sector unionism invariably have found that unions had larger effects 
on working conditions or non-wage benefits than on salaries or wages (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984; Budd, 2007; Hirsch et al., 1997). The analyses of teachers unions found the similar 
results. Delaney (1985) found that school districts with collective bargaining agreements had 
larger “fringe benefit index” compared to school districts without collective bargaining in 
Illinois. Eberts and Stone (1984) showed that bargaining had a larger effect on non-wage 
benefits than on wages using the public school data in New York. Podgursky (2003) argued 
that teachers unions effectively increased fringe benefits, measured by the pension 
contributions, for their members in Chicago public schools. Fringe benefits and working 
conditions must be studied in terms of compensating differentials with salaries, as they are 
also a part of the compensation package for teachers. The evidence on compensating 
differentials has been mixed. Delaney (1988) found that unions achieved gains in both wages 
and non-wage benefits while Eberts and Stone (1985) found the evidence for trade-offs 
between teacher salaries and fringe benefits/working conditions.  
My research builds on these previous studies on teachers unions and makes several 
important contributions. First, I utilize a district-teacher matched dataset, which make it 
possible for me to incorporate the influence of the financial status of school districts on 
outcomes of my interests. Second, my data allows me to conduct a more complete analysis on 
teachers unions using various measures of unionism at different levels such as legal 
environments of states, contractual status and union density of school districts and union 
membership of teachers. Third, I investigate the role of unions beyond collective bargaining 
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and identify the mechanism through which the unions affect the outcomes of interests in the 
absence of the bargaining agreement. Especially, my study provides the point estimate of the 
effect of meet-and-confer on outcomes of interest, which makes it a unique finding in 
literature. Fourth, I attempt to solve the endogeneity problem of unionization by employing 
multilevel (hierarchical) linear models and propensity score matching within the same legal 
environment towards teachers unions.  
 
3.3 Legal Environments and Contractual Status for Teachers Unions  
 
 Until the recent efforts to constrain or eliminate collective bargaining rights of 
teachers in Midwestern states, the legal settings for unionization have not changed much over 
the past 30 to 40 years. For the period covered by my analysis, collective bargaining laws 
covering teachers represent fixed legal environments. For instance, a state that allowed 
collective bargaining of teachers three decades ago still allow it in 2007. Contractual status of 
school districts is also quite static, so districts that have collective bargaining agreements with 
teachers unions in 2007 are likely to have had such agreements in 1970s and 1980s.
20
 Thus, 
these legal backgrounds regarding collective bargaining provide fairly exogenous variation 
for unionism. 
 Following Moe (2011), I define the legal environment towards teachers unions based 
on the strength of legal framework regarding teachers unions; whether a state allows 
collective bargaining for teachers unions and whether it allows agency fees so that teachers 
                                                          
20 “Teacher Monopoly, Bargaining, and Compulsory Unionism, and Deduction Revocation Table” by 
National Right to Work Foundation, 2010. 
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who do not join the union also pay for the collective bargaining services.
21
 I use this definition 
to classify 50 states into four groups.
22
 Table 3.2 presents the classification in detail. The first 
group, which I call High-CB group, is composed of 23 states that have collective bargaining 
laws and that allow the unions and school districts to negotiate mandatory agency fees for 
non-union members. The second group, Med-CB states, has collective bargaining laws but 
prohibit mandatory agency fees. There are 11 states in this group, and they are located in the 
Midwest and South. The third group, Low-CB states, allows local school districts to sign 
collective bargaining agreements but do not require them to bargain with the union. The local 
union must be strong enough to convince its school district to bargain and sign an agreement, 
and 9 states fit into this group. The fourth group, No-CB states, bans collective bargaining of 
teachers unions, and there are 7 states in this group. All states but one, Arizona, are located in 
the South.
 23
 
 There exist three contractual statuses between teachers unions and school districts, 
collective bargaining, meet-and-confer, and no agreement. All unions and school districts, 
except the unions in No-CB group, can sign collective bargaining agreements. These 
agreements determine teacher pay and conditions of work environment, and they are legally 
binding. In High-CB and Mid-CB group, the law mandates that school districts bargain with a 
union that gains recognition as the bargaining agent, but the law does not require that the two 
sides reach an agreement. In some cases, the two sides do not come to the resolution to sign 
                                                          
21
 The law also requires that the union represent those workers, for instance with grievance procedures. 
22
 The information on collective bargaining laws and agency fees is from “Teacher Monopoly, 
Bargaining, and Compulsory Unionism, and Deduction Revocation Table”, National Right to Work 
Foundation (2010). For reference, I also use Table 2-2, pp.54-55, Moe (2011). 
23
 According to Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml), most 
of High-CB states are “blue states” according to the average margins of victory in the last five 
presidential elections between 1992 and 2008. Eight out of eleven states in Med-CB group are “red 
states.” Low-CB group consists of both “red states” in the South and “purple states” whose voting 
pattern is mixed in national elections. All states in No-CB group are “red states.” 
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the bargaining contracts. When the negotiation between the two fails to reach an agreement, a 
legal bargaining impasse occurs. Then, both sides have several options: seeking help from 
mediators, fact finders, or arbitrators. In some states, arbitration is mandatory, often as an 
alternative to the right to strike. When all the efforts for the resolution to impasse fail, 
teachers may choose to strike, as we saw in Chicago very recently.
24
 
 In all states, districts and unions can choose to take a different path. They can have 
meet-and-confer agreements, in which they exchange information, opinions, and proposals to 
reach a resolution on matters within the scope of representation prior to the adoption by the 
districts of its final budget for the ensuing year. Unlike the collective bargaining agreements 
that produce legally binding contracts, the outcomes of meet-and-confer agreements are not 
legally enforceable. In some school districts, even in High-CB and Med-CB group with 
collective bargaining laws, unions do not have any agreement with their districts.  
 Regardless of states’ legal environment or districts’ contractual status, teachers unions 
can engage in activities using their political power. The union activities include lobbying 
school districts to grant teachers higher wages or better non-wage benefits and helping elect 
members of the school board that are favorably inclined to the unions’ demands. Thus, union 
density of school districts and union membership of individual teachers provide additional 
mechanism through which unions can affect work lives of teachers and economic status of 
school districts. 
                                                          
24  In many states such as Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Minesota, 
Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin, public school teachers have the right 
to strike. These states usually limit this right under the respective labor laws. Where teachers do not 
have the right to strike, state laws often impose monetary or similar penalties on those who strike 
illegally. In Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Washington, strikes by public employees are 
prohibited but have occurred during 2000-2007. 
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As noted in section 3.2, some earlier work has related outcomes to school districts’ 
union density or to teachers union membership. However, if a study does not consider states’ 
legal environments towards collective bargaining, the estimated effect of union density may 
misconstrue the density with states’ overall perspective towards collective bargaining. The 
legal environment of a state almost certainly affects the contractual status of school districts 
within the state and the attractiveness of unions to teachers. Thus, it influences union density 
and the ability of unions to deliver benefits to their members. My study examine the interplay 
of the legal environment, the contractual status, and the union density to conduct a more 
elaborate analysis for assessing what unions do in the educational sector and in the public 
sector more broadly, than the standard analysis of unions in the private sector.
25
  
Studies that simply include a dummy variable to indicate if a state allows collective 
bargaining or not would fail to take into account the variation in collective bargaining 
coverage (i.e. union density) of districts within the state. My study goes beyond the previous 
analyses of public sector unionism as it utilizes a wide array of indicators of union strength in 
affecting the outcomes of interests; the four legal environment groups (High-CB, Med-CB, 
Low-CB, and No-CB group), three contractual status (collective bargaining, meet-and-confer, 
and no agreement), different levels of union density of school districts, and union membership 
of individual teachers. The various measures of unionization also allow me to assess the 
relationship between union density/membership with outcomes of interests across and within 
different legal environments and different contractual status that surpass previous analyses of 
the effect of union density/membership in studies of private sector unionism (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984; DiNardo and Lee, 2004). 
                                                          
25 In the private sector, unionism is co-terminus with collective bargaining, and a single labor law, the 
1936 National Labor Relations Act (amended several times), regulates the labor relations throughout 
the country. 
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3.4 The District-Teacher Matched Data 
 
 I use data from the 2007-2008 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) administered by 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
26
 The SASS provides information on 
teachers’ pay, benefits, and working conditions as well as districts’ contractual status and 
teachers’ union membership.27 I also examine the 2003-2004 wave of the SASS. Since there 
was little change in a school district having a collective bargaining agreement between 2003 
and 2007, I use the 2003 data for a sensitivity analysis on my 2007 results rather than pooling 
it with the 2007 data to exploit changes over time in panel data.
28
 
 I focus on public schools, excluding the small number of charter schools. I use three 
questionnaires from the SASS: the School, the Teacher, and the School District 
Questionnaires. The Teacher Questionnaire asks if a respondent is a member of teachers 
unions (or association similar to unions), so I compute the union density by district and use it 
as an additional measure for teacher unionization. The School District Questionnaire asks 
about the contractual status between districts and teachers unions (i.e. if a school district has 
collective bargaining agreement, meet-and-confer agreement, or no agreement at all with the 
unions).  
                                                          
26
 The SASS uses a stratified probability sample design to make sure that the samples have sufficient 
numbers for reliable estimates. Once the schools are stratified and sampled, teachers within the 
schools are also stratified and sampled based on their characteristics. 
27  Many studies use the Current Population Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Group to 
analyze the effect of teachers unions on salaries but such analyses face a major problem due to the way 
the CPS asks workers about collective bargaining status. The CPS asks whether the person is covered 
by collective bargaining only if a person is not a union member. Thus, when researchers calculate the 
collective bargaining coverage from CPS, they implicitly assume that all the union members are 
covered by collective bargaining. This works well for the private sector but distorts the reality in the 
public sector (See Han, January 2012). 
28 The 2007-08 SASS also obtained data not available in the 2003-2004 survey on topics such as 
teacher dismissals, Adequate Yearly Progress, teacher quality, length of school days for students, and 
class organization. 
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 I combine the information on teachers, schools, and districts to form a multilevel 
dataset. Thus, teachers are grouped within their schools, and the schools are grouped within 
their districts. In this multilevel dataset, 38,240 teachers are nested in 7,570 schools, and those 
schools are nested within 4,600 districts. The multilevel dataset allows me to utilize three 
different measures of teachers unionization; union membership status of teachers, contractual 
status and union density of school districts. The dataset covers about a third of the U.S. public 
school districts.  
 The School Districts Finance Survey (SDFS) from Education Finance Statistics Center 
(EDFIN) of NCES has detailed annual fiscal data on public elementary and secondary 
education for every school district in the U.S. I merge information from the SDFS with the 
multilevel dataset from the SASS to create an employer-employee (district-teacher) matched 
dataset that allows me to examine the union/non-union differentials among employers with 
similar financial status that was impossible to do in other dataset, which lack any employer 
identifying information.
29
 To the extent that employment and compensation of employees 
depend on the economic situation of the public sector employers, it is critical to consider the 
financial status of the local school districts in the analysis of the union effects. The districts’ 
financial data is also useful to examine the claim that public sector unions adversely affect 
local governments’ budgetary balance. 
 Finally, some of the debates over the effects of teachers unions on pay and benefits 
have compared earnings of public school teachers with those of other college graduates 
(Hirsch et al, 2011; Han, 2012). For such comparisons, I use the Comparable Wage Index 
                                                          
29 Eberts & Stone (1985) emphasized the importance of using employers’ information. They obtained 
the public school districts data from New York Department of Education for the school years 1972-
1973 and 1976-1977. 
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(CWI) from the NCES.
30
 The CWI, developed by Taylor and Fowler (2006), measures the 
regional variations in the salaries of college graduates in non-educational sector. The CWI 
measures the salaries of occupations that are comparable to teaching in the local labor market 
using baseline estimates from the 2000 U.S. census and annual data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Occupational Employment Survey. The CWI is available at school district level, so 
it provides the mean for geographically appropriate comparisons for locality differences in 
cost of living and other labor market conditions that can otherwise contaminate comparisons 
due to unobservable factors in the local labor market. The CWI is also an appropriate measure 
of the opportunity cost of being a teacher over finding a non-teaching career in teachers’ 
school district. 
 Table 3.1 provides some key statistics from the dataset grouped by the legal 
environment for teachers unions. It shows that in High-CB states about 90% of teachers are 
members of teachers unions. Smaller proportions of teachers are union members as the legal 
environments become less favorable to teachers unions. Nevertheless, there is a big surprise in 
the data: a substantial proportion of teachers, slightly less than 50% of teachers, are unionized 
in No-CB group. 
 High-CB group has the highest percentage of teachers with master’s degree or above. 
The fraction of teachers who enter teaching through an alternative certification program is the 
highest in No-CB group. Majority of teachers earn additional compensation from 
extracurricular activities (such as coaching, student activity sponsorship, etc.) or from 
                                                          
30 The basic idea is that all workers will ask for higher wages in areas with a higher cost of living or 
with lack of amenities. If non-teachers have similar age, educational background, and preference for 
amenities, the CWI can be used to measure the uncontrollable component of variations in the wages 
paid to educators. The CWI predicts that Atlanta teachers in metro areas should also be paid 5 percent 
more than the national average teacher wage, if accountants in the Atlanta metro areas are paid 5 
percent more than the national average accountant wage, for example. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics by Group, SASS 2007-2008 
 
  High-CB Med-CB Low-CB No-CB 
Teachers 
% of teachers unionized  88.2  64  62.2 45.5  
% of teachers who enter teaching through alternative 
certification programs 
11.3  9.7  13.6  23.3  
Base teaching salary for 2007-2008 ($) 
50,720 
(15,680) 
39,590 
(10,610) 
42,200 
(10,330) 
42,430 
(10,200) 
Days in the normal contract year 
186.49 
(26.38) 
188.76 
(26.41) 
190.35 
(28.11) 
193.96 
(30.1) 
% of teachers with master’s degree or above 55.6 41.1  50.1  43.6  
% of teachers who earn additional compensation from 
extracurricular activities (coaching, evening class, 
etc.) or outside schools during the school year  
56.6 60.4 54.7 49.8 
% of teachers who worked during the summer in 2007 43.8 46 38.2 38.2 
Fraction of Hispanic teachers .048 (.214) .027 (.161) .018 (.133) .067 (.251) 
Fraction of Black teachers .043 (.201) .034 (.182) .072 (.258) .143 (.349) 
Fraction of Asian and other teachers .027 (.163) .007 (.085) .006 (.074) .009 (.099) 
N 16,430 9,410 6,760 5,640 
Schools 
The enrollment of grades K-12 810 (666) 779 (706) 734 (497) 937 (693) 
Pupil-teacher ratio 14.15 (5.1) 13.84(4.5) 14.52(4.8) 14.41(4.4) 
Fraction of students with free or reduced lunch .374 (.275) .397 (.234) .441 (.235) .509 (.267) 
Fraction of limited-English proficient students .09 (.154) .07 (.112) .042 (.084) .074 (.129) 
Fraction of Hispanic students .131 (.214) .104 (.164) .066 (.129) .167 (.242) 
Fraction of Black students .106 (.204) .082 (.152) .165 (.262) .285 (.284) 
Fraction of Asian students  .053 (.128) .018 (.028) .013 (.02) .018 (.029) 
Fraction of American Indian and other students .04 (.144) .064 (.146) .012 (.064) .035 (.149) 
N 3,340 1,770 1,330 1,130 
Districts     
# of districts with  meet-and-confer agreement (MC) 190 150 190 90 
# of districts with collective bargaining agreement 
(CB) 
1,790 760 70 0 
# of districts with no agreement (NA) 150 150 440 620 
Union density 0.892 0.646 0.63 0.465 
% of districts with state or district assessment 
requirement for high school graduation 
58.7  40.7  34.8  95.2  
% of districts offering defined-contribution retirement 
plan to teachers 
67.7 67.2 73.03 69.85 
% of districts paying funds into this retirement plan 36.1 50.54 47.21 36 
% of districts that reward excellence in teaching 5.15 8.15 6.46 20.48 
Log (Comparable Wage Index) .168 (.14) .02 (.087) .06 (.095) .12 (.112) 
N 2,130 1,060 700 710 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses
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working in jobs outside the school system during the school year, and many teachers have 
worked during the summer of 2007. The fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunch program is the highest in No-CB group, but the fraction of students who have limited-
English proficiency is the highest in High-CB group. The majority of districts in High-CB 
group and Med-CB group are covered by collective bargaining agreements, but more districts 
are covered by meet-and confer agreements or no-agreement than by collective bargaining 
agreements in Low-CB group and No-CB group. More than 95% of the districts require a 
state or district assessment for high school graduation in No-CB group. The fraction of 
districts rewarding teachers for excellence in teaching is much higher in No-CB group than in 
High-CB group. The CWI is the highest in High-CB group and the lowest in Med-CB group.  
 Table 3.2 presents the unionization and the financial status of each state within the 
four legal environment groups. Most states in High-CB group have high union density and 
large collective bargaining coverage. Collective bargaining coverage in Med-CB group is as 
high as in High-CB group, but the union density of Med-CB group is significantly lower than 
that of High-CB group, which suggests that the absence of agency fee produces many free 
riders. The union density of Low-CB group is still quite high with a wide variation in 
collective bargaining coverage across states. The financial status of each state, measured by 
the average of school districts’ budget (total revenue of districts–total expense of districts) 
divided by total revenue of districts, shows larger deficits in Low-CB group and No-CB group 
than in High-CB group and Med-CB group.  
 Figure 3.1 through Figure 3.4 highlight the findings in the descriptive statistics that 
contradict some widely held views about public sector unionism. The first misconception is 
the view that collective bargaining contracts or laws favorable to collective bargaining are 
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Table 3.2: The Unionization by State 
By Group based on the Legal Environment towards Teachers Unions 
SASS 2007-2008  
 
States 
Percent of 
teachers 
unionized 
Percent of 
teachers covered 
by CB 
Percent of 
teachers covered 
by MC 
Average ratio of 
revenue-expense/ 
revenue of 
districts 
1. High-CB group: States that have CB laws and allow agency fees.  
Alaska 84.9 89.86 6.19 -0.036 
California 88.83 91.42 6.22 -0.026 
Connecticut 98.88 92.39 5.02 0.008 
Delaware 90.91 97.08 0 -0.028 
Hawaii 96.77 100 0 0.118 
Illinois 93.89 96.18 2.55 -0.022 
Maine 74.93 88.45 11.55 0.003 
Maryland 81.86 97.72 1.66 0.013 
Massachusetts 93.89 91.36 5.08 0.004 
Michigan 89.61 85.32 5.87 0.013 
Minnesota 94.47 66.52 29.17 -0.017 
Montana 85 82.83 11.14 0.022 
New Hampshire 85.48 98.74 1.26 0.017 
New Jersey 95.12 89.37 6.29 -0.022 
New Mexico 36.08 44.22 9.17 -0.006 
New York 95.59 92.45 4.03 -0.036 
Ohio 87.31 85.27 5.33 0.024 
Oregon 93.93 96.6 2.78 -0.066 
Pennsylvania 91.93 87.14 7.35 0.006 
Rhode Island 97.25 79.48 16.76 0.004 
Vermont 82.39 94.76 5.24 0.115 
Washington 96.31 93.44 6.27 -0.061 
Wisconsin 97.44 88.93 10.32 0.015 
Group Average 88.27 87.29 7.91 -0.003 
2. Med-CB group: States that have CB laws but prohibit agency fees.  
Florida 52.57 95.88 3.91 -0.043 
Idaho 60.39 88.8 7.89 0.056 
Indiana 72.22 87.99 10.6 0.035 
Iowa 72.51 94.49 5.51 0.033 
Kansas 53.98 78.3 19.44 0.034 
Nebraska 85.89 88.79 10.81 0.016 
Nevada 72.8 100 0 -0.095 
North Dakota 74.14 78.55 13.11 0.022 
Oklahoma 57.07 55.51 11.51 0.012 
South Dakota 52.63 73.91 21.87 0.021 
Tennessee 60.37 84.65 8.21 -0.053 
Group Average 64.02 81.58 10.39 0.006 
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Table 3.2: The Unionization by State (Cont.) 
 
States 
Percent of 
teachers 
unionized 
Percent of 
teachers covered 
by CB 
Percent of 
teachers covered 
by MC 
Average ratio of 
revenue-expense/ 
revenue of 
districts 
3. Low-CB group: States that do not have CB laws but allow CB.  
Alabama 86.47 0 50.99 -0.018 
Arkansas 34.61 11.08 12.36 -0.025 
Colorado 61.26 68.05 13 -0.075 
Kentucky 59.49 19.48 15.41 -0.013 
Louisiana 55.09 14.17 10.24 0.018 
Missouri 73.08 4.38 55.64 -0.065 
Utah 59.94 76.83 14.31 -0.063 
West Virginia 67.87 0 15.36 -0.038 
Wyoming 52.26 3.2 52.78 0.046 
Group Average 62.23 18.55 28.47 -0.028 
4. No-CB group: States that ban CB of public school teachers.  
Arizona 43.43 3.98 61.23 -0.028 
Georgia 55.93 0 0.56 -0.034 
Mississippi 37.22 1.02 0 0.014 
North Carolina 42.71 0.49 10.84 0.013 
South Carolina 27.84 1.78 5.21 -0.047 
Texas 58.81 0 11.52 -0.075 
Virginia 50.92 0 30.96 -0.028 
Group Average 45.56 1 17.16 -0.028 
 
necessary for workers to join the unions. Figure 3.1 shows that even where there is no 
agreement between districts and teachers unions, half of teachers join the unions. Figure 3.2 
shows that in No-CB group, which prohibits collective bargaining of teachers, slightly less 
than 50% of teachers still join the unions. Furthermore, in Low-CB group, where there are no 
collective bargaining laws, the average union density is as high as the average union density 
in Med-CB group, where there exist collective bargaining laws.  
 The second misconception is that collective bargaining is the only way for public 
sector workers to come to an agreement with their employers. Before the enactment of public 
sector labor laws permitting or encouraging collective bargaining of workers in the 1960s and
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  Figure 3.1: Union Membership Status by Agreement Type 
  Source: SASS 2007-2008 
 
 
 
  Figure 3.2: Union Membership Status by Legal Environment 
  Source: SASS 2007-2008 
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 Figure 3.3: Contractual Coverage by Union Membership Status 
 Source: SASS 2007-2008 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 3.4: Agreement Type by Legal Environment 
 Source: SASS 2007-2008 
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1970s, it was common for unions and employers to have meet-and-confer agreements. Figure 
3.3 shows that the meet-and-confer agreement is not an obsolete institution. They still exist 
and quite popular in 2007; approximately 13% of union members and 14% of non-members 
are covered by these agreements. Approximately 40% of non-members are covered by 
collective bargaining, and these are the free-riders. Figure 3.4 shows that in Low-CB group 
about 30% of teachers are covered by meet-and-confer agreement while 20% of teachers are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements. In No-CB group, where a collective bargaining 
agreement is not allowed, 16 % of teachers have meet-and-confer agreements with their 
districts. Therefore, in Low-CB group and No-CB group, meet-and-confer is the main form of 
agreement between teachers unions and their school districts. 
 
3.5 Empirical Strategies to Correct for Endogeneity Problem of Unionization 
 
 I organize my analysis using various measures of unionism around groups of states 
that have similar legal environment towards teachers unions based on the notion that it is the 
legal environments rather than the state per se that affects how teachers unions operate. As the 
legal environments are determined years ago, it is reasonable to view then as exogenous 
determinants of decisions by teachers to unionize or by school districts to have any 
contractual agreement with the unions.  
 I start with a general analysis using all 50 states. To examine the relationship between 
the legal environment towards collective bargaining of teachers unions and teacher salaries, I 
estimate the following OLS regression for teacher salaries; 
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Log (Salary)ijk = 

0 1HighCBijk 2MedCBijk 3LowCBijk 4Unionijk 5Xijk  ijk  (1) 
 
where i, j, and k indicates teachers, schools, and districts respectively, Log(Salary)ijk is the log 
of the base salary of a teacher i of j
th
 school in k
th
 district. HighCBikj, MedCBijk, and LowCBijk 
are the binary variable indicating if a teacher i of j
th
 school in k
th
 district belongs to High-CB 
group, Med-CB group or Low-CB group respectively. No-CB group is the reference group in 
the analysis. For Unionijk, I use either a binary variable for union membership of individual 
teacher (Memberijk) or the districts’ union density (Densityk) measured on a scale of 0 to 1. 
 X is a vector of control variables at teacher level, school level, and district level. I have 
a rich set of teacher level variables: gender, ethnicity, race, status for full-time/part-time, a 
dummy for teachers who teach at secondary schools (grades 7
th 
-12
th
), teaching experience, 
experience
2
, interaction between experience and gender, interaction between experience
2
 and 
gender, education level, and teaching subject. It also includes school characteristics such as 
school program types, log (number of days in the school year), log (students enrollment of 
grade K-12), fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch program, students’ 
ethnicity and race. My measures of district characteristics are log (CWI) and the urban-centric 
locality of districts where schools are located in. The OLS regressions are weighted by each 
teacher’s final sample weight (wijk) that is provided in the SASS. 
 I also examine the relationship between contractual status of school districts with 
teachers unions and teacher salaries for all states using the model: 
 
Log (Salary)ijk = 

0 1CBijk 2MCijk 3Unionijk 4(CB*Union)ijk 5(MC*Union)ijk 6Xijk  ijk  (2) 
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where CBijk and MCijk are binary variables indicating if k
th
 district of teacher i of school j has 
collective bargaining or meet-and-confer agreement with teachers unions, respectively. No-
agreement districts form the reference group. Unionijk is measured either by Memberijk or 
Densityk. (CB*Union)ijk and (MC*Union)ijk are the interaction between CB and union 
measures and interaction between MC and union measures, respectively. X is the vector for 
the same control variables that I use in model (1), but state dummies and districts’ financial 
status measured by school districts’ total revenue are also added.  
The array of measures of unionization creates a challenge in defining the right 
comparison group for the analysis. Consider, for instance, the question of whether or not to 
include dummy variables for states in a regression of teacher level outcomes on districts’ 
contractual status or union density. States differ in their levels of collective bargaining 
coverage and union density. Thus, an analysis that excludes state dummies would be 
comparing union members or union density in Massachusetts, for example, to non-members 
or union density in Alabama with the risk of being contaminated by unmeasured differences 
between the states. However, an analysis that includes states dummies would be comparing 
the 95% of union members or districts with collective bargaining agreements to the 
potentially highly selected 5% of teachers who are non-members or districts without 
bargaining agreements in Massachusetts, and it would also be comparing the potentially 
highly selected few unionized teachers or districts with bargaining agreements to the majority 
of teachers who are non-members or districts without bargaining agreements in Alabama.  
To deal with this issue, I perform a separate analysis for each of my four groups 
categorized based on states’ legal environments towards the unions: High-CB, Med-CB, Low-
CB, and No-CB group. I compare teachers/districts within each group of states that share the 
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same legal environments so that I find comparable teachers/districts without restricting too 
much as in the analysis for a single state or a single district. This method also allows me to 
examine if the relationship between the unions and teachers’ work lives differ by legal 
environment.  
However, the unionization poses the endogeneity problem,
31
 within a given legal 
environment. The comparisons of teachers and schools by the union status or bargaining 
status within the same legal environments may be subject to omitted variable bias and/or 
selection bias, as some factors that I do not measure may cause differences in 
union/bargaining status and also affect the outcomes. I employ two statistical methods to 
mitigate these biases within each group: a multilevel (hierarchical) linear regression model 
and propensity score matching. 
In the multilevel dataset, teachers within the same school may share common 
characteristics and experience that are unobservable, which may also affect the outcomes. 
When this commonality is large, teachers within the same school do not behave 
independently. They have the same value of the school-level residual, and the error terms in 
OLS regressions are not independent. If so, the standard OLS estimates will suffer from the 
omitted variable bias. A proper way to deal with this problem is to employ a multilevel linear 
model that separates the total variance into within-group and between-group components. For 
detailed explanation of multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models, see Appendix I. 
 For High-CB group, Med-CB group, and Low-CB group, I estimate the following 
equation for a multilevel mixed-effect model: 
 
                                                          
31 Several studies tried to solve the endogeneity problems in measuring the causal effect of teachers 
unions by using longitudinal data, difference-in-difference estimators, IV regression, or a combination 
of these. (Hoxby, 1996; Hirsch et al., 2011). 
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Log (Salary)ijk = 

(0  u jk)1CBijk 2MCijk 3Unionijk 4 (CB*Union)ijk 5(MC*Union)ijk

6Xijk 7Z jk  ijk           (3) 
 
where X is the vector of control variables at the teacher level, and Z is the vector of control 
variable at the school level. For Unionijk, I use either union membership status (Memberijk) or 
districts’ union density (Densityk). The model estimates a single coefficient for each 
independent variable (fixed effects), so the effect of teachers unions is assumed to be the same 
for all schools within each group. However, the model allows a school-specific intercept, 

u jk , 
for each school (random effects). This model is called mixed-effect because it has both fixed 
effects component and random effects component.
32
 As the statistical strategy for estimating 
variance components and fitting the multilevel model, I use maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation. For No-CB group, meet-and-confer is the only available contractual option, so 
terms including CB are omitted from model (3). 
Selection bias may also distort the causal inference of the analysis. Under the same 
legal environments, some districts choose to have collective bargaining agreements with 
teachers unions while others choose meet-and-confer agreements. In the same school districts, 
some teachers choose to join the union while others do not. Thus, I use propensity score 
matching to minimize the selection bias and to refine my comparisons of teachers or schools 
within the group of states with the same legal environment.  
                                                          
32 The likelihood ratio test showed that the random slope was unnecessary once I focus on each group 
of states with the same legal environment towards teachers unions. Thus, I treat the effect of teachers 
unions the same for all schools, and the regression estimates a single regression line representing the 
population average while the school-specific intercept acts as a shifting factor of this regression line up 
or down depending on schools. See Appendix I for more details. 
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Considering union membership as a treatment, I view unionized teachers as the treated 
unit. Using propensity score matching, I define the non-treated unit as teachers who have not 
joined a union but have a similar probability of joining the union with unionized teacher 
within the same group of states. The treated units receive the treatment while non-treated units 
do not. Then, when I contrast treated units and non-treated units, the entire difference in base 
salary between the two groups is due to the union membership status. Assuming the treatment 
decision is random conditional on observable pre-treatment characteristics X (selection on 
observables or conditional independence), I specify the propensity score (p) of receiving a 
treatment for teacher i of school j in district k as a function of X that determine the selection 
into treatment such that 

pijk(x) Pr(Dijk 1| Xijk  x) , where D indicates if the teacher 
receives the treatment. In addition to analyzing union membership as a treatment at the 
teacher level, I also analyze collective bargaining and meet-and-confer agreements at school 
district level as additional treatments. Appendix II provides the details of propensity score 
matching. 
 I use logit regression to estimate the propensity score for each treatment variable, and 
the propensity score is the predicted value of D that I get from this regression. X can include 
higher order terms of covariates and interactions between the covariates. Since each group is 
different, the covariates vary a little by group. For example, the estimation of the propensity 
score for union membership in High-CB group uses about 30 covariates including 6 quadratic 
terms and 2 interaction terms. Appendix II provides a complete list of covariates used to 
estimate propensity scores for all treatment variables.  
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 To diagnose the quality of the matching, I carried out a series of tests. I calculated the 
percent of bias for each covariate that is used to estimate the propensity score
33
. For all 
treatment variables, the percent of bias for most covariates within each group was less than 
5% as required, which suggested that most covariates were well balanced in all groups. I 
performed a t-test for each covariate and calculated the mean difference between the treated 
group and the non-treated group. Both tests confirmed that the difference between the two 
groups was insignificant for most covariates. In sum, I obtained the balancing property of 
propensity score for all treatment variables in all four groups.
34
 Figure 3.5 displays the 
histogram of propensity scores for union membership by treatment status and by group. In 
each group of states, the treatment group and non-treated group have a very similar 
distribution, and their histograms are symmetrical. Therefore, I conclude that the matching 
has constructed good control units for the treated units on the observables in each group of 
states, and the results from the propensity score matching will be based on highly comparable 
groups.  
For a matching algorithm, I use the nearest neighbor (NN) matching based on 
propensity score. NN matching takes each treated unit and searches for the control unit with 
the closet propensity score, so all treated units find a match. To avoid bad matches and to 
keep the potential bias low, I apply “with replacement” option. Thus, a control unit can be the 
best match for more than one treated unit. I impose the common support restriction to 
                                                          
33 Percent of bias is the percent difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated group, 
and it is calculated as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the 
treated and non-treated groups (formulae from Rosenbaum and Rubin.1985). 
34 Among those with the same predicted probability of treatment (propensity score), the treatment 
group and non-treated group differ only on their error term in the propensity score equation. But this 
error term is approximately independent of the pre-treatment characteristics (X). Thus, the treatment 
assignment D is independent of Y, given the strata created by X’s. See Appendix II for a detailed 
explanation. 
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Table 3.3: Balanced Distribution of Propensity Score for Union Membership, 
 by Group 
 
SASS 2007-2008, District-Teacher Matched Dataset 
        
Stratum 
Control Treatment 
Mean 
Difference N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. 
High-CB group 
1 84 10.466 0.432 26 10.541 0.281 0.074 
2 185 10.557 0.259 73 10.619 0.295 0.062 
3 103 10.636 0.330 104 10.615 0.300 0.021 
4 79 10.638 0.394 116 10.678 0.401 0.040 
5 105 10.532 0.400 331 10.562 0.406 0.030 
6 110 10.415 0.436 489 10.594 0.387 0.178*** 
7 197 10.478 0.650 1364 10.633 0.355 0.155*** 
8 146 10.664 0.306 1,443 10.722 0.307 0.0576** 
9 142 10.674 0.309 2,657 10.675 0.309 0.101** 
10 156 10.877 0.309 4,144 10.929 0.271 0.052** 
Med-CB group 
1 254 10.367 0.363 136 10.382 0.235 0.014 
2 277 10.438 0.354 200 10.426 0.322 0.012 
3 655 10.424 0.365 847 10.436 0.333 0.013 
4 1178 10.514 0.256 2,213 10.518 0.258 0.003 
5 567 10.658 0.242 1,700 10.684 0.263 0.027** 
6 73 10.787 0.219 278 10.801 0.294 0.013 
Low-CB group 
1 69 10.373 0.311 54 10.412 0.415 0.039 
2 278 10.479 0.312 252 10.489 0.293 0.01 
3 661 10.535 0.292 809 10.543 0.346 0.008 
4 413 10.608 0.251 651 10.617 0.227 0.009 
5 306 10.639 0.244 681 0.649 0.269 0.011 
6 242 10.672 0.228 561 10.703 0.213 0.03* 
7 91 10.742 0.281 233 10.744 0.204 0.002 
8 34 10.687 0.198 200 10.755 0.0207 0.068* 
9 50 10.755 0.244 326 10.777 0.216 0.022 
No-CB group 
1 18 10.516 0.183 4 10.585 0.135 -0.068 
2 187 10.438 0.196 61 10.483 0.217 0.045* 
3 655 10.485 0.212 345 10.517 0.194 0.024** 
4 826 10.607 0.256 717 10.638 0.219 0.042** 
5 473 10.742 0.211 610 10.726 0.234 0.015 
6 229 10.752 0.234 369 10.808 0.204 0.057** 
7 1 10.714  18 10.809 10.818  
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improve the quality of the matches, so only the observations whose propensity score belongs 
to the intersection of the regions of the propensity score of the treated and the control units are 
considered in the analysis. Once each treated unit is matched with a control unit, I compute 
the mean difference between log (base salary) of the treated units and control units. 
Table 3.3 presents the mean differences by group, and the significance of the mean 
difference for each stratum of propensity score is marked using the T-test. The average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is then obtained by taking the weighted average of these 
mean differences. To estimate the variance of the estimator for ATT, I use bootstrapping. 
 I next investigate the relationship between teachers unions and working condition, 
which I measure with the log of the number of contract days. The equation I use for each 
group of states is: 
 
Log (Contract Day)ijk = 

(0  u jk)1CBijk 2MCijk 3Unionijk 4 (CB*Union)ijk 5(MC*Union)ijk

6Xijk 7Z jk  ijk           (4) 
 
 I also examine if there exist compensating differentials between teachers’ earnings and 
working condition by adding teachers’ base salary as an additional regressor to model (4).  
 My dataset has two binary variables indicating if a district offers a defined-
contribution retirement plan to teachers and if employers pay any funds into the retirement 
plan. Using these two variables, I investigate the relationship between teachers unions and 
non-wage benefits in each group. The two variables are only available at school district level, 
so I utilize the district level dataset. The equation I estimate is: 
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Non-wage Benefitk = 

0 1CBk 2MCk 3Densityk 4(CB*Density)k 5(MC*Density)k 6Xk k  (5) 
 
where k indicates districts. Densityk measures the union density of k
th
 district. CBk and MCk 
are binary variables indicating if k
th
 district has collective bargaining or meet-and-confer 
agreement with teachers unions, respectively. X represents the vector of control variables at 
school district level.
35
 The OLS regressions are weighted by each school district’s final 
sample weight (wk). The log of base salary is added as an additional regressor to model (5) to 
examine the existence of compensating differentials between salaries and non-wage benefits. 
 
3.6 Results 
 
Table 3.4 summarizes the effect of legal environments towards teachers unions on 
teachers’ base salaries. The results from the SASS show that the base salaries in High-CB 
group are the highest among all groups. Compared to teachers in No-CB group, which bans 
collective bargaining, teachers in High-CB group earn 10-14 percent more on average. 
Surprisingly, however, teachers in Med-CB group, which also has collective bargaining laws, 
are not paid more than teachers in No-CB group. This may be due to the free rider problem as
                                                          
35 These include log (CWI), log (average number of days in the school year), log (student enrollment 
grades K-12), fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch program within the district, a 
dummy for districts that offer classes for secondary grades (grades 7
th
 -12
th), students’ ethnicity and 
race, teachers’ ethnicity and race, a dummy indicating if a district requires high school students to pass 
a state or district assessment to earn high school diploma, log (total revenue), and 2000 decennial 
census locale code of districts. 
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these unions cannot negotiate agency fees and thus may have fewer resources to support their 
activities.36  
As seen in Table 3.1, teachers in Med-CB group take on more second jobs than 
teachers in other groups both during the school year and during the summer. This suggests 
that more teachers in Med-CB group may be forced to take multiple jobs to make ends meet. 
It is also possible that teachers unions in the Med-CB may use their bargaining power on 
other outcomes that would substitute for salaries. Thus, having pro-bargaining laws is not a 
sufficient condition to affect teachers’ base salaries. Initially, I expected that the union effects 
on pay would be proportional to the strength of the legal framework for unionization; highest 
in the High-CB group and declining uniformly to Med-CB, Low-CB, and No-CB group. Yet, 
Table 3.4 shows that the estimated union effects do not differ between Med-CB, Low-CB, and 
No-CB groups, although High-CB group has the strongest union effects on base salaries. 
Turning to my two other measures of unionization, union membership and union density are 
still positively associated with base salaries after controlling for the difference in legal 
environment. In the SASS 2007-2008 of Table 3.4, column (2) shows that union members 
earn 2.6 percent more than non-members on average regardless of the legal environment 
towards teachers unions. The SASS 2003-2004 dataset also shows similar pattern with the 
results from SASS 2007-2008. In sum, the legal environment is important, but it does not 
explain all of the union effects.  
Table 3.5 adds two additional factors to the regressions of teachers pay on the 
indicators of unionism: state dummies and district’s financial status measured by log 
(district’s total revenue). Most previous analyses of the union effects on pay have not included 
                                                          
36 Farber (1984) argues that right-to-work (RTW) results in a free-rider problem for private sector 
unions, which diminish their bargaining power. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) did not find this effect in 
public sector unions. 
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measures of school district financial condition due to the data limitation that does not allow 
researchers to identify the school district in which teachers work. In my study, I find that log 
(district’s total revenue) has a significant relationship with teachers’ base salaries. As we 
initially anticipated, the school districts with better financial status pay their teachers more. 
In column (1) through (3) of Table 3.5, adding districts’ financial information slightly 
reduces the coefficients of group dummies and measures of unionization compared to the 
results for the SASS 2007-2008 in Table 3.4. This implies that the estimates of the union 
effects on pay have suffered from omitted variable bias by ignoring the financial status of 
districts. Since the sign of the omitted variable bias is positive, the correlation between 
unionization and district’s revenue must be positive, which I confirm later in the analysis of 
the relation between teachers unions and districts’ budget. There are two possible 
interpretations of this result; it reflects the selectivity in the districts that unions are able to 
organize, or union activities improve school finances, possibly through teachers’ campaigning 
in local elections and lobbying local governments on issues relating to school budgets. 
The addition of the state dummies considerably reduces the strength of the association 
between unionization and teacher pay.
37
 In column (4) through (10) of Table 3.5, compared to 
no-agreement districts, teachers in collective bargaining districts earn 2.6 percent more and 
teachers in meet-and-confer districts earn 1.8 percent more. Regardless of contract status, 
union members earn 2.2 percent more than non-members, and increasing the district’s density 
by 10 percent is associated with 0.44 percent higher base salaries. The interaction terms 
between collective bargaining and union membership and between collective bargaining and 
                                                          
37  See Table 3A in Appendix III for the comparison between the results with and without state 
dummies. Without state dummies, union effects turn out to be much larger. The effect on base salaries 
of collective bargaining agreement is about 8 percent, membership effect is 7 percent, and density 
effect is almost 17 percent. 
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union density are significantly positive, suggesting that association between union density or 
union membership and teacher pay is stronger in collective bargaining districts than in no-
agreement districts.  
The substantial difference in the estimated union effects on teacher pay between the 
results with and without state dummies displays the complexity of the union effects on teacher 
pay. While it is possible that the OLS model with state dummies gives more valid estimates of 
the union impacts than the model without state dummies, it may focus too much on within-
state variation in which selection bias may be large and in which there may be a substantial 
within-state spillover of pay rate from districts that are unionized to districts that are not 
unionized. Some researchers have examined the spillover effect (or threat effect) of 
unionization on wages within and across industries (Rosen, 1969; Martin and Rence; 1984). 
The models of spillover effect have not been particularly successful, so I do not try to 
differentiate between these two explanations for the impact of state dummies on the analysis.  
I next examine the union effects within different legal environments regarding 
collective bargaining using the variation of unionization in each group. Within each group, I 
use four model specifications: OLS regression, OLS regression with state dummies, 
multilevel mixed-effect models, and propensity score matching. The last two models are 
preferred to OLS regression models as they minimize the bias due to the endogeineity of 
unionism within the same legal environment.  
The results from multilevel model (3) for each group are reported in Table 3.B-1 
through 3B-4 in Appendix III. The multilevel model estimates the between-school variance 
component (  
 ) to be 0.104 and within-school variance component (  
 ) to be 0.221 in High-
CB group, so the intra-class correlation (

 ) is 0.333. This value is quite large, implying that 
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teachers within the same school do not behave independently of one another, and that there 
are unobservable omitted factors in the error term. In all groups, the intra-class correlation is 
sizeable, ranging between 0.25 and 0.33.
38
 Therefore, the estimates from the standard OLS 
regressions will be biased, and the multilevel models that separately estimate the variance 
within and between districts are preferred. The propensity score matching corrects for 
selection bias by finding matches of treated and non-treated units that have the similar 
probability of getting the treatment. Moreover, as seen Table 3.3, more matches are found in 
the higher propensity score strata in High-CB group for example, so it will be appropriate to 
give more weights to these observations, which is done in estimating ATT from propensity 
score matching. Thus, the propensity score matching is also preferred to OLS regression.  
Table 3.6 reports the summary of union wage effects by group and by model 
specification, using four different measures of unionism. The multilevel mixed-effect model 
and propensity score matching present very similar results. The results from the OLS 
regression with state dummies show that both collective bargaining and meet-and-confer 
agreements are positively associated with base salaries in High-CB group, but the results from 
both multilevel model and propensity score matching show that neither collective bargaining 
nor meet-and-confer agreements has positive association with teachers’ base salaries in any 
group. The multilevel models and propensity score matching show that union membership has 
a positive association with base salaries in High-CB group and No-CB group, and the 
estimated coefficients from both models are almost the same. The multilevel models show 
that union density is also significantly related with teachers’ base salaries in the High-CB and 
No-CB group. In those groups, the greater the union density is, the higher the teachers’ base 
                                                          
38
 The Intra-class correlation (

 ) is 0.259 for Med-CB group, 0.253 for Low-CB group, and 0.292 for 
No-CB group. 
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salaries are. In Med-CB group and Low-CB group, however, no wage gains are found from 
union activity.39 
 Taking the results from multilevel mixed-effect models and propensity score matching 
at face value, contractual status has no association with teacher salaries. Spillover effects of 
unionization may explain this. Once the legal settings towards teachers unions are firmly 
established, it may be difficult for no-agreement districts to deviate much from the salary 
level of collective bargaining districts. If they deviate too much during this period, there will 
be more pressure from teachers unions to push for collective bargaining agreements in the 
next period. For the same reason, in the No-CB group, no-agreement districts may feel 
pressure to set their base salary comparable to the salary level of meet-and-confer districts. A 
school district that pays below the pay in the contracts from nearby school districts may be 
unable to attract the teachers it wants, and thus matches the pay in the districts with contracts. 
If this interpretation is correct, the mechanism that underlies the results is the classical market 
force and the pressure for a single wage for comparable workers in a local labor market. Thus, 
the spill-over effects of contractual status would be stronger within the group than across the 
groups. 
Even when there are no collective bargaining agreements between teachers unions and 
districts, teachers still act collectively through political actions such as campaigning and 
lobbying. Teachers unions can provide more efficient ways to form a collective voice for 
teachers, and having many members in the unions will be critical to achieve their goals. In 
No-CB group, about 50% of teachers still join teachers unions, and the unions have a small 
but significantly positive effect on base salary. Teachers unions possess the power to benefit 
                                                          
39
 Lovenheim (2009) also found that teachers unions had no impact on teacher salaries using the 
Census/Survey of Government data from three Midwestern states, Iowa, Indiana, and Minnesota. 
 143 
their members if they can obtain a high enough density even though the labor law does not 
allow collective bargaining.  
An alternative interpretation concerning the surprising absence of the effect of 
contractual agreements on teacher pay in the Med-CB group and Low-CB group is that the 
unions may provide advantages for their members on issues beyond the base salaries. For 
instance, working conditions and non-wage benefits are also part of the compensation packet, 
and teachers unions surely work hard to improve them. Table 3.7 summarizes the results of 
my analysis of the union effect on these outcome variables by group and by model.  
The columns of Table 3.7 represent the dependent variables for teachers’ 
compensations. The first and the second column shows teachers’ earnings and working 
condition measured by teacher level variables, log (base salaries) and log (number of contract 
days), respectively. The results for teachers’ base salaries are also shown in Table 3.5 and 
Table 3.6. The non-wage benefits are measured by two district level variables; a dummy 
indicating if a district offers defined-contribution retirement plan and a dummy indicating if a 
district pays funds into the defined-contribution retirement plan. The first and the second 
panel of Table 3.7 present the effect of union membership and the effect of union density on 
outcome variables, respectively, by group. The third panel shows the effect of contractual 
status, collective bargaining (CB) and meet-and-confer (MC), on outcome variables by group. 
I use multilevel mixed-effect models for earnings and working condition, 
40
 but use OLS 
regressions with state dummies for non-wage benefits because they are only available at 
district level where neither the multilevel model nor propensity score matching is applicable. 
                                                          
40 I record the estimates from multilevel model for group analysis mainly because propensity score 
matching does not allow me to utilize union density measure as it is not a binary treatment variable. 
As both methods produce similar estimates, this would not affect main results. 
 144 
For the general analysis using all 50 states on all dependent variables, I use OLS regressions 
with state dummies.   
The general analysis in Table 3.7 shows that unionism is positively associated 
teachers’ compensation, which is represented by the significantly positive coefficients of all 
measures of unionism in each panel. When I disaggregate the data by group, however, I find 
that teachers unions have different effects in different legal settings. The mechanisms through 
which unions influence teachers’ compensations greatly differ such that there is no universal 
union effect that can be applied to all legal environments.  
 
Table 3.7: The Summary of the Effect of Union Membership, Union Density, Collective 
Bargaining, and Meet-and-Confer on Teacher Compensation, by Group 
 
SASS 2007-2008 
 
Dependent Variables: Log(Base Salary), Log(Contract Days), Dummy for Districts providing 
DC retirement plan, and a dummy for Districts contributing funds to DC retirement plan 
 
Group 
Teacher level dependent variable
T 
District level dependent variable
D 
ln(base salary) ln(contract days) 
Districts has DC 
retirement plan 
Districts 
contributes funds  
Panel 1. Effect of Union Membership by Group 
All States .022(.005)*** .001(.004)   
High-CB group .064(.017)*** -.003(.013)   
Med-CB group .008(.006) -.004(.005)   
Low-CB group .011(.007) -.001(.008)   
No-CB group .016(.007)*** .001(.007)   
Panel 2. Effect of Union Density by Group 
All States .044(.012)*** -.014(.009) .03(.043) .047(.04) 
High-CB group .104(.034)*** -.01(.015) .092(.094) -.04(.07) 
Med-CB group -.007(.016) -.03(.012)** .008(.039) .074(.058) 
Low-CB group -.013(.018) -.008(.014) -.047(.082) .129(.006)** 
No-CB group .037(.016)** -.02(.011)* .003(.133) .046(.074) 
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Table 3.7: The Summary of Effect of Union Membership, Union Density, Collective 
Bargaining, and Meet-and-Confer on Teacher Compensation, by Group (Cont.) 
 
Group 
Teacher level dependent variable
T 
District level dependent variable
D 
ln(base salary) ln(contract days) 
Districts has DC 
retirement plan 
Districts 
contributes funds  
Panel 3:  Effects of Collective Bargaining (CB) and Meet-and-Confer (MC) by Group 
All States 
CB .026(.011)** -.017(.006)*** .068(.04)* .081(.042)* 
MC .018(.008)** -.001(.006) .006(.034) .073(.039)* 
High-CB group 
CB .032(.045) -.024(.014)* .156(.093) .126(.074) 
MC .036(.048) -.009(.014) .06(.120) .217(.073)*** 
Med-CB group 
CB -.019(.015) .003(.011) .019(.052) .119(.074) 
MC -.005(.018) .007(.011) .028(.069) .147(.04)*** 
Low-CB group 
CB -.018(.015) -.038(.016)* -.034(.11) .242(.162) 
MC .014(.011) .006(.008) -.028(.034) .023(.067) 
No-CB group 
CB NA NA NA NA 
MC -.025(.011) -.02(.012) .126(.052)** -.061(.129) 
Note: Errors are clustered within states for OLS models and clustered within schools for multilevel 
model. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
T
For teacher level dependent variables, SASS district-teacher matched dataset is used.  
Analysis for All states: Weighted OLS regressions with state dummies.  
Analysis for High-CB, Med-CB, Low-CB, and No-CB: Multilevel mixed effect models are used. 
Control variables for SASS district-teacher matched dataset: gender, ethnicity, race, a dummy for full-
time teachers, a dummy for secondary schools (grades 7th -12th) teachers, experience, experience
2
, 
interaction between experience and gender and between experience
2
 and gender, education level, 
teaching subjects, school program types, log (number of days in the school year), log (total students 
enrollment of grades K-12), fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch program, 
students’ ethnicity and race, log (revenue), log (CWI), and 11 urban-centric locality codes of school 
districts. 
D
For district level dependent variables, SASS district level dataset is used. Weighted OLS regressions 
with state dummies are used. 
Control variables for SASS district level dataset: log (revenue), log (CWI), a dummy variable indicating 
if a district requires high school students to pass a state or district assessment to earn high school 
diploma, log (total student enrollment grades K-12), fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch program, log (number of school days), a dummy for district offering classes to secondary 
grades (7th -12th), students’ ethnicity and race, teachers’ ethnicity and race, and 7 dummies for census 
district locale codes. 
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Panel 1 summarizes the estimates of union membership premium in teachers’ earnings 
and working condition by group. In the first column, the estimate of coefficient and standard 
errors for all states shows that union membership status has a significantly positive 
relationship with teachers’ base salaries. On average, union members earn higher earnings 
than non-members by 2.2 percent. The High-CB group shows the strongest association 
between union membership and teachers’ earnings, and the union membership premium is 
6.4%. The No-CB group also shows small but significantly positive association between the 
two. In the Med-CB and Low-CB group, there is no union membership premium. The second 
column shows that union membership status has no association with the number of contract 
days, regardless of the group.  
The panel 2 presents the effects of union density on teachers’ compensations. For 
teachers’ base salaries, union density premium shows similar pattern with union membership 
premium. Union density is positively associated with base salaries in the High-CB and the 
Low-CB group, and the magnitude of the association is about three times greater in the High-
CB than in the No-CB group. Union density is associated with the reduction of the number of 
contract days in the Med-CB and the No-CB group by 2-3 percent. The average contract days 
are 180 days per year, so this is equivalent to 4-5 days of reduction in contract days or 4-6 
percent increase in salaries per working day. Although union density has no relation with the 
probability of districts providing defined-contribution retirement plan in any group, it is 
strongly associated with the probability of districts with paying funds into the retirement plan 
in the Low-CB group. It suggests that in the Low-CB group, unions care more about how the 
defined-contribution retirement plan is funded by the employers than teachers’ base salaries.  
 147 
The effects of contractual status on teachers’ compensation are presented in the panel 
3 of Table 3.7. As shown in Table 3.5, there exist a CB premium and a MC premium in 
teachers’ base salaries if we focus on the estimates from the general analysis. Compared to 
no-agreement districts, teachers in collective bargaining districts earn 2.6 percent more and 
teachers in meet-and-confer districts earn 1.8 percent more. However, no such premium exists 
in each group. For other types of teachers’ compensation, the story is rather complex. There is 
a CB premium in the number of contract days, and it is the largest in the Low-CB group. In 
the Low-CB group, teachers covered by CB have 4% less contract days or equivalently 7 days 
compared to teachers covered by no agreement.  
The general analysis for two dummy variables representing non-wage benefits show 
that CB provides an important channel to affect the probability that districts engage in 
teachers’ defined-contribution retirement plan. However, the group analysis reveals that MC 
plays more significant role than CB. In the No-CB group, districts that are covered by MC 
have higher probability to provide defined-contribution retirement plan to their teachers 
compared to districts covered by no agreement by 12.6 percentage points. In the High-CB and 
Med-CB group, the probability that districts pay funds into a defined-contribution retirement 
plan is significantly higher in MC districts compared to no-agreement districts by 22 and 15 
percentage points, respectively. Therefore, it seems that MC is the key mechanism through 
which unions influence teachers’ non-wage benefits. This result explains why some school 
districts may go for MC agreements rather than CB agreement in states that also allows CB of 
teachers.  
I show that teachers unions have multiple potential pathways for improving teachers’ 
well-being beyond teacher salaries. If they do not raise salaries, they increase working 
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conditions and/or non-wage benefits. Union membership and union density are more 
important mechanisms for unions influencing teachers’ earnings than the contractual status. 
For working conditions and non-wage benefits, union density and contractual status is more 
relevant channel for union effects. Especially, I find that MC has stronger associations with 
teachers’ non-wage benefits than CB does. 
Table 3.8 examines the existence of compensating differentials between teachers’ 
earnings and working condition by group. Teachers who earn more in base salaries work for 
longer contract days. For example, in High-CB group, increasing the base salaries by 10 
percent is associated with 0.7 percent longer contract days, which is equivalent to 
approximately 1.3 days. Teachers in High-CB group face more favorable trade-offs than 
teachers in Low-CB group as a 10-percent-increase in base salaries is associated with a 2.5 
day-increase in contract days in the Low-CB group. Teachers in No-CB group face no trade-
offs between salaries and working conditions, perhaps because the relationship between 
teachers unions and both earnings and working conditions are quite small. The trade-offs are 
also found between base salaries and non-wage benefits. Districts that pay higher base salaries 
have a lower probability of offering defined-contribution retirement plans to teachers than the 
districts that pay lower base salaries. 
 In sum, collective bargaining is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
teachers unions to affect teachers’ working lives. Teachers unionize even where collective 
bargaining is prohibited, and they gain modest wage premium for members. Teachers in the 
districts with collective bargaining agreements do not necessarily earn higher salaries than 
teachers in districts with no agreement. The union effects on outcome variables vary in 
different legal settings, and the mechanisms through which teachers unions influence 
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outcomes also differ by group, which shows that it is precarious to generalize the relation 
between the unions and outcomes in one legal setting to another.
41
  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
 One of the big challenges in studying public sector unionism is to obtain measures of 
collective bargaining status and the strength of a union in or out of collective bargaining. I 
used the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) to construct a multilevel dataset of school 
districts, schools, and teachers. I combined this dataset with the Comparable Wage Index 
(CWI) data, which allowed me to control for geographic variation in cost of living, 
amenity/disamenity, and other unobservable labor market characteristics. By merging the data 
of districts’ financial status from the School Districts Finance Survey to the SASS multilevel 
dataset and the CWI, I created a district-teacher matched dataset for U.S. public schools.  
 Some of my findings run counter to the standard story of labor unions. The surprising 
findings that have emerged from my empirical analysis are that: i) about half of teachers 
joined teachers unions in even districts where collective bargaining was not allowed, and 
union members gained a modest wage premium in those districts, ii) a meet-and-confer 
agreement, which many viewed as a relic of the past, had continued to play an important role 
for teachers unions and had positive association especially with teachers’ non-wage benefits, 
iii) teachers in districts with collective bargaining agreements did not invariably receive 
                                                          
41 This result also implies that the external validity of an experimental study for union effects in one 
legal environment may be weak. 
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higher base salaries than teachers in the districts that have no agreement with teachers 
unions
42
.  
Using multilevel mixed-effect models and propensity score matching, I found that 
teachers unions behaved in different ways in different legal settings. Whereas the contractual 
status between school districts and teachers unions had no association with teachers’ base 
salaries within each group, union membership and density had a positive association with 
base salaries in High-CB group and No-CB group. In Med-CB group and Low-CB group, 
teachers unions did not bring any wage gain from union activities. In all groups, however, 
teachers unions are associated with better working conditions (smaller number of contract 
days) and/or greater non-wage benefits (higher probability that districts offer defined-
contribution retirement plans to teachers or with the probability that employer pay funds into 
the retirement plans). Finally, I found the trade-offs between teacher salaries and other kinds 
of compensations. The trade-offs between the salaries and other types of compensations was 
more favorable for teachers in High-CB group than in Low-CB group as teachers in Low-CB 
group were required to forgo larger salaries to enjoy the same working conditions as teachers 
in High-CB group.  
In the debate over the collective bargaining of public sector workers, both the pro-
collective bargaining and the anti-collective bargaining forces seem to believe that the 
bargaining is the be-all and end-all for public sector unions. My analysis rejects this 
proposition. The legal environments and contractual status are important for teachers unions 
to influence teachers’ lives, but unions organize with or without bargaining power as the 
“freedom of assembly” asserts. Furthermore, teachers unions manage to find ways to affect 
                                                          
42 Underpinning this result was the finding that teachers unions in districts with collective bargaining 
laws but without agency fees failed to have any significant wage effect. 
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teachers’ well-being even under the most hostile legal environments. Therefore, broadening 
the perspective towards unionism beyond collective bargaining is essential to fully understand 
how unions behave and operate in the public sector. 
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Chapter 4: Reevaluation of the Role of Teachers Unions on Teacher Pay Structure and 
School Districts’ Financial Status 
 
This paper reevaluates the role of teachers unions on teachers’ pay structure and school 
districts’ financial status, using dataset based on the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) and 
School Districts Finance Survey for 2007-2008. In contrasts to previous findings on unionism, 
I find that the variance of teachers’ earnings is higher in more unionized settings. The positive 
association between earning variance and unionism is mainly because the increased variance 
from more credentials-based pay structure dominates the reduced variance from less merit-
based pay. Moreover, I find that teachers unions play a larger role in raising more revenue 
than increasing expenditure of school districts. Therefore, unlike common beliefs that teachers 
unions weaken financial soundness of school districts, my study shows that the financial 
status of school districts with teachers unions is stronger than that of districts without the 
unions. 
 
Key words: collective bargaining, meet-and-confer, agency fees, income inequality, 
performance pay system, budget deficit 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
 Labor unions have been the subject of debate and dispute for a long time.  Ever since 
the publication of Richard Freeman and James Medoff’s What Do Unions Do? in 1984, the 
issues in the book have been greatly discussed in the labor economics. Although most studies 
agree that the purpose of unions to improve workers’ well-being, how union affect workers 
compensation and other working conditions or whether the union effects are good or bad for 
social outcomes still remain controversial. In the meantime, some topics are being overlooked 
because many believe the role of unions in those fields is well understood or the lack of 
reliable data makes it difficult to study union effects in those topics. In this study, I focus on 
two of these subjects; the role of unions on the employees’ pay structure and employers’ 
financial status.  
 Unions historically reduce inequality in the distribution of earnings (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984; Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Dinardo and Lemieux, 1997). According to these 
studies, unions have diminished the individual variation in wages by standardizing the pay 
rate among workers with similar levels of work experience, seniority, and skill. Studies using 
the panel data for individuals or cross-countries showed that the unionism reduced the income 
inequality in the public sector (Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996; Lemieux, 1992; Riddell, 
1992). Using the CPS data between 1973, 1974, and 1993, Card (2001) also found that 
increased unionism substantially reduced the wage inequality for both male and female 
workers within the public sector. According to his estimation, the wage variance would have 
risen by 30-40 percent in the absence of unions in the public sector.  
 160 
 Wage inequality is closely related to performance-based pay system, and it is 
commonly believed that unions dislike performance pay system. Teachers unions, for 
example, often oppose bonus payments system on the basis of the academic performance of 
students. (Uzell 1983; Brandt 1990). Gregg and Machin (1988) found that, on average, the 
performance linked pay schemes are less likely to be present if an establishment has a strong 
union rather than a weak one. Lemieux, Macleod, and Parent (2009) showed that incidence of 
performance pay has been growing more among nonunion workers than among union 
workers. However, Ballou and Podgursky (1994, 1997) challenged the widely held belief that 
most teachers are against performance pay system.  For example, Ballou and Podgursky found 
that Black and Hispanic teachers tend to support pay for performance (1994), and most 
teachers favor additional pay based on performance as an opportunity to speed up the 
promotion (1997). Therefore, whether the preference of unions towards performance pay 
system is actually translated into the pay structure remains controversial.  
 Many critics of public sector unions have claimed that collective bargaining added to 
government’s budget deficits by asking for higher compensations for employees, which 
caused or worsened the financial crisis of government. However, the empirical evidence on 
this issue is equivocal. Freeman and Ichniowski (1988) suggested that public sector collective 
bargaining could have some adverse effects on state or local budgets. Card, Lemieux, and 
Riddell (2004) showed that unions reduce wage inequality among male workers, but not 
among female workers. Allegretto et al. (2011) showed that the increase in budgetary problem 
after financial crisis was not due to the collective bargaining of public sector employees but 
mainly due to the fall in the housing prices. Freeman and Han (2012) found that states with 
more favorable legal environments towards collective bargaining of public sector employees 
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had slightly larger budget deficits than states that do not allow collective bargaining, but the 
results were sensitive to model specifications. They also found that some states that forbid 
collective bargaining of public sector employees were among those with the largest budget 
deficits.  
 Building on these studies, my research evaluates common beliefs about the unions in 
the public sector. Using the dataset in the educational sector, the School and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) for 2003-2004 and 2007-2008, I investigate whether teachers unions reduce income 
inequality, whether they result in low rate of implementation of performance pay system, and 
whether they worsen the financial condition of their employers. Motivated from Han (2012), 
which showed that the absence of financial information of school districts resulted in the 
omitted variable bias in the estimated union effects, this study uses a unique dataset that 
merges different sources of data to utilize the information on school districts’ economic status 
in addition to general characteristics of school districts.  
 In contrast to the findings of previous literature on unions, my study shows that 
teachers unions are associated with higher variance of teacher salaries as the salary structures 
is based more on objective credentials, which tend to raise the income variance, and less on 
performance pay system, which tends to lower the income variance. Moreover, my data on 
financial information of school districts rejects the conventional wisdom that public sector 
unions deteriorate employers’ financial status. Rather, I show that unionism is associated with 
stronger financial standing of school districts, measured by district’s total budget. I find that 
teachers unions play a greater role in raising districts’ total revenue per student than raising 
districts’ total expenditure per student.  
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4.2 Legal Settings for Teachers Unions 
 
 The legal environments for public school teachers differ greatly by state. Followed by 
Han (2012), I categorize states into four groups by two legal criteria: the legal status of 
collective bargaining and of the agency shop for public school teachers. Table 4.1 shows the 
group classification of 50 states using these legal criteria. The “High-CB” group contains 23 
states that have compulsory collective bargaining laws and allows unions and employers to 
negotiate mandatory agency fees for workers who do not join the unions.
43
 The “Med-CB” 
group contains 11 states that have compulsory collective bargaining laws but bans mandatory 
agency fees. Thus, non-members in the Med-CB group do not pay the unions dues even 
though they are covered by collective bargaining. The “Low-CB” group consists of 9 states 
that allow collective bargaining to happen but does not require employers to bargain with 
unions. The “No-CB” group consists of 7 states that outlaw collective bargaining by public 
sector workers. The group categorization reflects the strength of the legal settings towards 
unions in a descending order, ranging from the most favorable (the High-CB group) to the 
most hostile (the No-CB group) legal environment for collective bargaining of public sector 
unions. 
 All unions and school districts, except in the No-CB group, can sign collective 
bargaining agreements (CB). These agreements determine teacher pay and conditions of work 
environment, and the outcomes are legally binding. In all states, including the No-CB group, 
districts and unions can choose the alternative option to collective bargaining, called “meet-
and-confer (MC)”. During meet-and-confer, teachers unions and school districts exchange 
                                                          
43 The ‘compulsory’ bargaining laws do not imply that laws automatically establish the bargaining 
agreement between employers and employees in the public sector, regardless of workers’ preferences. 
The collective bargaining is mandated only when the majority of employees favor it. 
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information, opinions, and proposals to reach a resolution on matters within the scope of 
representation prior to the adoption by the districts of its final budget for the ensuing year. 
However, unlike the collective bargaining agreements that produce legally binding contracts 
at the end of the meeting, the outcomes of meet-and-confer agreements are generally legally 
unenforceable.  
 In some school districts, even in the High-CB and the Med-CB group that have 
mandatory collective bargaining laws, there is no agreement between teachers unions and 
school districts. In this case, teachers are covered by neither collective bargaining nor meet-
and-confer agreement. In the No-CB group, the majority of school districts have no agreement 
with teachers unions, and meet-and-confer is the only available agreement option between 
teachers unions and districts. 
 
Table 4.1: Legal Environments for Collective Bargaining of Public School Teachers 
 
Group Definition States 
High-CB 
States that have 
compulsory CB laws 
and allow agency 
fees 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington, Wisconsin 
Med-CB 
States that have CB 
laws but prohibit 
agency fees 
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee 
Low-CB 
States that do not 
have CB laws but 
allow CB 
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming 
No-CB 
States that ban CB 
of public sector 
workers 
Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas, Virginia 
Source: “Teacher Monopoly, Bargaining, and Compulsory Unionism, and Deduction Revocation 
Table”, National Right to Work Foundation (2010) 
 
 164 
4.3 Data 
 
 The primary data source I use is from the 2007-2008 Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) administered by National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
44
 The SASS data is 
multilevel; the information is obtained from the questionnaires at teacher, school, and school 
district level. The school district questionnaire asks about the contractual status between 
districts and teachers unions (i.e. if a school district has collective bargaining agreement, 
meet-and-confer agreement, or no agreement at all with the unions). The teacher 
questionnaire asks if a respondent is a member of teachers unions (or association similar to 
unions). I compute the union density by district using this information on union membership 
status of individual teacher and utilize it as an additional measure for unionization of teachers. 
In the SASS district data, there are about 4,600 school districts which covers a third of the 
U.S. public school districts.  
 I also use the Comparable Wage Index (CWI) from the NCES. The CWI, developed 
by Taylor and Fowler (2006), measures the regional variations in the salaries of college 
graduates in non-educational sector. The CWI measures the salaries of occupations that are 
comparable to teaching in the local labor market using baseline estimates from the 2000 U.S. 
census and annual data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment 
Survey. The CWI is available at school district level, so it provides the mean for 
geographically appropriate comparisons for locality differences in cost of living and other 
labor market conditions that can otherwise contaminate comparisons due to unobservable 
                                                          
44 I also examine the 2003-2004 wave of the SASS. Since there was little change in the collective 
bargaining status of school districts between 2003-2004 and 2007-2008, I use the 2003-2004 data for a 
sensitivity analysis for my 2007-2008 results rather than pooling it with the 2007 data to exploit 
changes over time in panel data. 
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factors in the local labor market. The CWI is also an appropriate measure of the opportunity 
cost of being a teacher over finding a non-teaching career in teachers’ school district.45 
 The final data source is the School Districts Finance Survey (SDFS) from Education 
Finance Statistics Center (EDFIN) of NCES. SDFS has detailed annual fiscal data on public 
elementary and secondary education for every school district in the U.S. This data provides 
valuable information on both the revenue and the expenditure of each school district. I merge 
information from the SDFS and CWI with the SASS district data to create the master dataset 
of school districts for 2007-2008. After the merge, the sample in my master dataset includes 
about 3,800 school districts. For the sensitivity analysis, I also utilize another dataset which 
merged 2003-2004 SASS with 2003 CWI and 2003 SDFS in the same way I used to create 
the master dataset for 2007-2008.  
 Table 4.2 provides some key statistics from the dataset grouped by the legal 
environment for teachers unions. The majority of school districts in the High-CB group and 
the Med-CB group are covered by collective bargaining agreements. In the Low-CB group, 
collective bargaining of teachers unions is allowed, but more school districts have meet-and-
confer with teachers unions than collective bargaining. In the No-CB group, most school 
districts have no agreement with the unions, but many districts are covered by meet-and-
confer agreements. Union density of each state is calculated using teachers’ union 
membership status from the SASS teacher level data. Approximately 90 % of teachers are 
unionized in the High-CB group. The union density in the Med-CB group and Low-CB group 
                                                          
45 The basic idea is that all workers will ask for higher wages in areas with a higher cost of living or 
with lack of amenities. If non-teachers have similar age, educational background, and preference for 
amenities, the CWI can be used to measure the uncontrollable component of variations in the wages 
paid to educators. The CWI predicts that Atlanta teachers in metro areas should also be paid 5 percent 
more than the national average teacher wage, if accountants in the Atlanta metro areas are paid 5 
percent more than the national average accountant wage, for example. 
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is very similar even though the former group has mandatory collective bargaining laws and 
the latter group does not. More than 60% of teachers are unionized in both groups, but more 
than 80% of teachers are covered by collective bargaining in the Med-CB group. This implies 
that there are many free-riders, mainly due to the fact that agency fees are not allowed in this 
group. In the No-CB group, collective bargaining is banned, but about half of teachers still 
join the unions.  
 Most school districts require a state or district assessment for high school graduation 
in the No-CB group. The number of instruction in major subjects required for high school 
graduation is also the greatest in the No-CB group. This suggests that the No-CB group set 
stricter standard for high school graduation compared to other groups do. The number of days 
in the normal contract year is the smallest but the salary schedule is the highest for teachers in 
the High-CB group. The fraction of districts rewarding teachers for excellence in teaching is 
much higher in the No-CB group than in the High-CB group. More school districts offer 
group life insurance and retirement plan in the Low-CB and the No-CB group than in the 
High-CB group. Percent of Hispanic or Black students are the highest in the No-CB group. 
Percent of students with reduced or free-lunch program is also the highest in the No-CB 
group. The CWI, which reflects the cost of living of a school district, is the highest in the 
High-CB group and the lowest in the Med-CB group. I measure the financial status of each 
state by the average of school districts’ budget (total revenue – total expense of school 
districts) divided by the total revenue of school districts. On average, there exist greater 
budget deficits in the Low-CB group and the No-CB group than in the High-CB group and the 
Med-CB group. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics by Group 
SASS School District Data, 2007-2008 
 
 High-CB Med-CB Low-CB No-CB 
# of districts with  meet-and-confer agreement 
(MC) 
190 150 190 90 
# of districts with collective bargaining agreement 
(CB) 
1,790 760 70 0 
# of districts with no agreement (NA) 150 150 440 620 
Union density 0.89 0.65 0.63 0.47 
% of districts with state or district assessment 
requirement for high school graduation 
58.7 40.7 34.8 95.2 
# of years of instruction required for high school 
graduation for the field of  
    
English 
3.94 
(.31) 
3.97 
(.26) 
3.91 
(.31) 
3.99 
(.19) 
Mathematics 
2.88 
(.61) 
2.89 
(.57) 
3.26 
(.66) 
3.30 
(.54) 
Computer science .41 (.57) .57 (.68) .50 (.61) .69 (.65) 
Social studies 
3.20 
(.58) 
3.07 
(.55) 
3.24 
(.54) 
3.38 
(.57) 
Physical or biological science 
2.59 
(.65) 
2.65 
(.65) 
2.99 
(.72) 
2.89 
(.62) 
Foreign language .46 (.77) .38 (.74) .40 (.73) .81 (.94) 
Days in the normal contract year for a teacher 187 (26) 189 (26) 190 (28) 194 (30) 
Yearly base salary schedule ($) for teachers with     
BA with no teaching experience 
35,540 
(5,630) 
30,650 
(3,110) 
33,090 
(3,840) 
33,590 
(4,200) 
BA with 10 years of teaching experience 
47,780 
(9,230) 
36,728 
(4,106) 
39,670 
(4,920) 
40,180 
(4,200) 
MA with no teaching experience 
39,200 
(6,080) 
33,180 
(3,190) 
36,550 
(4,420) 
36,170 
(4,350) 
MA and 10 years of teaching experience 
53,740 
(10,100) 
40,960 
(4,910) 
44,000 
(5,830) 
43,650 
(4,830) 
% of districts rewarding excellence in teaching 5.15 8.15 6.46 20.48 
% of districts offering     
general medical Insurance 99.16 98.48 97.85 98.74 
dental insurance 91.57 79.81 84.36 88.92 
group life insurance 84.50 80.47 91.54 93.13 
defined-benefit (DB) retirement plan 85.77 84.55 93.11 90.04 
defined-contribution (DC) retirement plan  67.7 67.2 73.03 69.85 
% of districts paying funds into DC plan 36.1 50.54 47.21 36.0 
% of Hispanic students 13.11 10.45 6.63 16.66 
% of Black students 10.58 8.25 16.46 28.49 
% of Asian students 5.32 1.76 1.27 1.84 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics by Group (Cont.) 
 
 High-CB Med-CB Low-CB No-CB 
% of students with free or reduced lunch 37.40 39.71 44.05 50.91 
% of large/mid-size city and urban fringe 57.12 26.07 32.16 40.8 
Log (Comparable Wage Index) .17 (.14) .02 (.09) .06 (.10) .12 (.11) 
Average ratio of (district’s revenue-district’s 
expense)/ district’s revenue 
-0.003 0.006 -0.028 -0.028 
N 2,130 1,060 700 710 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses 
 
4.4 Empirical Strategies 
 
 I employ weighted OLS regressions to evaluate some of the commonly held beliefs 
about teachers’ unions. The legal environment towards collective bargaining of public sector 
unions has historically evolved over several decades since 1970s to shape the exogenous 
perspective on unionism in each state. Thus, I first utilize the dummy variables for four legal 
groups to measure strength of the unionism to investigate the relationship between legal 
environments toward collective bargaining and outcomes of interest. I also use additional 
measures for unionism; the contractual status (collective bargaining or meet-and-confer 
agreement) between unions an districts and union density of districts. The equations I estimate 
to evaluate these claims are: 
 
Outcomek = 

0 1HighCBk 2MedCBk 3LowCBk 4Densityk 5Xk k   (1) 
 
Outcomek = 

0 1CBk 2MCk 3Densityk 4(CB*Density)k 5(MC*Density)k 6Xk k  (2) 
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where k indicates school district. HighCBk, MedCBk, and LowCBk are the binary variables 
indicating if the k
th
 district belongs to the High-CB group, the Med-CB group or the Low-CB 
group respectively. The No-CB group is the reference group in the analysis. Densityk 
represents the union density of the k
th
 district measured on a scale of 0 to 1. CBk and MCk are 
binary variables indicating if the k
th
 district has collective bargaining or meet-and-confer 
agreement with teachers unions, respectively. No-agreement districts form the reference 
group. X represents the vector of control variables at school district level.
46
 Each regression is 
weighted by school districts’ final weights. As seen in Table 4.2, each group has some 
distinctive characteristics that may be related to both unionism and the outcomes of interest. 
Thus, state dummies are also included in model (2) to reduce omitted variable bias in 
estimating union effects.  
 I also run the separate regression analysis for each group using model (2) to examine if 
the effects of teachers unions vary depending on legal environment towards collective 
bargaining. The estimated union effects may be smaller within each group than across groups 
because the spillover effects of unions are more easily transmitted within the same group 
whose members share the similar legal and cultural view towards unionism.  
 The first claim I evaluate is that teachers unions, like most private and public sector 
unions, compress the pay structure and reduce income inequality. To assess this claim, I 
estimate union wage differentials for the log (minimum teacher salary schedule) and the log 
(maximum teacher salary schedule). If teachers unions compress the pay scale, the strength of 
                                                          
46 These include log (CWI), log (average number of days in the school year), log (student enrollment 
grades K-12), fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch program within the district, a 
dummy for districts that offer classes for secondary grades (grades 7
th
 -12
th), students’ ethnicity and 
race, teachers’ ethnicity and race, a dummy indicating if a district requires high school students to pass 
a state or district assessment to earn high school diploma, log (total revenue), and 2000 decennial 
census locale code of districts. 
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the association between the unions and the minimum salary schedule would exceed the 
strength of association between the unions and the maximum salary schedule. I also examine 
the relation between unionism and the variance of teachers’ base salaries within school 
districts, which is a widely used measure of pay inequality in literature.
47
  
 The second assertion is that teachers unions strongly oppose pay for performance, 
which allows school districts to pay teachers based on some academic performance measures 
of their students. To investigate if this claim has any empirical ground, I use the binary 
variable indicating if a district rewards teachers for excellence in teaching. In Table 4.2, the 
No-CB group has the highest fraction of districts that pay incentives based on their 
performance, so the unconditional mean supports the common belief that teachers unions are 
against the performance pay system. One of the important elements to consider examining the 
role of unions on performance pay system is employers’ economic condition. A school district 
with better financial status would be more likely to compensate high-performing teachers in 
addition to their base salaries than a school district with financial distress. Since my dataset 
contains the information on school districts’ fiscal standing, I can separate out the effect of the 
financial situation of districts from the effect of teachers unions on performance pay system. 
 Lastly, I look into the validity of the claim that public sector unions worsen the 
financial condition of the employers. Many argue that unions increase the public spending 
beyond the financial capacity of the employers. To evaluate this assertion, I use three outcome 
variables; per pupil revenue measured by log (district’s total revenue/number of students), per 
pupil spending measured by log (district’s total expenditure/number of students), and 
district’s total budget, measured by (total revenue–total expenditure)/1,000,000. Unlike the 
                                                          
47
 The minimum salary schedule and maximum salary schedule are provided in district level dataset of 
the 2007-2008 SASS. I calculate the variance of base salaries/10,000 within each district using the 
teacher level dataset from the 2007-2008 SASS, and merge this information to district level dataset. 
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common belief, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.2 show that the Low-CB group 
and the No-CB group have larger budget deficits than the High-CB group and the Med-CB 
group. The regression analysis can confirm if this finding stands even after controlling for 
other relevant variables. 
 
4.5 Results 
 
 Most studies agree that unions tend to reduce income inequality in wage distribution. 
Initially, I have hypothesized that unions would have larger influence on the minimum salary 
schedule than on the maximum salary schedule to attain more compressed income 
distribution. However, I find that teachers unions affect the maximum salary schedule much 
more than the minimum salary schedule. Moreover, unions are associated with a greater 
variance in base salaries, thus with a wider pay structure. The first and the second panel of 
Table 4.3 present the effect of unionism on teachers’ minimum and maximum salary schedule 
respectively. Column (1) shows that the High-CB group has a larger minimum salary 
schedule by 6.2 percent compared to the No-CB group. Column (4) shows that the High-CB 
group also has larger maximum salary schedule compared to the No-CB group but by greater 
magnitude, 16.7 percent, so the gap between the two groups is much greater for the maximum 
salary schedule. Moreover, both union density and contractual status (CB or MC) are 
positively associated only with the maximum salary schedule (see column 5). The third panel 
of Table 4.3 shows that the districts in the High-CB group have larger variance of base 
salaries of teachers and less compact wage distribution than the districts in the No-CB group 
 172 
T
ab
le
 4
.3
: T
he
 E
ff
ec
t o
f T
ea
ch
er
s U
ni
on
s o
n 
th
e 
Pa
y 
St
ru
ct
ur
e 
SA
SS
, 2
00
7-
20
08
 D
is
tri
ct
 L
ev
el
 D
at
as
et
 
W
ei
gh
te
d 
O
LS
 R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
: L
og
(M
in
im
um
 S
al
ar
y 
sc
he
du
le
), 
Lo
g(
M
ax
im
um
 S
al
ar
y 
sc
he
du
le
), 
an
d 
V
ar
ia
nc
e(
B
as
e 
Sa
la
ry
/1
0,
00
0)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
m
in
_s
al
 
m
in
_s
al
 
m
in
_s
al
 
m
ax
_s
al
 
m
ax
_s
al
 
m
ax
_s
al
 
va
r_
sa
l 
va
r_
sa
l 
va
r_
sa
l 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
ig
h-
C
B
 
0.
06
20
**
 
 
 
0.
16
7*
**
 
 
 
76
.7
7*
**
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
31
) 
 
 
(0
.0
50
2)
 
 
 
(1
4.
51
) 
 
 
M
ed
-C
B
 
0.
00
50
 
 
 
-0
.0
03
 
 
 
13
.0
7 
 
 
 
(0
.0
31
3)
 
 
 
(0
.0
44
9)
 
 
 
(9
.0
46
) 
 
 
Lo
w
-C
B
 
0.
03
41
 
 
 
0.
00
29
 
 
 
8.
45
8 
 
 
 
(0
.0
32
0)
 
 
 
(0
.0
49
8)
 
 
 
(1
0.
34
) 
 
 
C
B
 
 
-0
.0
04
2 
 
 
0.
04
70
* 
 
 
12
.6
6 
 
 
 
(0
.0
08
6)
 
 
 
(0
.0
24
9)
 
 
 
(1
2.
21
) 
 
M
C
 
 
0.
00
87
 
 
 
0.
03
16
* 
 
 
20
.2
3 
 
 
 
(0
.0
07
1)
 
 
 
(0
.0
17
8)
 
 
 
(2
0.
20
) 
 
U
ni
on
 d
en
si
ty
 
 
 
-0
.0
02
4 
 
 
0.
05
39
**
 
 
 
28
.1
0*
* 
 
 
 
(0
.0
05
4)
 
 
 
(0
.0
21
7)
 
 
 
(1
1.
76
) 
Lo
g(
re
ve
nu
e)
 
0.
06
6*
**
 
0.
03
8*
**
 
0.
03
8*
**
 
0.
11
2*
**
 
0.
08
6*
**
 
0.
08
5*
**
 
59
.1
8*
**
 
57
.3
9*
**
 
55
.9
4*
**
 
 
(0
.0
18
3)
 
(0
.0
05
9)
 
(0
.0
05
8)
 
(0
.0
23
9)
 
(0
.0
17
1)
 
(0
.0
16
7)
 
(1
8.
04
) 
(1
1.
38
) 
(1
1.
30
) 
St
at
e 
du
m
m
ie
s 
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
3,
70
0 
3,
70
0 
3,
70
0 
3,
70
0 
3,
70
0 
3,
70
0 
3,
65
0 
3,
65
0 
3,
65
0 
A
dj
us
te
d 
R
2 
0.
50
1 
0.
76
3 
0.
76
3 
0.
66
8 
0.
78
0 
0.
78
2 
0.
23
1 
0.
27
6 
0.
26
0 
N
ot
e:
 E
rr
or
s a
re
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 w
ith
in
 st
at
es
 (p
re
se
nt
ed
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
). 
**
* 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
p<
0.
05
, *
 p
<0
.1
 
C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
: l
og
 (C
W
I),
 a
 d
um
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
if 
a 
di
st
ric
t r
eq
ui
re
s h
ig
h 
sc
ho
ol
 st
ud
en
ts
 to
 p
as
s a
 st
at
e 
or
 d
is
tri
ct
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t t
o 
ea
rn
 h
ig
h 
sc
ho
ol
 d
ip
lo
m
a,
 lo
g 
(to
ta
l s
tu
de
nt
 e
nr
ol
lm
en
t g
ra
de
s K
-1
2)
, f
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 st
ud
en
ts
 e
lig
ib
le
 fo
r f
re
e 
or
 re
du
ce
d-
pr
ic
e 
lu
nc
h 
pr
og
ra
m
, 
lo
g 
(n
um
be
r o
f s
ch
oo
l d
ay
s)
, a
 d
um
m
y 
fo
r d
is
tri
ct
 o
ff
er
in
g 
cl
as
se
s t
o 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
gr
ad
es
 (7
th
 -1
2t
h)
, s
tu
de
nt
s’
 e
th
ni
ci
ty
 a
nd
 ra
ce
, t
e a
ch
er
s’
 
et
hn
ic
ity
 a
nd
 ra
ce
, a
nd
 7
 d
um
m
ie
s f
or
 c
en
su
s d
is
tri
ct
 lo
ca
le
 c
od
es
 
 
 173 
does (see column 7), and that union density is positively linked to the wage variance (see 
column 9). District’s total revenue has positive association with salary schedules suggesting 
that districts with better financial status are able to pay teachers more.   
 I repeat the same analysis using SASS 2003-2004 master dataset to check if this story 
is consistent across different time period. Table 4A in Appendix IV reports the results in the 
same format with Table 4.3. The magnitudes of the coefficients of union measures are very 
similar to those from the SASS 2007-2008 master dataset and the signs of the coefficients are 
the same. The High-CB group compared to the No-CB group is positively linked to the 
teacher salary schedule, and more so with maximum salary schedule. Contractual status, both 
CB and MC, lose statistical significance, but union density has larger association with 
maximum salary schedule than with minimum salary schedule. Therefore, as seen from the 
SASS 2007-2008, unionism is positively associated with wage variance.  
 This pattern, however, is not universal across legal environment. I examine the 
relation between unionism and wage variance by legal group using 2007-2008 SASS master 
dataset.  Table 4.4 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for contractual 
status and union density for each group. For each group, first two columns do not include 
state dummies and last two columns add state dummies. The last two columns emphasize 
more in the variation of unionism within the states than the first two columns. Districts 
covered by collective bargaining agreement have larger wage variance relative to districts 
with no agreement in both the High-CB group (see column 1 and 3) and the low-CB group 
(see column 9 and 11). However, in the low-CB group, union density is negatively associated 
with wage variance (see column 10 and 12), so the total effect of unionism on wage 
distribution is unclear. Union density is positively associated in all the other groups, although 
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only the High-CB group shows statistical significance (see column 2 and 4). In sum, as 
opposed to standard understanding, I do not find the evidence that unionism reduces income 
inequality in the educational sector.  
 Table 4.5 presents the evidence that teachers unions are associated with less use of 
performance pay system. Column (1) shows that the No-CB group among all groups is most 
likely to reward their teachers for excellence in teaching. Column (2) adds union density to 
the model, and the coefficients for the High-CB and Med-CB become insignificant. This 
suggests that union density may be the main mechanism for teacher unions to influence the 
implementation of performance pay system. According to column (3), the probability of 
rewarding teachers for excellence in teaching falls by 10 percentage points in the districts 
with collective bargaining agreements compared to districts without any agreement with the 
unions. The probability of rewarding teachers for excellence in teaching is about 6 percentage 
points lower for meet-and-confer districts compared to no-agreement districts. Regardless of 
the contractual status, a 10-percent-increase in union density is associated with the reduction 
of the probability of rewarding teachers for excellence in teaching by 1 percent (see column 
4). In Table 4.2, the No-CB group has the highest rate of rewarding their teachers for 
excellence in teaching, on average. To control for this, I include state dummies in the last two 
model specification only to see the state dummies playing minor role.   
 Table 4B in the Appendix IV replicates the Table 4.5 using 2003-2004 SASS dataset. 
The signs of most coefficients for unionism measures, except for meet-and-confer, are still 
negative, although the statistical significance in many coefficients disappear. In column (2) 
and (4), union density is still negatively associated with the probability of rewarding teachers
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for excellence in teaching. Adding state dummies in column (6) cut the magnitude of the 
coefficient in half, but it seems clear that union density is the key channel for teachers unions 
to affect the performance pay system. Districts with higher union density are less likely to 
implement pay for performance than districts with lower density. 
 The group analysis for the effect of unionism on performance pay system is presented 
in Table 4.6. In the High-CB group, a negative association exists between unionism and 
performance pay system. In column (1) and (3), districts that have collective bargaining or 
meet-and-confer agreements with unions have smaller probability of rewarding teachers for 
excellence in teaching than districts that have no agreement with unions. Column (2) and (4) 
show that union density is negatively associated with pay for performance in the High-CB 
group. The association between unionism and performance pay is weak in the Med-CB group 
and uncertain in the low-CB and the No-CB group. Therefore, districts with stronger 
unionism tend to reject performance pay system, and this is more common for the states that 
have favorable legal environment towards collective bargaining of teachers.  
 Teacher salary schedules are usually determined based on observable credentials such 
as teaching certification status, education level, and seniority. Pay structure mainly based on 
teacher qualification or teaching performance tends to increase the variance in income 
distribution. On the other hand, less use of pay for performance reduces income variance. 
When the increased income variance due to greater use of credentials for pay structure is more 
than the offset by the reduced income variance due to less use of performance pay, the income 
distribution becomes wider. Therefore, teachers unions which object to pay for performance 
are associated with greater income inequality.  
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 Finally, as noted earlier, I find no support in my data that teachers unions are 
detrimental to financial status of their school districts. Recall that the financial status of states, 
measured by the average of school districts’ budget (total revenue – total expense) divided by 
total revenue of districts, was lower in the Low-CB group and the No-CB group that do not 
have collective bargaining laws than in the High-CB group and the Med-CB group that have 
such laws (See Table 4.2). I utilize three variables to capture the financial status of districts; 
log (districts’ total revenue per student), log (districts’ total expenditure per student), and 
districts’ budget/1,000,000. I regress these variables on various union measures using 2007-
2008 SASS data, and Table 4.7 presents the results.  
 I find that there is positive association between unionism and district’ revenue, and 
also between unionism and districts’ expenditure. The first and the second panel of Table 
present the relation between unionism and districts’ revenue/expenditure. In column (1), 
compared to districts in the No-CB group, districts in the High-CB group have larger total 
revenue per student by 13 percent. Column (4) shows that districts in the High-CB group have 
larger total expenditure per student than districts in the No-CB group by 10.8 percent. Thus, 
the positive association is stronger with districts’ total revenue per student than with total 
expenditure per student. Column (2) and (5) show that controlling for state dummies, 
collective bargaining and meet-and-confer agreement are linked with larger districts’ revenue 
and expenditure by similar amounts (11-12 percent). Union density is positively associated 
with both total revenue per student and total expenditure per student, but the association is 
also greater with total revenue per student. The third panel of Table 4.7 reports the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors for union effects on districts’ budget. According to column 
(8), collective bargaining districts or meet-and-confer districts have higher budgets by $2.6 
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million compared to no-agreement districts. Union density is positively associated with the 
size of districts’ financial standing to the extent that a 10-percent-increase in union density is 
linked with about $270,000 increase in districts’ budget. This positive association between 
teachers unions and districts’ financial status might be because teachers unions often lobby for 
larger education revenue so that more resources become available for educators and students.  
 I repeat the same analysis using 2003-2004 SASS master dataset, and Table 4C in 
Appendix IV presents the results. As seen in Table 4.7, the positive association is stronger 
between the unions and log (total revenue per student) than between the unions and log (total 
expenditure per student). Comparing column (2) and (5), we see that collective bargaining 
districts or meet-and-confer districts compared to no-agreement districts have both larger 
revenue and larger expenditure, but more of the revenue than the expenditure. Union density 
is significantly linked to total revenue per student (see column 3), but not to total expenditure 
per student (see column 6). In column (8) and (9), both contractual status and union density 
have positive association with districts’ budgets. Collective bargaining has greater association 
with districts budget than meet-and-confer. The SASS 2007-2008 also shows this pattern, but 
SASS 2003-2004 shows it more clearly. Therefore, districts’ budgets are higher for districts 
with greater unionism. 
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 Table 4.8 shows the results from the group analysis for the union effects on districts’ 
budgets. As seen in Table 4.7, teachers unions have positive association with school districts’ 
budgets for most groups. In the Low-CB group, this association is not clear as the sign of the 
coefficient of collective bargaining is opposite to the sign of the coefficient of union density. 
However, the estimated negative association between collective bargaining and districts’ 
budget loses its statistical significance with the addition of state dummies. This suggests that 
the negative coefficient for collective bargaining may be simply capturing the variation in the 
state-specific heterogeneity of districts’ budget more than measuring union effects on budgets.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
 By combining the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and School Districts Finance 
Survey data for 2007-2008, I created the unique dataset that contains more sophisticated 
measures on unionism of public school teachers and financial information of school districts. 
This dataset allowed me to reevaluate claims being made on teachers unions and their policies 
for teachers’ labor market.  
 Some of my findings are against conventional wisdom about teachers unions, and 
sometimes quite the opposite from the standard story regarding labor unions. Unlike the 
previous studies that showed the negative association between unionism and income 
inequality, I found that the variance of teachers’ earnings were higher in more favorable legal 
environment than in hostile legal environment for unions. I also found that teachers unions 
tend to undermine the probability of implementing performance pay system. Because the 
increased variance from more use of credentials-based pay structure dominated the reduced 
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variance from less use of merit pay system, unionism were positively associated with variance 
of earning for teachers.  
 Teachers unions raised both per pupil revenue and per pupil expenditure of school 
districts, but they raised the revenue more than the expenditure. Collective bargaining districts 
or meet-and-confer districts had higher budgets than no-agreement districts. Union density 
also has positive association with districts’ economic situation. This finding rejects the 
common belief that unions tend to deteriorate employers’ financial status by pushing for 
greater spending beyond the financial capacity of employers. The results from 2007-2008 
SASS dataset are consistent with those of 2003-2004 SASS dataset.  
 My study suggests that the results from previous studies on unions in the public sector 
may not be applicable in more recent period. When school districts face budgetary problems, 
financial information of districts is a critical factor to consider examining union effects. Thus, 
reevaluation of the previous perspectives and understandings towards unionism is an 
important task to fully understand how unions behave and operate after the financial crisis in 
2008. Moreover, it is essential to recognize that collective bargaining is not a necessary 
condition for public sector unions to affect outcomes of interest. Meet-and-confer agreement 
also plays an important role for unions to influence the well-being of employees and 
employers. Union density, regardless of contractual status, is also a significant channel for 
unions to affect school districts’ outcomes. More study is required to comprehend how these 
non-bargaining mechanisms can affect the outcomes of both employees and employers. 
 It is noteworthy that the significance of union effects tends to decrease when I focus 
on each group and run separate analysis within the group of states with the same legal 
environment. This may be because the spillover effects of unions are stronger within legal 
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group or each state than across groups or states. Therefore, it is essential to understand how 
union effects actually spread out beyond their own districts influencing their neighborhood 
districts, although it seems clear that the workers’ voice through the union density plays an 
important channel. 
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Appendix I 
 
Multilevel (Hierarchical) Mixed-Effect Linear Model 
 
 To adjust for the unobservable factors that are shared by the teachers within the same 
school, I use multilevel mixed-effect models that can contain both fixed effects and random 
effects. The mixed-effect model has the following form in matrix notation, 
 

y  XZu              (1) 
 
where y is the n × 1 vector of outcomes, X is an n × p covariate matrix for the fixed effects  , 
and Z is the n × q covariate matrix for the random effects u. The n × 1 vector of error terms, 


, is assumed to be multivariate normal with mean zero and variance matrix 


2R.   is the 
regression coefficient to be estimated, and 

X is the linear predictor of the fixed portion in 
model (1). For the random portion of (1), 

Zu , u is assumed to have variance–covariance 
matrix K, and it is orthogonal to 

 . The total variance matrix is: 
 












R
Ku
Var
20
0

            (2) 
 
 The random effects u are not directly estimated but instead they are characterized by the 
variance components of K. They are estimated along with the overall residual variance ( 2 ) 
and the residual-variance parameters. 
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 Since my data is clustered (i.e. teachers are clustered within schools), I can rewrite 
equation (1) as  
 

y j  X jZ ju j  j              (3) 
 
where j=1, 2,…, M indicate clusters (schools) and jth cluster has nj observations. These 
clusters can be considered as M independent groups, so the random effect 

u j  can be thought 
as M realizations of a q× 1 vector that is normally distributed with mean 0 and Var(uj)= ∑ , a  
q × q variance  matrix. In two-level model, the observation yij is for individual i within cluster 
j, and the individual comprise the first level and clusters comprise the second level of the 
model.  
 In the random intercept model, which I mainly use for the analysis, the random effect 
only works through the intercept and not through the coefficient, so there is only one random 
effect at school level. The only possible covariance structure is the identity matrix (I) so that 
∑= 

u
2I .   
  is called “within-school” estimated variance component and   
  is called 
“between-school” estimated variance component, and I can use these values to estimate the 
intra-class correlation (

 ). Intra-class correlation is a summary of the proportion of the 
outcome variability that is attributable to differences across schools and it is calculated as:  
 
22
2
ˆˆ
ˆ
ˆ





u
u               (4) 
 
which ranges between 0 and 1. When the intra-class correlation is large (close to 1), the 
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within-school variation among teachers is so small that teachers in the same school behave 
almost the same. When the intra-class correlation is small (close to 0), then the teachers 
within the same school are almost independent from each other, and simple OLS regression 
could suffice for the analysis.  
Multilevel models using survey data needs to be dealt with caution. In a standard 
modeling with weights, the sampling weight for teacher i in school j in the two-level sample is 
wij = 1/πij where πij is the probability that teacherij is selected. However, multilevel modeling 
of survey data is different from the standard modeling in that weighted sampling occurs at 
multiple levels in the model, resulting in multiple sampling weights. Therefore, it is not 
enough to just use the single sampling weight (wij), because weights enter into the log 
likelihood at both the school level and the teacher level. I need wj, the inverse of the 
probability that group j is selected in the first stage, and wi|j, the inverse of the probability that 
individual i from group j is selected at the second stage conditional on group j already being 
selected. Thus, I specify two types of weights in both data level (teacher’s final weight and 
school’s final weight). Because wij is unique to group j, the group-to-group magnitudes of 
these weights need to be standardized (normalized) so that they are constant across groups. I 
rescale wij to sum to the cluster size nj. I also tried other rescaling methods, but the estimates 
were quite robust to these rescaling methods.  
In my multilevel dataset, teachers comprise the first level and schools comprise the 
second level of the model, ignoring the district for the moment. The equation for multilevel 
model to measure the effect of union membership on the base salary is: 
 
Log(Salary)ij = 

0 1Memberij 2Xij 3Z j  (u0 j  u1 j Memberij ) ij  
           = 

(0  u0 j ) (1  u1 j )Memberij 2Xij 3Z j  ij     (5) 
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where Memberij represents if teacher i at school j is a member of teachers unions, X is the 
vector of control variables that are measured at individual (teacher) level, and Z is the vector 
of control variable measured at the school level. There are two levels of error terms for each 
teacher. One is at the individual level (

 ij), and the other is at the school level (

u0 j ). The first 
error term 

 ij  is unique to teacher i in school j, assumed to be i.i.d. for all teachers, and 

ij ~ N(o,
2). The other error term 

u j  is unique to school j, and its value is identical for all 
teachers in the j
th
 school to represent the unobserved common experience that all teachers in 
the j
th
 school share. 

u j  is i.i.d. across schools and also assumed 

u j ~ N(o,u
2) . Since all 
teachers in the same school have the same value of the school-level error term (

u j ), the total 
error terms (

ij  u j) in the model are associated across teachers within the same school. 
 The model (5) allows random effects through both random slope (

u1 j ) and random 
intercepts (

u0 j ). The random coefficient assumes that the effect of teachers unions on teacher 
salary may vary from one school to the other. As the fixed intercept model is nested in 
random intercept model, I perform a likelihood ratio test to check if adding random intercept 
of each school improves the fit of the model. In each group of states, the model with random 
intercept was favored over the model with fixed intercept. Thus, I decide to add a school-
specific intercept into the model. After this, I perform another likelihood ratio test to see if 
adding random slope to random intercept model can make a significant improvement in model 
fit, as the random intercept model is nested in random slope combined with random intercept 
model. The model that only has random intercept is favored to the model that has both 
random slope and random intercept in each group. This implies that the random slope is 
unnecessary once I focus on each group of states with the same legal environment towards 
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teachers unions, and I can treat the effect of teachers unions the same for all schools. Thus, 
model (5) becomes simpler as there is now a single coefficient for union membership:  
 
Log(Salary)ij =

(0  u j )1Memberij 2Xij 3Z j  ij      (6) 
 
 The model now has both fixed effect and random effect component, called mix-effect. 
The model estimates a school-specific intercept for each school but a single coefficient for 
each independent variable. The fixed portion of the model,

0 1Unionismij 2Xij 3Z j , 
produces a single regression line representing the population average while the random effect, 

u j , is a shifting factor of this regression line up or down depending on schools. For 
appropriate weighting scheme to deal with survey data, I specify two types of weights in both 
teacher-level and school-level data, and I also standardize the weight for rescaling. As the 
statistical strategy for estimating variance components and fitting the multilevel model, I use 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation.  
 It is noteworthy that I have not considered the district, which is a third-level in my 
dataset. The current weighing and rescaling methods of the statistical analysis with multilevel 
dataset does not support higher level than two-level model, so there is a chance that the 
multilevel mixed-effect model in using the three-level dataset may not correctly define the 
standardized weight. However adding school-specific intercept will still capture the great 
amount of district-level variation especially when we focus on each group. Then, we can think 
of the school-level error term (

u j ) is replaced by a complex of school and district level error 
term (

u jk ), and the total error terms (

ij  u j) is by

ijk  u jk. 
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Appendix II 
 
Propensity Score Matching Model 
 
 To adjust for the selection bias for unionization, I use propensity score matching model. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) defined propensity score as the conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment given pre-treatment characteristics: 
 

p(X) Pr(D 1| X)  E(D | X)         (7) 
 
where D ={0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to treatment and X is the vector of pretreatment 
characteristics. Authors show that if the exposure to treatment is random within cells defined 
by multi-dimensional X, it is also random within cells defined by the values of the propensity 
score,

p(X), which is one-dimensional variable. Two very important assumptions must be 
addressed for propensity score matching.  
 
Assumption 1 The balancing property of pretreatment covariates given propensity score:  
  

DX | p(X) 
 
Assumption 2 Unconfoundedness given propensity score: 
  If 

Y1i,Y0iD | X , then 

Y1i,Y0iD | p(X) 
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 The first assumption implies that observations with the same propensity score must 
have the same distribution of observable characteristics independently of treatment status. In 
other words, for a given propensity score, exposure to treatment is random and on average 
treated and control units should be observationally identical. The second assumption means 
that if the treatment decision is random conditional on the pretreatment observable 
characteristics (selection on observables), then all selection biases due to observable 
covariates can be removed conditional on propensity score.  
Let 

Y1i  and 

Y0i  denote the potential outcome of treated unit and untreated unit, 
respectively. Then, then the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) can be estimated 
once the propensity is given: 
 
    )(,1|1| 0101 iiiiiii XpDYYEEDYYEATT   
    1|)(,0|)(,1| 01  iiiiiii DXpDYEXpDYEE      (8) 
 
 Suppose that teacher i of school j in district k has a propensity score of joining the 
teachers unions (p) as a function of the covariates (X) such that

pijk(x) Pr(Dijk 1| Xijk  x) , 
where D indicates if the teacher joins the unions. I use logit regression to estimate propensity 
score since the treatment status is a binary variable: 
 
Unionijk= 

0 1Xijk  ijk          (9) 
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where X represents the covariates that determine selection into treatment. X can include higher 
order terms of covariates and interactions between the covariates.
48
 The propensity score is 
the predicted value of Union that I get from this regression. For a matching algorithm, I use 
the nearest neighbor (NN) matching based on propensity score. NN matching takes each 
treated unit and search for the control unit with the closet propensity score, so all treated units 
find a match.  
 Following Becher and Ichino (2002), let T be the set of treated units (teachers who are 
members of teachers unions) and C be the set of control units (teachers who are not members 
of teachers unions), and let 

Yi
T  and 

Ym
C  be the base salary of the union-teachers and non-union 
teachers, respectively. Denote by C(i) the set of non-union teachers matched to the union-
teachers i with the estimated propensity score pi. Then, NN matching has sets that are defined 
as 

C(i) min
m
|| pi  pm ||. 
 
                                                          
48 The covariates to estimate the propensity score for union membership in High-CB group are a 
dummy for collective bargaining district and meet-and-confer district, gender, ethnicity, race, a 
dummy for full-time teachers, a dummy for teachers who teach at secondary schools (grades 7
th
- 12
th
), 
teaching experience, experience
2
, interaction between experience and gender and between experience
2
 
and gender, education level, teaching subjects, school program types, log (number of days in the 
school year), log (CWI), log (total students enrollment of grades K-12), fraction of students eligible 
for free or reduced-price lunch program and its squared, fraction of Hispanic student in the district and 
its squared, fraction of black students and its squared, fraction of Asian students and its squared, 
fraction of other race students and its squared. The covariates to estimate the propensity score for 
collective bargaining in High-CB group are union density, log (CWI), log (total student enrollment 
grades K-12), fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch program and its squared, log 
(number of school days) and its squared, years of instruction required 6 major subjects to obtain a 
standard diploma, a dummy for a district offering classes to secondary grades (7th -12th), students’ 
ethnicity and race, teachers’ ethnicity and race, 8 dummies for census district locale codes, and log 
(revenue). The covariates to estimate the propensity score for meet-and-confer in High-CB group are 
union density and its squared, log (CWI), log (total student enrollment grades K-12), fraction of 
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch program, log (number of school days), years of 
instruction required 6 major subjects to obtain a standard diploma, a dummy for a district offering 
classes to secondary grades (7th -12th), students’ ethnicity and race, teachers’ ethnicity and race, 8 
dummies for census district locale codes. Similar sets of covariates are used for other groups. 
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Let 

N i
T  be the number of units in the treated group (number of union-teachers) and

N i
C  
be the number of units in the control units (number of non-union teachers) matched with 
union-teacher i. Control units are given an initial weight proportionate to the number of 
control units that are matched with treated unit, which is then rescaled so that the sum of 
weights equals the number of matched treated units. In the case of matching with 
replacement, weights of control units that were reused are summed across all matches in 
which the control unit was used. Denote 

wim 
1
N i
C
 if 

mC(i)  and 0 otherwise. Then ATT 
estimator from NN matching is:  
 
  
  









Ti Cm
C
mmT
T
iT
Ti iCm
C
mim
T
iT
NN Yw
N
Y
N
YwY
N
ATT
111
)(
    (10) 
 
where 
i
imm ww . 
Estimating variance for ATT estimator should also include the variance from the 
estimation of the propensity score, the imputation of the common support, and etc. I use 
bootstrapping to deal with this problem. Assuming the outcomes across units are independent,  
)( NNATTVar 



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